Ruiz-Lopez v. Holder, 682 F.3d 513, *518 (6th Cir. Jun. 19, 2012) (Washington conviction of felony flight from an officer, in violation of Washington Revised Code 46.61.024, may or may not categorically rise to the level of a crime of moral turpitude: We express no opinion regarding whether flight accompanied by only a reckless mens rea also categorically meets the BIA's definition of a CIMT [applicable to convictions after the most recent amendment in 2003 lowered the mens rea to recklessness for the third element of this offense].).

Ruiz-Lopez v. Holder, 682 F.3d 513, *516 (6th Cir. Jun. 19, 2012) (court of appeals gives Chevron deference to BIA interpretation of vague statutory phrase moral turpitude unless it is arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute. Kellermann, 592 F.3d at 702 (quoting Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843"44, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984)). No deference is given, however, to the BIA's interpretation of a state criminal statute; that issue is reviewed de novo. Serrato"Soto, 570 F.3d at 688.).

Anaya-Aguilar v. Holder, 683 F.3d 369 (7th Cir. Jun. 14, 2012) (no jurisdiction to review BIA decision to deny sua sponte motion to reopen).

United States v. Dawn, 685 F.3d 790 (8th Cir. Jun. 28, 2012) (Arkansas conviction of second-degree sexual assault, in violation of Ark.Code Ann. 5"14"125(a) (2002), is categorically a crime of violence for purposes of the Armed Career Criminals Act, since the elements of the statute necessarily involve either a use of force or substantial risk that force will be used).

United States v. Dawn, 685 F.3d 790 (8th Cir. Jun. 28, 2012) (Arkansas conviction of second-degree battery, in violation of Ark. Code Ann. 5"13"202(a) (2006), is not categorically a crime of violence for purposes of the Armed Career Criminals Act, because it includes recklessly causing serious physical injury, including reckless driving).

Bobadilla v. Holder, 679 F.3d 1052 (8th Cir. May 29, 2012) (finding full analysis of Matter of Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. 687 (A.G. 2008), including the factual analysis, to be a reasonable interpretation, and therefore due Chevron deference).

Campos v. State, 816 N.W.2d 480 (Minn. June 20, 2012) (Padilla is a new rule of constitutional criminal procedure, and not applicable to cases that were final at the time post-conviction relief was filed).
http://www.mncourts.gov/opinions/sc/current/OPA101395-0620.pdf

Sawyers v. Holder, 684 F.3d 911 (9th Cir. Jun. 29, 2012) (per curiam) (Cuevas"Gaspar v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 1013 (9th Cir. 2005), and Mercado"Zazueta v. Holder, 580 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2009) are no longer valid precedent on the issue of imputation under 8 U.S.C. 1229b); following Holder v. Martinez Gutierrez, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 2011 (2012).

Rodriguez v. Holder, 683 F.3d 1164, *1170 (9th Cir. Jun. 27, 2012) (BIA erred by making its own factual determination and engaging in de novo review of the IJ's factual findings; 8 C.F.R. 1003.1(d)(3)(i), (iv), allow it to review findings of fact only for clear error, and prohibit it from making its own factual determinations).

The court described the correct standard of review as follows:

The BIA may find an IJ's factual finding to be clearly erroneous if it is illogical or implausible, or without support in inferences that may be drawn from the facts in the record. Anderson v.

Rodriguez v. Holder, 683 F.3d 1164 (9th Cir. Jun. 27, 2012) (whether BIA applied correct standard of review of an issue is a question of law reviewable by the court of appeals on a petition for review); Arteaga v. I.N.S., 836 F.2d 1227, 1228 (9th Cir.1988), abrogated on other grounds by I.N.S. v. Elias"Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 112 S.Ct. 812, 117 L.Ed.2d 38 (1992); see also Afridi v. Gonzales, 442 F.3d 1212, 1218 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that the court can determine whether the BIA applied the correct legal standard in making its determination), overruled on other grounds by Estrada"Espinoza v.