United States v. Smith, 36 F.3d 128
(1st Cir. Sept. 7, 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1008 (1994)
(Rhode Island conviction of felony drug possession offense
that would only be a misdemeanor under federal law but was
felony under laws of convicting state constituted an aggravated
felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(B), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(B),
for illegal re-entry sentence enhancement purposes under U.S.S.G.
§ 2L1.2(b)(2)).

United States v. Rodriguez,
26 F.3d 4 (1st Cir. June 17, 1994) (Massachusetts conviction
for possession with intent to distribute illegal drug was
a "trafficking" crime and therefore an aggravated
felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(B), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(B),
for illegal re-entry sentence enhancement purposes under U.S.S.G.
§ 2L1.2(b)(2)).

United States v. Forbes, 16
F.3d 1294 (1st Cir. Feb. 24, 1994) (New York second conviction
for criminal possession of controlled substance under N.Y.
Penal Law § 220.09 was punishable under Controlled Substances
Act as a felony and, therefore, defendants conviction qualified
as an aggravated felony justifying enhanced sentence under
U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 for illegal re-entry purposes).

Amaral v. INS, 977 F.2d 33
(1st Cir. Oct. 13, 1992) (Rhode Island conviction of possession
of a controlled substance, in violation of R.I.Gen.Laws §
21-28-4.01(C)(1)(a), was a felony under state law and would
have been a felony under federal law, because of two prior
drug convictions, and therefore constituted an aggravated
felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(B), 8 U.S.C.

Fernandez-Santander v. Thornburgh,
751 F.Supp. 1007 (D.Me. Nov. 9, 1990) (Maine conviction for
distribution of controlled substances, in violation of 17-A
M.R.S.A. § 1103, qualified as a "drug trafficking crime"
that in turn qualified as an aggravated felony under INA §
101(a)(43)(B), 8 U.S.C.

Durant v. ICE, 393 F.3d 113, 114 n.1 (2d Cir. Dec. 16, 2004) (court declined to address whether two state simple possession convictions constitute an aggravated felony for immigration purposes, so this question is still open in the Second Circuit); contra, Matter of Carachuri-Rosendo, 24 I. & N. Dec. 382, 385 (BIA 2007), citing United States v. Simpson, 319 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2002) (second possession conviction constitutes aggravated felony for sentencing purposes only).
Thanks to Jared Brown.

Gousse v. Ashcroft,
339 F.3d 91 (2d Cir. Aug. 6, 2003) (Connecticut conviction
under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 21a-277(a) constitutes conviction
for "illicit trafficking in a controlled substance"
under INA § 101(a)(43)(B), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(B)).

United States v. Simpson, 319 F.3d
81 (2d Cir. Dec. 24, 2002) (New York convictions for misdemeanor
possession of a controlled substance, under New York Penal
Law § 221.10, 221.15, 221.40 (2000), constituted aggravated
felonies warranting 8-level enhancements under U.S.S.G. §
2L1.2(b) of defendants sentence for illegal re-entry).

United States v. Pornes-Garcia, 171
F.3d 142 (2d Cir. Mar. 26, 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 880,
120 S.Ct. 191 (1999) (New York conviction of felony attempted
criminal possession of cocaine in the first degree, in violation
of N.Y. Penal Law § 110.05(1), constituted an "aggravated
felony " under INA § 101(a)(43)(B), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(B),
justifying 16-level enhancement under U.S.S.G.

United States v. Paredes-Batista, 140 F.3d
367 (2d Cir. Mar. 18, 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 859, 119
S.Ct. 143 (Oct. 5, 1998) (New York conviction under N.Y. Penal
Law § 220.31, which provides that "[a] person is guilty
of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the fifth degree
when he knowingly and unlawfully sells a controlled substance,"
constituted an aggravated felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(B),
8 U.S.C.