United States v. Iqbal, 684 F.3d 507 (5th Cir. 2012) (affirming district court order releasing portions of the presentence report from a criminal case to DHS for use in removal proceedings, because the reasons for confidentiality can be outweighed when [as here] the moving party can show a compelling, particularized need for disclosure to meet the ends of justice.); quoting United States v. Huckaby, 43 F.3d 135, 139 (5th Cir. 1995).

Note: Criminal defense counsel must therefore contest facts in the PSR that would prove damaging in later removal proceedings.

Young v. Holder, 697 F.3d 976, *982 (9th Cir. Sept. 17, 2012) (en banc) (In both criminal and immigration contexts, we often must inquire whether an individual's prior state conviction constitutes a conviction for a generic federal crime. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Duenas"Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183, 185"86, 127 S.Ct. 815, 166 L.Ed.2d 683 (2007) (applying, in the immigration context, the approach set forth in Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 599"600, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990), in the criminal sentencing context); United States v.

Young v. Holder, 697 F.3d 976, *983 (9th Cir. Sept. 17, 2012) (en banc) (When, as here, the state statute of conviction criminalizes a broader range of conduct than the generic federal crime, we employ the modified categorical approach, which requires us to determine whether a jury was actually required to find all the elements of the generic federal crime. Aguila"Montes de Oca, 655 F.3d at 920 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Lari v. Holder, 697 F.3d 273 (5th Cir. Sept. 27, 2012) (8 C.F.R. 1003.2(d), barring noncitizens from filing a motion to reconsider after their departure from the United States, is ultra vires to the INA).

United States v. Castillo-Marin, 684 F.3d 914 (9th Cir. Jul. 3, 2012) (New York conviction of assault in the first degree, under New York Penal Law 120.10, was not categorically a crime of violence, for illegal re-entry purposes, because it includes reckless endangerment and causing injury during flight, which do not prohibit only conduct that involves an intent to injure, and may be committed with mere recklessness).

United States v. Castillo-Marin, 684 F.3d 914, *920 (9th Cir. Jul. 3, 2012) (Our precedent is clear that a district court may not rely on a PSR's factual description of a prior offense to determine whether the defendant was convicted of a crime of violence, notwithstanding the defendant's failure to object to the PSR. . . . Thus, to the extent the district court relied on the PSR's factual description of Castillo"Marin's prior offense to determine that Castillo"Marin had been convicted of a crime of violence, it plainly erred.); United States v.

California Penal Code 1193 (Judgment upon persons convicted of commission of crime shall be pronounced as follows: (a) If the conviction is for a felony, the defendant shall be personally present when judgment is pronounced against him or her, unless the defendant, in open court and on the record, or in a notarized writing, requests that judgment be pronounced against him or her in his or her absence, and that he or she be represented by an attorney when judgment is pronounced, and the court approves his or her absence during the pronouncement of judgment, or unless, after the exercise of rea

People v. Lara, 54 Cal.4th 896, 281 P.3d 72 (Jul. 19, 2012) (Court's of Appeal's judgment directing the trial court to exercise its discretion under Penal Code 1385 to decide whether its order striking enhancements should be applied so as to maximize defendant's presentence credits under the version of former Penal Code 4019 applicable to this case, is reversed as the court's authority under section 1385 does not authorize a court to disregard the historical facts that disqualify a local prisoner from earning day-for-day conduct credit under former section 4019).

People v. Nishi, 207 Cal.App.4th 954, 143 Cal.Rptr.3d 882 (1st Dist. Jul.

B.F. v. Superior Court, 207 Cal.App.4th 621, 143 Cal.Rptr.3d 730 (2d Dist. Jul. 2, 2012) (granting writ of mandate commanding Superior Court to consider the request of the Minors B.F., M.F., and L.F., by and through their legal guardians, regarding special immigrant status pursuant to INA 101(a)(27)(J), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(27)(J) and 8 CFR 204.11, and to conduct a hearing, as soon as practicable, on the merits of the Minors' request and thereafter issue a new order.)