Kuhali v.Reno, 266 F.3d 93 (2nd Cir. 2001) (ammunition was not a firearm or destructive device). The Ninth Circuit suggests that ammunition-related offenses are not deportable under the firearms ground. See Malilia v. Holder, 632 F.3d 598, 603 (9th Cir. 2011) (Because only the improper delivery of a firearms would constitute a removable offense, a violation of 922 is not categorically a removal [firearms] offense. For instance, improperly delivering ammunition would not render the alien removal under 1227.)

Gjerjaj v. Holder, 691 F.3d 288 (2nd Cir. Aug. 28, 2012) (noncitizen from non-VWP country who fraudulently enters the U.S. with a false passport from a VWP country is bound by VWP restriction on removal proceedings).

Vartelas v. Holder, 689 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. Aug. 6, 2012) (on remand from Vartelas v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 1479 (2012), which implicitly required the conclusion that the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) change should not be applied to petitioner retroactively, the case is remanded to the BIA to consider whether he was prejudiced by his attorney's failure to argue the issue of retroactivity).

Desai v. Attorney General, 695 F.3d 267 (3d Cir. Aug. 21, 2012) (the post-departure bar, under 8 C.F.R. 1003.2(d), which precludes a removed person from filing a motion to reopen immigration proceedings, can be invoked by the agency as a basis for refusing to reopen proceedings sua sponte under 8 C.F.R. 1003.2(a)); distinguishing Prestol Espinal v. Attorney General, 653 F.3d 213, 224 (3d Cir.2011) (the post-departure bar held invalid to the extent it conflicted with a statute, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996, 8 U.S.C.

Mendoza v. United States, 690 F.3d 157 (3d Cir. June 28, 2012, ordered published Aug. 1, 2012) (although counsel's deficient performance may have precluded defendant from seeking relief at the time of the plea, defendant cannot show any sound reasons for his lengthy delay in pursuing relief since that time).

United States v. Gomez, 690 F.3d 194 (4th Cir. Aug. 10, 2012) (Maryland conviction of child abuse, in violation of Maryland Code 1957, Article 27, 35C, was not a crime of violence for illegal re-entry sentencing purposes because the offense could be committed without use of force).

United States v. Gomez, 690 F.3d 194 (4th Cir. Aug. 10, 2012) (for non-common law offenses, the modified categorical approach applies only when the statute defines more than one crime, so an admission at plea that the defendant used force in committing the offense is irrelevant where the statute of conviction covers only one generic crime that does not have force as an element).

Barahona v. Holder, 691 F.3d 349 (4th Cir. Aug. 13, 2012) (no duress exception exists to the material support of terrorists inadmissibility bar to adjustment of status).

Nino v. Holder, 690 F.3d 691 (5th Cir. Aug. 13, 2012) (Texas conviction of unlawful possession of fraudulent identifying information, in violation of Texas Penal Code 32.51(b)(2007) [obtains, possesses, transfers, or uses identifying information of another person without the other person's consent and with intent to harm or defraud another.], categorically constituted a crime involving moral turpitude, even when considering that the offense may be committed only with intent to harm).

Nino v. Holder, 690 F.3d 691 (5th Cir. Aug. 13, 2012) (for purposes of determining whether an applicant is ineligible for cancellation of removal for nonpermanent residents pursuant to INA 240A(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b)(1), it does not matter when the crime of moral turpitude occurred in relation to the alien's admission), following the reasoning of Matter of Cortez, 25 I&N Dec. 301 (BIA 2010).