United States v. Zamudio, 314 F.3d 517 (10th Cir. 2002) (Utah distribution of marijuana is an aggravated felony offense under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(B), INA 101(a)(43)(B), for sentencing purposes under U.S.S.G. 2L1.2).

Tostado v. Carlson, ___ F.3d ___, 2006 WL 250257 (8th Cir. Feb. 3, 2006) (Illinois felony conviction for the unlawful possession of cocaine and unlawful possession of cannabis, held a drug trafficking aggravated felony, under INA 101(a)(43)(B), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(B), for immigration purposes, even though the offense would have been a misdemeanor if prosecuted in federal court, because "a drug trafficking crime is an offense which would be punishable under 21 U.S.C. 801 et seq., and which would qualify as a felony under either state or federal law."), citing Lopez v.

United States v. Palacios-Suarez, 418 F.3d 692 (6th Cir. Jul. 22, 2005) (Ohio conviction for misdemeanor simple possession of a controlled substance, in violation of Ohio Rev.Code Ann. 2925.11(A), is not an aggravated felony for illegal re-entry sentencing purposes, because the offense is not a felony).

United States v. Palacios-Suarez, 418 F.3d 692 (6th Cir. Jul. 22, 2005) (Kentucky conviction for misdemeanor simple possession of a controlled substance, in violation of Ky.Rev.Stat. Ann. 218A.1415(1), is not an aggravated felony for illegal re-entry sentencing purposes, because the offense is not a felony).

United States v. Amaya-Portillo, 423 F.3d 427 (4th Cir. Sept. 6, 2005) (Maryland conviction of misdemeanor simple possession of cocaine, in violation of Md.Code, Art. 27, 287(e), was not an aggravated felony for sentencing purposes, as the state offense is not a felony, even though the offense was punishable by up to four years imprisonment).

Salazar-Regino v. Trominski, ___ F.3d ___ (5th Cir. June 30, 2005) (Texas deferred adjudication following guilty plea to felony possession of marijuana constituted a conviction for removal purposes under INA 101(a)(48)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(48)(A), even though it did not constitute grounds for removal under the hypothetical federal felony test dictated by the BIA at the time the plea of guilty was entered, because it would only have constituted a misdemeanor if prosecuted in federal court).
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data2/circs/5th/0341492p.pdf

Masok v. Achim, ___ F.3d ___, 2005 WL 1017891 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (Illinois conviction of possession of less than 15 grams of cocaine, in violation of 720 ILCS 570/402(c), which constituted a Class 4 felony under Illinois law, held not convicted of an aggravated felony, under INA 101(a)(43)(B), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(B), because the conviction would not have constituted a felony, but only a misdemeanor, if prosecuted under federal law).

393 F.3d 113 (2d Cir. Dec. 16, 2004) (second conviction for possession of cocaine is an aggravated felony drug offense, since a second possession conviction is a felony under federal law).

Yanez-Garcia v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 280 (7th Cir. Nov. 2, 2004) (dismissing for lack of jurisdiction a petition for review seeking to reverse Board of Immigration Appeals' decision that single possession offense can qualify as aggravated felony drug trafficking crime).

The Davis/Barrett test [historically, and to the extent it survives Matter of Yanez-Garcia, 23 I. & N. Dec. 390 (BIA 2002)] applies both to the "illicit trafficking" prong I of the aggravated felony definition contained in 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(B), and the "drug trafficking crime" prong II of this definition: The Board's previous decisions, Matter of Davis, supra, and Matter of Barrett, supra, essentially established a two-pronged test ("Davis/Barrett test") for determining whether a state drug offense qualifies as an aggravated felony under section 101(a)(43) of the Act.