Nelson v. Attorney General of U.S., 685 F.3d 318 (3d Cir. May 22, 2012) (when a qualifying conviction stops the accrual of continuous presence, under INA 240A(d)(1), 8 U.S.C. 1229B(d)(1) for purposes of cancellation of removal, the noncitizen may not thereafter begin a new period); following Briseno"Flores v. Attorney General, 492 F.3d 226 (3d Cir. 2007); Matter of Mendoza-Sandino, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1236, 1241 (BIA 2000) (once an alien's period of continuous presence or residence is terminated by the stop-time provision, INA 240A(d)(1), 8 U.S.C.

Akinsade v. United States, 686 F.3d 248 (4th Cir. July 25, 2012) (abuse of discretion is the standard of review of a district courts denial of a writ of error coram nobis without an evidentiary hearing); United States v. Peter, 310 F.3d 709, 711 (11th Cir. 2002); Fleming v. United States, 146 F.3d 88, 90 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting Foont v. United States, 93 F.3d 76, 78 (2d Cir. 1996); Santos-Sanchez v. United States, 548 F.3d 327, 330 (5th Cir. 2008), abrogated on other grounds by Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1481 (2010).

Akinsade v. United States, 686 F.3d 248 (4th Cir. July 25, 2012) (criminal defense counsel misadvised defendant/petitioner even though the Second Circuit held in Akinsade v. Holder, 678 F.3d 138, 143 (2d Cir. 2012) that defendant/petitioner was not deportable in the petition for review of his removal order).

Akinsade v. United States, 686 F.3d 248 (4th Cir. July 25, 2012) (the courts immigration advisal to defendant at plea that the plea "could lead to his deportation" did not prevent a finding of prejudice from counsels failure to provide correct immigration advice).

Akinsade v. United States, 686 F.3d 248, *252 (4th Cir. July 25, 2012) (As a remedy of last resort, the writ of error coram nobis is granted only where an error is "of the most fundamental character" and there exists no other available remedy. United States v. Mandel, 862 F.2d 1067, 1075 (4th Cir. 1988). The writ is narrowly limited to "extraordinary cases presenting circumstances compelling its use to achieve justice." United States v. Denedo, 129 S. Ct. 2213, 2220 (2009) (quoting United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 511 (1954)).

United States v. Bonilla, 687 F.3d 188 (4th Cir. Jul. 17, 2012) (Texas conviction for burglary, in violation of Texas Penal Code 30.02(a)(3), constitutes a crime of violence for illegal reentry sentencing purposes, because it substantially corresponds to the elements of generic burglary as outlined in Taylor v. United States, notwithstanding that defendant may not have formulated his intent prior to the unlawful entry).

United States v. Esparza-Perez, 681 F.3d 228 (5th Cir. May 14, 2012) (Arkansas conviction of aggravated assault, in violation of Ark. Code 5-13-204(a)(1), is not a crime of violence for illegal re-entry sentencing purposes, under U.S.S.G. 2L1.2 cmt. n.1(B)(iii), because it does not require proof of an assault as that crime is generally defined"i.e., as an offense that involves the use, attempted use, or threatened use of offensive contact against another person).

United States v. Rayo-Valdez, 302 F.3d 314, 318 n.5 (5th Cir. 2002) (guidelines commentary is binding as though it were in the guidelines themselves).

Gallegos-Hernandez v. United States, 688 F.3d 190 (5th Cir. Jul. 18, 2012) (denial of drug rehabilitative treatment to prisoners with ICE detainers did not violate prisoner's due process rights or the equal protection clause; BOP policy was rationally related to BOP's legitimate interest in preventing prisoners from fleeing).

United States v. Griffin, ___ F.3d ___, ___ (7th Cir., Jul. 5, 2012) (reversing federal conviction for felon in possession of firearms where there was no evidence defendant intended to exercise any control over his father's firearms in his parents' home where he went to live after being released from prison: a defendant's strong connection to the residence alone does not suffice to establish the nexus required to prove his constructive possession of a gun found in the residence.").