Stancle v. Clay, 692 F.3d 948 (9th Cir. Aug. 28, 2012) (habeas petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling for the period between the denial of his first superior court habeas petition and the filing of his second in the same court because he did not limit his second petition to an elaboration of the facts or simply attempt to correct deficiencies in the original petition; alleged mental incompetence is insufficient to warrant equitable tolling because petitioner did not meet his burden of showing that he could have filed a timely petition with the assistance he was receiving).

United States v. Descamps, 466 Fed. Appx. 563 (9th Cir. 2012) (Supreme Court grant of certiorari is limited to the question whether, in a case under the Armed Career Criminal Act, when a state crime does not require an element of the federal crime of burglary, the federal court may find the existence of that element by examining the record of the state proceedings under the "modified categorical approach.).

The issue presented is "Whether the Ninth Circuit's ruling in United States v.

Corpuz v. Holder, 697 F.3d 807, *814 (9th Cir. Aug. 31, 2012) (while time in pre-conviction civil confinement to determine competence to stand trial generally would not be included in the phrase term of imprisonment for purposes of former INA 212(c), such a period is considered part of the term of imprisonment where the defendant was given credit for time served on the basis of the civil confinement, but with limitations: The question is how this time should be counted.

Aguilar-Turcios v. Holder, 691F.3d 1025 (9th Cir. Aug. 15, 2012) (military conviction of violating UCMJ Article 92, which prohibits violat[ing] or fail[ing] to obey any lawful general order or regulation, see 10 U.S.C. 892(1), did not amount to a violation of 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(2) and (a)(4), under the modified categorical approach, because the facts on which the conviction necessarily rested do not satisfy the elements of either 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(2) or (a)(4), and therefore do not constitute deportable child pornography aggravated felony convictions under INA 101(a)(43)(I), 8 U.S.C.

Aguilar-Turcios v. Holder, 691F.3d 1025, *1037 (9th Cir. Aug. 15, 2012) (there is no legal precedent that allows a court, in its application of the modified categorical approach, to look beyond the record of conviction of the particular offense that the government alleges is an aggravated felony. . . . Aguilar-Turcios Article 92 and Article 134 convictions were for separate offenses that charged different conduct, and we are reluctant to conflate the two into one or allow one to seep into the other when applying the modified categorical approach.); accord, Jaggernauth v.

Aguilar-Turcios v. Holder, 691 F.3d 1025, *1039 (9th Cir. Aug. 15, 2012) (Because the two charges are worded differently, we cannot conclude that the two convictions necessarily rested on the same facts.)

United States v. Flores-Mejia, 687 F.3d 1213 (9th Cir. Aug. 9, 2012) (California conviction for violation of California Penal Code 211, robbery, is a categorical crime of violence under the "enumerated offenses" definition in U.S.S.G. 2L1.2 for illegal re-entry sentencing purposes).

United States v. Bustamante, 687 F.3d 1190 (9th Cir. Aug. 7, 2012) (vacating federal convictions for illegal reentry, making a false statement in a passport application, and making a false statement in an application for supplemental security income benefits, a because the introduction into evidence of a document appearing to be a transcription of defendant's birth certificate from the Philippines violated defendants rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, and this error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt).

Mojica v. Holder, 689 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. Oct. 10, 2012) (rejecting petitioner's imputation argument making use of her father's lawful permanent residence to qualify for cancellation of removal, in light of the Supreme Court's holding in Holder v. Martinez Gutierrez).

Nijar v. Holder, 689 F.3d 1077, 1086-1087 (9th Cir. Aug. 1, 2012) (DHS does not have the authority to terminate an alien's asylum status; The regulations pursuant to which the Department of Homeland Security terminates asylum status, 8 C.F.R. 208.24(a) and 8 C.F.R. 1208.24(a), are ultra vires because the governing statute, 8 U.S.C. 1158(c)(2), confers that authority exclusively on the Attorney General.).