Crimes of Moral Turpitude

The crime of moral turpitude ground of inadmissibility, and both of the CMT grounds of deportation, are triggered by a criminal “conviction.”[9]  Any disposition in criminal court that does not constitute a “conviction” for immigration purposes will not trigger the CMT deportation grounds[10] (the CMT inadmissibility ground may be triggered by either a conviction or an admission of committing a CMT[11]).  Whether a conviction exists for immigration purposes is assessed under a uniform federal standard.[12]  

Only certain dispositions are considered to be “convictions” for immigration purposes.[13]  The statute defines a conviction to include a “formal judgment of guilt of the alien entered by a court,” and also other less formal dispositions.  A conviction can result from a trial or plea of guilty or no contest.[14]  A state, federal, or foreign conviction can trigger this ground.[15]  A finding of guilt followed by commitment to a state mental hospital is considered a conviction,[16] as is a finding of guilt followed by commitment to another institution or agency.[17] 

            However, dismissal, see § 2.5, diversion (if no plea of guilty or no contest or the equivalent has been entered), see § 2.6, dispositions entered in juvenile court, see § 2.9, and convictions that are still on direct appeal (or as to which appeal may still be initiated), see § 2.12, are not considered “convictions” for immigration purposes.  Convictions that have been vacated or voided as a result of post-conviction relief no longer constitute convictions, as long as the order was entered on some ground of legal invalidity of the conviction, see § § 10.3 ff, infra, rather than as a result of a state rehabilitative statute, see § 10.11, infra.[18]  Deferred entry of judgment, and similar dispositions that follow a plea of guilty or no contest constitute convictions for immigration purposes even if no conviction results under state law.  See § 2.6, infra.[19]

[9] Aguilera-Enriquez v. INS, 516 F.2d 565 (6th Cir. 1975); Mylius v. Uhl, 210 F. 860 (2d Cir. 1914).

[10] INA § § 237(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), (ii), 8 U.S.C. § § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), (ii).

[11] INA § 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I).  See § 4.4, infra.

[12] Will v. INS, 447 F.2d 529 (7th Cir. 1971).

[13] INA § 101(a)(48)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A)

[14] Ahmed v. INS, 92 F.3d 1196 (10th Cir. 1996) (Table); Giammario v. Hurney, 311 F.2d 285 (3d Cir. 1962) (where noncitizen pleaded guilty and was convicted of larceny in Australia, he was properly deported as a noncitizen excludable from admission based on conviction of crime of moral turpitude; noncitizen’s claim that he pleaded guilty only because a trial would have taken weeks or months was rejected, and the court refused to try anew the issue of noncitizen’s guilt). 

[15] Bufalino v. Irvine, 103 F.2d 830 (10th Cir. 1939); Ponzi v. Ward, 7 F.Supp. 736 (D. Mass. 1934); Matter of Alfonso-Bermudez, 12 I. & N. Dec. 225 (BIA 1967) (conviction under city ordinance of disorderly conduct).

[16] Matter of V, 7 I. & N. Dec. 242 (BIA 1956).

[17] Zabanazad v. Rosenberg, 306 F.2d 861 (9th Cir. 1962); Adams v. United States, 299 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1962); Matter of Garcia, 19 I. & N. Dec. 270 (BIA 1985); Matter of HV, 9 I. & N. Dec. 428 (BIA 1961); Matter of P, 8 I. & N. Dec. 517 (BIA 1960) (two convictions, commitment under Federal Youth Correction Act).

[18] Matter of Roldan, 22 I. & N. Dec. 512 (BIA 1999) (en banc), overruled in part by Lujan-Armendariz v. INS, 222 F.3d 728 (9th Cir. 2000) (expungements for first offense simple possession of drugs under the Federal First Offender Act will work to eliminate the conviction for immigration purposes in Ninth Circuit).

[19] Matter of Punu, 22 I. & N. Dec. 224 (BIA 1998) (en banc).