Malta-Espinoza v. Gonzales, ___ F.3d ___, 2007 WL 624532 (9th Cir. March 2, 2007) (where the statute is framed in the disjunctive, e.g., harassment or following is sufficient for conviction, a plea to a charge phrased in the conjunctive, e.g., harassment and following, establishes conviction of harassment, or following, or both, because a plea of guilty admits only the elements of the charge necessary for a conviction and does not establish more than would have been established by a jury verdict of guilty on the charge), following United States v. Cazares, 121 F.3d 1241, 1247 (9th Cir.

Malta-Espinoza v. Gonzales, ___ F.3d ___, 2007 WL 624532 (9th Cir. March 2, 2007) (California conviction of stalking [harassing or following with threats], in violation of Penal Code 646.9, did not constitute an aggravated felony crime of violence, under INA 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F), as defined by 18 U.S.C. 16(b), because the full range of conduct forbidden by the harassment portion of the statute does not constitute a crime of violence since "some stalking crimes [those committed at a distance by telephone or mail] include no substantial risk of violence").

Malta-Espinoza v. Gonzales, ___ F.3d ___, 2007 WL 624532 (9th Cir. March 2, 2007) ("We also note that the BIA affirmed on the theory that Malta-Espinoza's conviction was for harassing, not following. We cannot uphold the decision of the BIA, an administrative agency, on a theory other than the one upon which it relied. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 87, 63 S.Ct. 454, 87 L.Ed. 626 (1943).").

In Obasohan v. U.S. Attorney General, ___ F.3d ___, 2007 WL 548359 (11th Cir. February 23, 2007), the Ninth Circuit held, inter alia, that a fraud offense did not constitute an aggravated felony, for purposes of removal, because the restitution order, standing alone, had been issued by the sentencing judge under a preponderance standard, and the immigration court was required to make a loss to the victim finding by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence. Under the law of many states, such as California, restitution need be proven only by a preponderance of the evidence. E.g., People v.

United States v. Lopez-Hernandez, __ F.Supp.2d __ (N.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 2007) ("[T]o collaterally attack his 1997 deportation proceeding, Lopez-Hernandez must demonstrate: (1) that he exhausted all administrative remedies available to him to appeal his removal order, (2) that the underlying removal proceedings at which the order was issued improperly deprived him of the opportunity for judicial review, and (3) that the entry of the order was fundamentally unfair.")

United States v. Lopez-Hernandez, __ F.Supp.2d __ (N.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 2007) (motion to allow collateral attack of immigration proceedings in prosecution for illegal re-entry granted where defendant demonstrated that immigration proceeding was improper where IJ failed to inform defendant [post-IIRAIRA, pre-St. Cyr] that he could apply for relief under former INA 212(c)).

January 12, 2007 USCIS Interoffice Memo provides guidance on the May 12, 2006 Interim Rule allowing paroled arriving aliens in removal proceedings to apply for adjustment of status. AILA InfoNet document #07030661 http://www.aila.org/content/default.aspx?docid=21806

Matter of Kotliar, 24 I. & N. Dec. 124 (BIA 2007) (noncitizen arrested at home while on criminal probation is subject to mandatory detention under INA 236(c)(1), 8 U.S.C. 1226(c)(1) (2000), regardless of the reason for the most recent criminal custody, provided it can be ascertained from the facts that he was released from criminal custody after October 8, 1998, the expiration date of the Transition Period Custody Rules).
http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/vll/intdec/vol24/3558.pdf

Matter of Kotliar, 24 I. & N. Dec. 124 (BIA 2007) (noncitizen need not be charged with the ground of deportation that provides the basis for mandatory detention under INA 236(c)(1) in order to be considered an alien who "is deportable" on that ground).
http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/vll/intdec/vol24/3558.pdf

Matter of WCB, 24 I. & N. Dec. 118 (BIA 2007)(Immigration Judge has no authority to reinstate a prior order of deportation or removal pursuant to INA 241(a)(5), 8 U.S.C. 1231(a)(5) (2000); noncitizen subject to reinstatement of a prior order of deportation or removal pursuant to INA 241(a)(5) has no right to a hearing before an Immigration Judge; Immigration Judge did not err in terminating removal proceedings as improvidently begun where the respondent was subject to reinstatement of his prior order of deportation).
http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/vll/intdec/vol24/3557.pdf