This section covers general considerations that arise in deciding whether a given conviction will trigger the immigration consequences of crimes of moral turpitude, and that may therefore be treated once here in detail, with reference back to this discussion in the specific areas in which they are relevant.  No crime or conviction will trigger any immigration consequences if the defendant is a United States citizen.  Therefore, alienage (i.e., the fact that the defendant is a citizen of a foreign country) is an invariable prerequisite to the imposition of adverse immigration consequences.  See § 2.2, infra.  Moreover, the two different grounds of deportation, and the single ground of inadmissibility, flowing from crimes of moral turpitude all require a conviction.[1]   See § § 2.3, 4.3, 5.2, 5.12, infra.  Finally, the conviction must be for a “crime” in order to trigger these adverse immigration consequences.  See § 2.13, infra.

[1]  The CMT ground of inadmissibility may also be triggered, in rare circumstances, by an admission of the commission of a CMT.  See § 4.4, infra.

Ninth Circuit

CONVICTION " NON-CONVICTION DISPOSITION " VIOLATION OR INFRACTION " MILITARY NON-JUDICIAL PUNISHMENT
United States v. Reveles, 660 F.3d 1138, No. 10-30313 (9th Cir. Oct. 24, 2011) (the non-judicial punishment (NJP) administered by the Navy for drunk driving was not criminal in nature and therefore the Government did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution by prosecuting and convicting the defendant for the crime a second time"this time in the U.S. district court"after he had received NJP for the same offense.) NOTE: Applying this to the immigration context, the argument would be that, if even an offense that carries 30 days in custody is not considered to be criminal, offenses that may not meet each of the Matter of Eslamizar requirements might nevertheless fail to constitute a conviction of a crime for immigration purposes as well, as long as it appears they also do not follow a criminal procedure. See Matter of Eslamizar, 23 I. & N. Dec. 684, 687 (BIA 2004) (finding that an Oregon violation was not a conviction, because it carried: (1) no possible jail sentence; (2) no right to appointed counsel; (3) no right to jury trial; and (4) and no right to proof beyond a reasonable doubt).