United States v. Clase-Espinal, 115
F.3d 1054 (1st Cir. June 19, 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S.
957 (1997) (Texas felony conviction for possession of cocaine,
under Tex. Health & Safety Code § 481.115(f) (1996), was
an "aggravated felony" under INA § 101(a)(43)(B),
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B) for illegal re-entry sentence enhancement
purposes under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(2)).

United States v. Cuevas, 75
F.3d 778 (1st Cir. Feb. 7, 1996) (Rhode Island second conviction
of drug possession constituted an aggravated felony under
INA § 101(a)(43)(B), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(B) for illegal
re-entry sentence enhancement purposes under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(2)).

Matter of Martin, 23 I. & N. Dec.
491 (BIA Sept. 26, 2002) (Connecticut conviction of third-degree
assault, in violation of section 53a-61(a)(1) of the Connecticut
General Statutes, which involves the intentional infliction
of physical injury upon another, is a crime of violence under
18 U.S.C. § 16(a), for deportation purposes).

Matter of Small, 23 I.
& N. Dec. 448 (BIA June 4, 2002) (en banc) (New York misdemeanor
conviction of sexual abuse of a minor, in violation of N.Y.
Penal Law § 130.60(2), with a sentence of one year in custody,
constitutes a crime of violence aggravated felony under INA
§ 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F)).

Matter of Jean, 23 I. & N.
Dec. 373 (AG May 2, 2002) (New York conviction of second-degree
manslaughter, under N.Y. Penal Law § 125.15(1), may constitute
a "crime of violence" and therefore an aggravated
felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F)).

Matter of Ramos,
23 I. & N. Dec. 336 (BIA Apr.

Matter of Olivares-Martinez,
23 I. & N. Dec. 148 (BIA July 3, 2001) (under United States
v. Chapa-Garza, 243 F.3d 921 (5th Cir. Mar. 1, 2001) and United
States v. Hernandez-Avalos, 251 F.3d 505 (5th Cir. May 11,
2001), a Texas conviction for felony DWI is not a crime of
violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) (1994), and is therefore
not an aggravated felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C.

Matter of Puente-Salazar,
22 I. & N. Dec. 1006 (BIA Sept. 29, 1999) (Texas conviction
of driving while intoxicated under Texas Penal Code § 49.04,
which is a felony as a result of a sentence enhancement statute,
is a conviction for a crime of violence and therefore an aggravated
felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F)),
overruled by Matter of Ramos, 23 I. & N. Dec. 336 (BIA
Apr. 4, 2002).

Matter of Aldabesheh, 22 I.
& N. Dec. 983 (BIA Aug. 30, 1999) (en banc) (New York
conviction for criminal contempt in the first degree, in violation
of section 215.51(b)(i) of the New York Penal Law, with a
sentence to imprisonment of at least one year, is a conviction
for a crime of violence as defined under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b),
thus rendering it an aggravated felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(F),
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F)).

Matter of Sweetser, 22
I. & N. Dec. 709 (BIA May 19, 1999) (Colorado conviction
of criminally negligent child abuse under sections 18-6-401(1)
and (7) of the Colorado Revised Statutes, where negligence
in leaving stepson alone in a bathtub resulted in the childs
death, was not a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C.