Elkins v. Comfort 392 F.3d 1159 (10th Cir. 2004) (if the FFOA were to apply, the defendant would have to get the exact same sentence to probation as is provided under the FFOA).

Ann Benson, Directing Attorney, Washington Defender Associations Immigration Project, Overview of Immigration Consequences of Criminal Conduct for Immigrant Survivors of Domestic Violence (Sept. 2004)
http://www.immigrationadvocates.org/library/item.181220-Overview_of_Immi...

Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470 (1973); Gray v. Klauser, 282 F.3d 633, 644 (9th Cir. 2002) (Idaho deprived petitioner of right to present a defense under Sixth Amendment when trial court used different standard for determining admissibility of hearsay statements from two dead victims. "A state rule or state judge may not without justification impose stricter evidentiary standards on a defendant . . . than it does on the prosecution.").

An executive order was issued in July 2002, retroactive to September 11, 2001, declaring the current Iraq War/occupation a "military operation involving armed conflict with hostile force" such that persons who enlist and honorably serve in the military can take advantage of the more generous naturalization provisions of INA 329. See http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/index.php?content=f0611. The executive order doesn't mention the Iraq War specifically, but anyone who serves anywhere in the world is covered by it. Thanks to Margaret Stock.

Marshall v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 595 F.2d 511, 513 (9th Cir. 1979) (the underlying purpose of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is as follows: "[The exhaustion requirement] "makes sense in terms of both judicial economy and agency efficiency", State of California ex rel. Christensen v. FTC, 549 F.2d at 1324, because it permits "an administrative agency to perform functions within its special competence to make a factual record, to apply its expertise, and to correct its own errors so as to moot judicial controversies". Parisi v. United States, 405 U.S. 34, 37, 92 S.

Attorney General Opinion, Opinions from Office of Legal Counsel, Vol. 31, May 17, 2007 ("A "misdemeanor crime of domestic violence" under 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(9) is
limited to those offenses of which the use or attempted use of physical force or the threatened use of a deadly weapon is an element that is, a factual predicate specified by law and required to support a conviction.

Attorney General Opinion, Opinions from Office of Legal Counsel, Vol. 31, May 17, 2007 ("A "misdemeanor crime of domestic violence" under 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(9) is
limited to those offenses of which the use or attempted use of physical force or the threatened use of a deadly weapon is an element that is, a factual predicate specified by law and required to support a conviction.

Attorney General Opinion, Opinions from Office of Legal Counsel, Vol. 31, May 17, 2007 ("A "misdemeanor crime of domestic violence" under 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(9) is
limited to those offenses of which the use or attempted use of physical force or the threatened use of a deadly weapon is an element that is, a factual predicate specified by law and required to support a conviction.

Ukpabi v. Mukasey, ___ F.3d ___ (6th Cir. May 13, 2008) (court of appeal has jurisdiction to review IJ's denial of continuance of removal proceedings under abuse of discretion standard, and reaching claims of violation of international law and due process).

Woods v. Carey, 525 F.3d 886 (9th Cir. May 12, 2008) (prior decision dismissing habeas petition as barred as successive under 28 U.S.C. section 2244(b) is vacated and remanded with instructions that the district court construe petitioner's pro se petition as a motion to amend the habeas petition that was still pending before the district court at the time this new petition was filed).