In re Douglas, 200 Cal.App.4th 236, 132 Cal.Rptr.3d 582, 586 (4th Dist. Oct. 27, 2011) (For noncapital cases in California, there is no express time window in which a petitioner must seek habeas relief. (In re Huddleston (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1031, 1034.) Rather, the general rule is that the petition must be filed as promptly as the circumstances allow.... (In re Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 750, 765, fn.

In re Douglas, 200 Cal.App.4th 236, 132 Cal.Rptr.3d 582, 586 (4th Dist. Oct. 27, 2011) (Substantial delay is measured from the time the petitioner or his ... counsel knew, or reasonably should have known, of the information offered in support of the claim and the legal basis for the claim.); quoting In re Robbins (1998) 18 Cal.4th 770, 780; citing In re Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 750, 765, fn.

In re Douglas, 200 Cal.App.4th 236, 132 Cal.Rptr.3d 582, 586 (4th Dist. Oct. 27, 2011) (A petition that has been substantially delayed may nevertheless be considered on the merits if the petitioner can establish good cause for the delay, such as investigation of a potentially meritorious claim, or to avoid the piecemeal presentation of claims.); citing In re Robbins (1998) 18 Cal.4th 770, 780.

In re Douglas, 200 Cal.App.4th 236, 132 Cal.Rptr.3d 582, 586 (4th Dist. Oct. 27, 2011) (The only excuse Defendant offers to explain the delay between conviction in 1997 and this petition in 2010 is his mistaken belief regarding the registration requirement. California law does not condone willful ignorance: A petitioner will be expected to demonstrate due diligence in pursuing potential claims.

In re Douglas, 200 Cal.App.4th 236, 132 Cal.Rptr.3d 582, 588 (4th Dist. Oct. 27, 2011) (A petition for writ of habeas corpus that is substantially delayed without good cause is considered untimely and will not be considered on the merits unless the defects alleged by petitioner constitute a fundamental miscarriage of justice . . .

In re Douglas, 200 Cal.App.4th 236, 132 Cal.Rptr.3d 582, 588 (4th Dist. Oct. 27, 2011) (Though the trial court erred [in failing to advise the defendant of the sex offender registration requirement before plea], Defendant was almost instantly aware of the error when he signed the registration advisal form and received verbal notification on December 19, 1997. Despite this notice, Defendant chose to take no action for over a decade, and has thus forfeited his right to contest the error.

In re Douglas, 200 Cal.App.4th 236, 132 Cal.Rptr.3d 582, 588-89 (4th Dist. Oct. 27, 2011) (Moreover, unreasonable delay also bars consideration of a petition for writ of habeas corpus under the doctrine of laches. (People v. Miller, supra, 6 Cal.App.4th at pp. 881-882.) Application of the doctrine is appropriate where the delay is unreasonable and has prejudiced respondent. (Miller v. Eisenhower Medical Center (1980) 27 Cal.3d 614, 624.)).

In re Douglas, 200 Cal.App.4th 236, 132 Cal.Rptr.3d 582, 589 (4th Dist. Oct. 27, 2011) (the California prejudice requirement of laches reflects recognition that a substantial delay will prejudice the respondent's ability to answer the petition, respects the importance of finality of judgments to the state, and recognizes the difficulty of retrial in the event that a judgment is set aside on habeas corpus many years after the conviction.); quoting In re Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 750, 787; distinguishing Gratzer v. Mahoney (9th Cir.

In re Douglas, 200 Cal.App.4th 236, 132 Cal.Rptr.3d 582, 589 (4th Dist. Oct. 27, 2011) (The Supreme Court has recognized that when a habeas petitioner succeeds in obtaining a new trial, the erosion of memory and dispersion of witnesses that occur with the passage of time, [citation], prejudice the government and diminish the chances of a reliable criminal adjudication.); quoting McCleskey v. Zant (1991) 499 U.S. 467, 491.

In re Douglas, 200 Cal.App.4th 236, 132 Cal.Rptr.3d 582, 590 (4th Dist. Oct. 27, 2011) (constructive custody, for habeas corpus jurisdictional purposes, includes hose on parole, probation, bail, or release on own recognizance pending hearing on the merits of a habeas corpus petition; Without actual or constructive custody, courts have no authority to grant relief.); citing People v. Villa (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1063, 1069"1070; In re Stier (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 63, 82; In re Wessley W. (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 240, 246.