United States v. Phillips, __ F.3d __, 2005 WL 1459431 (11th Cir. June 22, 2005) (attempted sale of a controlled substance, in violation of state law is a drug trafficking offense for sentencing purposes), agreeing with United States v. Hernandez-Valdovinos, 352 F.3d 1243, 1247, 1249 (9th Cir. 2003).

Ali v. Ashcroft, ___ F.3d ___ (7th Cir. Jan. 11, 2005) (Illinois felony conviction of possession with intent to distribute THC, in violation of Wis. Stat. 961.41(1m)(h)(1), held an aggravated felony under INA 101(a)(43)(B), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(B); argument that THC falls within definition of marijuana and therefore gratuitous distribution of small amount of marijuana does not constitute a felony under federal law not addressed).

United States v. Gonzalez-Roque, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2004 WL 555700 (S.D.N.Y. March 22, 2004), modifying 2004 U.S. Dist. 2004 WL 307260 (S.D.N.Y., Feb. 6, 2004) (New York conviction Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Second Degree, in violation of Penal Law 265.03 is not a crime of violence under USSG 2L1.2, for purposes of a 16-level enhancement of a sentence for illegal reentry).

The Oregon assault statute includes a negligence prong. If a noncitizen has been convicted under this prong, or if the record of conviction isn't clear, it may not be a crime of violence or domestic violence. In United States v. Trinidad-Aquino, 259 F.3d 1140 (9th Cir. 2001), the 9th circuit said that a person cannot negligently "use" force.

United States v. Campos-Fuerte, 357 F.3d 956 (9th Cir. Feb. 04, 2004) (California conviction of fleeing from an officer by driving a vehicle in a willful or wanton manner, in violation of California Vehicle Code 2800.2, constitutes a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. 16(b), and is therefore an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F), INA 101(a)(43)(F), for purposes of enhancing an illegal reentry sentence).
http://caselaw.findlaw.com/data2/circs/9th/0310055p.pdf

Matter of Vargas-Sarmiento, 23 I. & N. Dec. 651, 654 (BIA 2004) (New York conviction of abortion first-degree manslaughter, in violation of Penal Law 125.20(3), does not constitute a crime of violence and is therefore not an aggravated felony for immigration purposes, under INA 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F)(2000)).

Milbin v. Ashcroft, 293 F.Supp.2d 158 (D. Conn. Dec. 2, 2003) (conviction of Conn. General Statute 53a-61, Assault in the Third Degree, with one year suspended sentence, did not constitute an aggravated felony crime of violence under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F)), following Chrzanoski v. Ashcroft, 327 F.3d 188 (2d Cir. 2003).

Matter of Buynovskiy, A71-155-241 - Hartford (unpublished BIA Jan. 13, 2004) (Massachusetts conviction of assault and battery on a public employee, in violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265 Sec. 13D, not a crime of violence aggravated felony, under INA 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F), for immigration purposes).

United States v. Vargas-Duran, 356 F.3d 598 (5th Cir. Jan. 8, 2004) (Texas conviction of intoxication assault - "by accident or mistake, while operating an aircraft, watercraft or motor vehicle in a public place while intoxicated, by reason of that intoxication causes serious bodily injury to another." - in violation of Tex. Penal Code Ann. 49.07 (1994), did not constitute a crime of violence, and so was not an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F), for purposes of a 16-level sentence enhancement for illegal reentry under U.S.S.G.

United States v. Medina-Maella, 351 F.3d 944 (9th Cir. Dec. 10, 2003) (California conviction for lewd or lascivious acts upon a child under the age of 14 years, under California Penal Code 288, constitutes a conviction for a "crime of violence" for purposes of enhancing the sentence for unlawful re-entry into the United States under U.S.S.G. 2L1.2 (2002), even though the offense does not have force as an element; recent amendments to U.S.S.G. 2L1.2 irrelevant).
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data2/circs/9th/0250215p.pdf