United States v. Calderon-Pena, 339 F.3d 320 (5th Cir. July 17, 2003)(Texas conviction of child endangerment, in violation of Texas Penal Code § 22.041(c), would not on its face constitute a crime of violence under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F), INA § 101(a)(43)(F), for purposes of illegal-reentry sentence enhancement under U.S.S.G.

United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 335 F.3d 793 (8th Cir. July 14, 2003) (Utah conviction of automobile homicide, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-207(1), held to be a crime of violence for purposes of illegal reentry 16-level sentence enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1), since the Utah offense has as an element the use of physical force against another, irrespective of the predicate offense's mens rea element; no argument made that specific offense of conviction did not require use of force).

United States v. Bonilla-Montenegro, 331 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. June 9, 2003) (California conviction of voluntary manslaughter, in violation of Penal Code § 192(a), held to be a "crime of violence" aggravated felony, under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F), for purposes of enhancing illegal reentry sentence under USSG § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A), even though the elements of the offense do not require intentional use of force, because it is listed in the Guideline).

United States v. Bonilla-Montenegro, 331 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. June 9, 2003)(California conviction of voluntary manslaughter, constitutes a crime of violence for purposes of a 16-level illegal reentry sentence enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 21.2(b)(1)).
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data2/circs/9th/0250141p.pdf

Le v. Attorney General, 196 F.3d 1352 (11th Cir. 1999), affd United States v. Rubio, 317 F.3d 1240 (11th Cir. 2003) (Fla. Stat. Ann. 316.193(3) (1996), driving under the influence with serious bodily injury is a crime of violence and an aggravated felony for deportation purposes under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F), INA 101(a)(43)(F)).

Chery v. Ashcroft, ___ F.3d ___ (2d Cir. 2003) (Conn.G.S 53a-71 conviction for consensual sexual intercourse with a person under age 18 (statutory rape) is a crime of violence and aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F), for immigration purposes, even though no harm actually done to 14-year-old victim, since offense involves a substantial risk that physical force might be used against the victim in the course of committing the offense)
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1069170401061

United States v. Bonilla-Montenegro, 331 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. June 9, 2003) (voluntary manslaughter, in violation of California Penal Code 192(a)(1) is a crime of violence for sentencing purposes. Specific intent not required to find offense is a crime of violence under U.S.S.G. 2L1.2).

Chrzanoski v. Ashcroft, 327 F.3d 188 (2d Cir. 2003)(Connecticut conviction of third-degree assault in violation of section 53a-61(a)(1) of the Connecticut General Statutes, which involves the intentional infliction of physical injury upon another, is not a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16(a) (2000) and is therefore not an aggravated felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F) (2000), because use of force is not an element of the offense), overruling In re Martin, 23 I. & N. Dec. 491, Int. Dec. 3481 (BIA 2002).

SECOND DEGREE MANSLAUGHTER - CRIME OF VIOLENCE

United States v. Arizaga-Acosta, ___ F.3d ___, 2006 WL 60260 (5th Cir. Jan. 12, 2006) (federal conviction for conspiracy to possess a listed chemical (ephedrine) with intent to manufacture methamphetamine, under 21 U.S.C. 841(d)(1), held not to qualify as a "drug-trafficking offense" under USSG 2L1.2, for purposes of imposing a sentence enhancement to an illegal reentry sentence, because the U.S. Sentencing Commission specifically included this offense under USSG 4B1.2 cmt. n.1, but declined to do so under 2L1.2).