United States v. Acuna-Cuadros,
385 F.3d 875 (5th Cir. Sept. 21, 2004) (per curiam) (Texas
conviction for retaliation, in violation of Tex. Penal Code
§ 36.06 (1995), penalizing one who "knowingly harms or
threatens to harm another by an unlawful act," did not
qualify as "crime of violence" supporting 16-level
enhancement under U.S.S.G.

United States v. Martinez-Paramo,
380 F.3d 799 (5th Cir. Aug. 4, 2004) (Pennsylvania conviction
for terroristic threats, in violation of 18 Pa. Cons. Stat.
§ 2706(a) (2003), was not established to be a crime of violence,
under U.S.S.G.

United States v. Insaulgarat,
378 F.3d 456 (5th Cir. July 19, 2004) (Florida conviction
of aggravated stalking (after being subject to a domestic
violence protective order, "knowingly, willfully, maliciously,
and repeatedly follows or harasses another person"),
in violation of Florida Statute § 784.048(4) (1993), did not
constitute a crime of violence within the meaning of U.S.S.G.

Zaidi v. Ashcroft, 374 F.3d 357
(5th Cir. June 21, 2004) (Oklahoma conviction for sexual battery
("the intentional touching, mauling or feeling of the
body or private parts of any person sixteen (16) years of
age or older, in a lewd and lascivious manner and without
the consent of that other person . . . ."), in violation
of Okla. Stat. Ann. tit.

United States v. Sarmiento-Funes,
374 F.3d 336 (5th Cir. June 21, 2004) (Missouri conviction
of sexual assault, in violation of Mo. Ann. Stat. § 566.040(1)
committed if "he has sexual intercourse with another
person knowing that he does so without that persons consent,"
did not qualify as a crime of violence under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2
cmt. n.1(B)(ii), for purposes of 16-level enhancement of sentence
for illegal re-entry).

Nguyen v. Ashcroft,
366 F.3d 386 (5th Cir. Apr. 26, 2004) (Oklahoma conviction
for facilitation of a drive-by shooting, under 21 Okl.St.Ann.
§ 652, subd. B., constituted a crime of violence aggravated
felony for deportation purposes).

Popal v. Gonzalez, 416
F.3d 249 (3d Cir. July 29, 2005) (Pennsylvania conviction
of simple assault (reckless), in violation of Pennsylvania
Penal Code § 18 Pa.C.S.A. 2701, is not an aggravated felony
crime of violence for immigration purposes, since a mens rea
of recklessness is insufficient to qualify as a crime of violence
under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F)).

Tran v. Gonzales, 414 F.3d 464 (3d Cir.
July 12, 2005) (Pennsylvania conviction of "reckless
burning or exploding," in violation of 18 Pa.C.S.A. §
3301(d)(2), did not constitute a crime of violence under 18
U.S.C. § 16(b), and was therefore not an aggravated felony
crime of violence under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C.

United States v. Remoi, 404 F.3d
789 (3d Cir. Apr.

Bovkun v. Ashcroft, 283
F.3d 166 (3d Cir. Mar. 8, 2002) (Pennsylvania misdemeanor
conviction of making terroristic threats, in violation of
18 Pa. Cons.Stat. § 2706 (1998), qualified as a "crime
of violence" under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F),
for immigration purposes, since the maximum of the indeterminate
11- to 23-month sentence imposed was one year or more).