United States v. Mendoza-Sanchez, ___
F.3d ___, 2006 WL 1966655 (5th Cir. Jul. 14, 2006) (Arkansas
conviction of burglary, in violation of Ark.Code Ann.

United
States v. Fernandez-Cusco, __ F.3d __ (5th Cir.
Apr. 20, 2006) (Minnesota felony conviction for third degree
sexual conduct, under Minn. Stat. 8 § 609.344, is not necessarily
a "forcible sex offense," and therefore not categorically
a crime of violence for illegal re-entry sentencing purposes).

Mathews v. Reno, 52
F.Supp.2d 195 (D.Mass. May 18, 1999) (Rhode Island conviction
of second-degree child abuse, the infliction upon a child
of any "serious physical injury," in violation of
R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-9-5.3(2), constitutes a crime of violence
under 18 U.S.C. § 16(a), and is considered an aggravated felony
under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F), for
immigration purposes).

Rowe v. INS, 45 F.Supp.2d
144 (D.Mass. Apr. 30, 1999) (conviction for assault and battery
of a police officer is an aggravated felony as defined by
INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F), for purposes
of deportation).

Chery v. Ashcroft, 347 F.3d 404
(2d Cir. Oct. 17 2003) (Connecticut conviction under Conn.G.S
§ 53a-71 for consensual sexual intercourse with a person under
age 18 (statutory rape) is a crime of violence and aggravated
felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C.

Dickson v.
Ashcroft, 346 F.3d 44 (2d Cir. Sept. 9, 2003) (New York conviction
of unlawful imprisonment in the first degree, in violation
of N.Y. Penal Law § 135.10, with indeterminate sentence of
one to three years, held not to be an aggravated felony crime
of violence within the meaning of INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C.

Jobson v. Ashcroft,
326 F.3d 367 (2d Cir. Apr. 22, 2003) (New York conviction
of manslaughter in the second degree, under N.Y.P.L. § 125.15(1),
is not a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) and thus
is not an aggravated felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C.

Chrzanoski v. Ashcroft,
327 F.3d 188 (2d Cir. Apr. 22, 2003) (Connecticut conviction
of third-degree assault in violation of section 53a-61(a)(1)
of the Connecticut General Statutes, which involves the intentional
infliction of physical injury upon another, is not a crime
of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16(a) and is therefore not an
aggravated felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C.

Dalton v. Ashcroft,
257 F.3d 200 (2d Cir. July 20, 2001) (New York conviction
of driving while intoxicated, in violation of New York Vehicle
and Traffic Law § 1192.3, did not necessarily constitute a
"crime of violence" under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b), since
a risk of the use of force is not an integral part of the
offense, and was thus not an aggravated felony under INA §
101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C.

United States v. Pacheco, 225 F.3d 148
(2d Cir. Aug. 29, 2000), cert. denied, 533 U.S. 904, 121 S.Ct.
2246 (2001) (Rhode Island misdemeanor simple assault conviction,
for which suspended sentence of one year was imposed, constituted
an aggravated felony, under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(43)(F), warranting 16-level enhancement of illegal
re-entry sentence for violation of INA § 276(a)(1), 8 U.S.C.