Leader v. Blackman, 744 F.Supp.
500 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 8, 1990) (New York conviction for attempted
criminal sale of controlled substances in the third degree,
in violation of N.Y. Penal Law § 220.39, constitutes an "aggravated
felony," under INA § 101(a)(43)(B), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(B),
and triggers mandatory detention).

Wilson v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 377 (3d Cir. Nov. 26, 2003) (New
Jersey conviction for possession of marijuana with intent
to distribute could not be determined to be aggravated felony
since court could not determine from state court judgment
whether crime could be categorized as a felony under state
law involving "drug trafficking").

Gerbier
v. Holmes, 280 F.3d 297 (3d Cir. Feb. 8, 2002) (Delaware conviction
of "trafficking in cocaine," in violation of Del.Code
Ann. tit. 16, § 4753A(2)(a), that was based on possession
of between 5 and 50 grams of cocaine, did not constitute an
"aggravated felony " under INA § 101(a)(43)(B),
8 U.S.C.

Steele v. Blackman, 236 F.3d
130 (3d Cir. Jan. 2, 2001) (New York second misdemeanor conviction
for distribution of 30 grams or less of marijuana without
remuneration was not for a hypothetical offense punishable
as a felony under the federal Controlled Substances Act and
therefore was not an "aggravated felony" under INA
§ 101(a)(43)(B), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(B) for immigration
purposes).

United States v. Amaya-Portillo,
423 F.3d 427 (4th Cir. Sept. 6, 2005) (Maryland conviction
of misdemeanor simple possession of cocaine, in violation
of Md.Code, Art. 27, 287(e), was not an aggravated felony
for sentencing purposes, as the state offense is not a felony,
even though the offense was punishable by up to four years
imprisonment).

United States v. Wilson, 316
F.3d 506 (4th Cir. Jan. 16, 2003) (Virginia conviction of
simple possession of an unknown quantity of cocaine, a controlled
substance, a felony under state law, Va.Code § 18.2-250(a),
constituted an aggravated felony, for purposes of enhancing
a sentence for illegal re-entry pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2,
even though it would only have been chargeable as a misdemeanor
in federal court).

Garcia v. Attorney General,
___ F.3d ___, 2006 WL 2529471 (3d Cir. Sept. 5, 2006) (Pennsylvania
conviction of two counts of manufacturing, delivering, or
possessing a controlled substance with the intent to deliver,
under 35 Pa. Stat. Ann.

United States v. Arizaga-Acosta,
436 F.3d 506 (5th Cir. Jan. 12, 2006) (federal conviction
for conspiracy to possess a listed chemical (ephedrine) with
intent to manufacture methamphetamine, under 21 U.S.C. § 841(d)(1),
held not to qualify as a "drug-trafficking offense"
under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2, for purposes of imposing a sentence
enhancement to an illegal re-entry sentence, because the U.S.

United States v. Palacios-Quinonez,
431 F.3d 471 (5th Cir. Nov. 29, 2005) (California conviction
of "possession" of a controlled substance for purposes
of U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(i), includes constructive possession;
purchase for sale of a controlled substance, in violation
of California Penal Code § 11351 is an aggravated felony drug
trafficking offense for sentencing purposes).

United States v. Restrepo-Aguilar,
74 F.3d 361 (1st Cir. Jan. 30, 1996) (Rhode Island conviction
of felony drug possession offense that would only be a misdemeanor
under federal law but was felony under laws of convicting
state constituted an aggravated felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(B),
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B), for illegal re-entry sentence enhancement
purposes under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(2)).