Crimes of Moral Turpitude
§ 2.14 (C)
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(C) Other Non-Criminal Violations. Dispositions resulting from other types of proceedings may also fail to qualify as convictions of crimes for similar reasons.
In some states, it is possible to have a case transferred from adult criminal court to juvenile court or family court under some circumstances. In this event, immigration counsel could argue that a “civil” finding did not constitute a criminal conviction. See § 2.9, supra.
A court order finding a violation of a protective order, while possibly triggering the domestic violence ground of deportation,[158] should not be considered a “crime” of moral turpitude, as this order is civil, rather than criminal. Even if a "conviction" results, counsel can still argue that violation of a protective order is a regulatory offense, rather than a crime of moral turpitude, because there is nothing inherently wrong with violating a court order; it is just that the judge has forbidden the conduct.
In rare instances, an offense may not be considered a crime for other reasons. For example, an attempt to commit a crime which has recklessness as a mental element was held not to be a crime at all, since a person cannot intend to commit a criminally reckless act, and the “crime of attempted reckless endangerment is nonexistent since it is a non-intent offense.”[159]
[158] INA § 237(a)(2)(E)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii).
[159] Knapik v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 84 (3d Cir. Sept. 17, 2004) (New York conviction of attempted reckless endangerment in the first degree, in violation of New York Penal Law § 120.25, does not constitute a crime of moral turpitude for deportation purposes, since a person cannot intend to commit a criminally reckless act, and the “crime of attempted reckless endangerment is nonexistent since it is a non-intent offense.”), citing People v. Trepanier, 84 A.D.2d 374, 380, 446 N.Y.S.2d 829 (N.Y.App.Div. 1982) (affirming the lower court’s decision to dismiss the indictment as to this charge).