Perez-Mejia v. Holder, ___ F.3d ___, ___, 2011 WL 5865888 (9th Cir. Nov. 23, 2011), amending 641 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. Apr. 21, 2011) (Perez"Mejia is correct that we may set aside a determination by the IJ that rests on an alien's erroneous concession, at least in some circumstances.); citing Mandujano"Real v. Mukasey, 526 F.3d 585, 588 (9th Cir.

Perez-Mejia v. Holder, ___ F.3d ___, 2011 WL 5865888 (9th Cir. Nov. 23, 2011), amending 641 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. Apr. 21, 2011) (even though petitioner did not raise an argument in his brief before the BIA, the issue is considered exhausted where the BIA addressed the issue on the merits); see Vizcarra"Ayala v. Mukasey, 514 F.3d 870, 874 (9th Cir. 2008) ([O]ur precedent is quite clear that claims addressed on the merits by the BIA are exhausted.); Socop"Gonzalez v. INS, 272 F.3d 1176, 1186 (9th Cir.

Perez-Mejia v. Holder, ___ F.3d ___, ___, 2011 WL 5865888 (9th Cir. Nov. 23, 2011), amending 641 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. Apr. 21, 2011) (When the modified categorical approach must be employed, an alien's factual admissions may not be used as evidence to establish that he is removable, unless those admissions are included in the narrow, specified set of documents that are part of the record of conviction, such as a plea agreement.); see S"Yong v. Holder, 600 F.3d 1028, 1035"36 (9th Cir.2010); Tokatly v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 613, 623"24 (9th Cir.2004); Huerta"Guevara v.

United States v. Yepez, 652 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. July 25, 2011) (California courts nunc pro tunc reduction of probation term, under Penal Code 1203.3, to end one day prior to the commission of a federal drug offense, effectively qualified the defendant for application of the Safety Valve allowing a shorter sentence under 18 U.S.C. 3553(f)); citing 18 U.S.C.

Cordova-Soto v. Holder, 659 F.3d 1029 (10th Cir. Oct.

Alhuay v. U.S. Atty. Gen., 661 F.3d 534 (11th Cir. Oct. 26, 2011) (per curiam) (a removal order ends lawful permanent resident status, even if issued more than five years after the grant of LPR status, because INA 246(a), 8 U.S.C. 1256(a), bars rescission after five years, and does not bar issuance of a removal order on the basis that the grant of LPR status was based on misrepresentations); see Matter of Belenzo, 17 I. & N. Dec.374, 382 (BIA 1981); Matter of S, 9 I. & N. Dec.

Sanchez Fajardo v. Atty Gen., 659 F.3d 1303 (11th Cir. Oct. 12, 2011) (rejecting the framework for determining whether a crime involves moral turpitude announced in Matter of Silva-Trevio, 24 I&N Dec. 687 (A.G. 2008)).

Sanchez Fajardo v. Atty Gen., 659 F.3d 1303, 1309 (11th Cir. Oct. 12, 2011) ([W]hen Congress incorporated the language premising inadmissibility on whether a person was convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude into the INA, it was presumably aware that this language had been interpreted to require the application of a categorical and modified categorical approach. . . . [If Congress had wanted to change that interpretation,] it could easily have amended the statute to allow adjudicators to consider the actual conduct underlying a conviction.).

Lapaix v. U.S. Atty Gen., 605 F.3d 1138, 1143 (11th Cir. 2010) (petitioners in removal proceedings are entitled to the protections of the Fifth Amendment due process clause: To prevail on a due process claim, the petitioner must show that she was deprived of liberty without due process of law and that the purported errors caused her substantial prejudice.

Denisyuk v. State, ___ Md. App. ___, ___, ___ A.2d ___ (Md. Ct. App. Oct. 25, 2011) (Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010), applies retroactively to convictions entered after April 1, 1997: where a decision has applied settled precedent to new and different factual situations, the decision always applies retroactively, and it is only where a new rule constitutes a clear break with the past that the question of prospective only application arises.); quoting Potts v. State, 479 A.2d 1335, 1340 (Md. 1984)).