(A)   United States Standards Apply.  In determining whether a conviction suffered in a foreign jurisdiction constitutes a crime involving moral turpitude, the courts apply standards and law of the United States rather than those of the foreign country.[78]

            For example, in United States ex rel. McKenzie v. Savoretti,[79] the court held that the INS did not have to prove that the British West Indies convictions of crimes of forgery, uttering, and stealing involved moral turpitude in the foreign jurisdiction by investigating the substantive foreign law.  The noncitizen argued that his convictions were actually for juvenile delinquency, and that he was tried and convicted as an adult offender because a juvenile court had not been set up in the British West Indies.  The court rejected this argument, saying that moral turpitude within the scope of the immigration laws is determined without reference to the laws of foreign jurisdictions, and that where the noncitizen had admitted the accuracy of the record showing his conviction of the crimes of forgery, uttering, and stealing, the determination that he had been convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude was correct, since under United States standards these crimes are considered to be crimes of moral turpitude.

 

In rejecting the contention of a noncitizen that the hearing officer erred in referring to Italian law in his decision as to moral turpitude, since no proof of the foreign law was made at the hearing, the court in De Lucia v. Flagg[80] held that it was only necessary for the hearing officer to consider the record of conviction in Italy of voluntary homicide “with grave provocation” and apply the prevalent United States standards of what constitutes moral turpitude to reach his conclusion.

 

In Vidal y Planas v. Landon,[81] the court held that a noncitizen convicted in Spain of homicide with extenuating circumstances, when he had evidently shot a man in self-defense after having been attacked, had not been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.  The record of conviction established that the defendant, at the time of the slaying, was in a blind rage which had been incited by the victim.  The court applied standards supplied by the Solicitor General of the Department of Justice for the information of immigration officers, which excepted from the category of crimes involving moral turpitude those offenses which were “the outcome merely of natural passions, of animal spirits, of infirmity of temper, of weakness of character, or of mistaken principles, unaccompanied by a vicious motive or corrupt mind.”

            In Mercer v. Lence,[82] the court rejected the noncitizen’s argument that Canadian statutes must be consulted in order to determine whether the crime of conspiracy to defraud involves moral turpitude, and that without proof as to whether the crime proscribed by the foreign statute involved moral turpitude, the question could not be determined here.  The court held that moral turpitude for immigration purposes must be determined according to United States standards, and concluded that the noncitizen had been convicted of a crime which U.S. courts regard as involving moral turpitude.

 

            The question whether an offense is a CMT is different from the question of determining the elements of the statute of conviction, which does depend upon the law of the convicting jurisdiction.[83]  See Chapter 6, infra. 

[78] Squires v. INS, 689 F.2d 1276, 1278 (6th Cir. 1982) (appraisal of petty offense statute);

United States ex rel. Ventura v. Shaughnessy, 219 F.2d 249 (2d Cir. 1955) (Portuguese crime “very similar to what we call burglary or larceny”); McKenzie v. Savoretti, 200 F.2d 546 (5th Cir. 1952); Mercer v. Lence, 96 F.2d 122 (10th Cir.), cert. den., 305 U.S. 611 (1938); Whitty v. Weedin, 68 F.2d 127 (9th Cir. 1933) (bigamy committed in Canada); Pillisz v. Smith, 46 F.2d 769 (7th Cir. 1931) (manslaughter committed in Hungary); United States ex rel. Ulrich v. Kellogg, 58 App. D.C. 360, 30 F.2d 984, 71 A.L.R. 1210 (D.C. Cir.), cert. den., 279 U.S. 868, 73 L. ed. 1005, 49 S.Ct. 482 (1929) (conviction in foreign country of larceny, irrespective of whether it was petit or grand larceny under American standards); Matter of McNaughton, 16 I. & N. Dec. 569 (BIA 1978) (securities fraud); Matter of M, 9 I. & N. Dec. 132 (BIA 1960); Ex parte Isojoki, 222 Fed. 151 (D. Cal. 1915) (unmarried woman living in Sweden with unmarried man, and having isolated intercourse with other unmarried men, both in Sweden and on a ship en route to Australia); Siniscalchi v. Thomas, 195 F. 701 (6th Cir. 1912) (conviction of rape in Italy);

United States ex rel. Huber v. Sibray, 178 F. 144 (C.C.Pa. 1910), rev’d on other grounds, 185 F. 401 (3d Cir. 1911) (adultery committed in Austria); Forbes v. Brownell, 149 F.Supp. 848 (D.D.C. 1957) (bigamy in Canada); United States ex rel. Cumberbatch v. Shaughnessy, 117 F.Supp. 152 (D.N.Y. 1953) (false statement before United States consular officer in Trinidad); United States ex rel. Teper v. Miller, 87 F.Supp. 285 (D.N.Y. 1949) (noncitizen’s conviction in England of “stealing a fur” from his wife); United States ex rel. Ciarello v. Reimer, 32 F.Supp. 797 (D.N.Y. 1940) (assault and battery in Italy); United States ex rel. Chartrand v. Karnuth, 31 F.Supp. 799 (D.N.Y. 1940) (conviction in Canada of theft of shoes valued at $12); United States ex rel. Schreiber v. Reimer, 19 F.Supp. 719 (D.N.Y. 1937) (embezzlement committed in Belgium); Matter of Katsanis, 14 I. & N. Dec. 266 (BIA 1973); Matter of Awaijane, 14 I. & N. Dec. 117 (BIA 1972); Matter of M, 9 I. & N. Dec. 132 (1960) (swindling, forgery, and “violation of domicile” in Italy); Matter of D, 4 I. & N. Dec. 149 (BIA 1950) (attempted suicide); Matter of M, 2 I. & N. Dec. 686 (BIA 1946) (Canadian conviction for “joy riding”).

[79] United States ex rel. McKenzie v. Savoretti, 200 F.2d 546 (5th Cir. 1952).

[80] De Lucia v. Flagg, 297 F.2d 58 (7th Cir. 1961), cert. den., 369 U.S. 837, 7 L. Ed..2d 843, 82 S.Ct. 867 (1962).

[81] Vidal y Planas v. Landon, 104 F.Supp. 384 (S.D.Cal. 1952).

[82] Mercer v. Lence, 96 F.2d 122 (10th Cir.), cert. den., 305 U.S. 611, 83 L. Ed.. 388, 59 S.Ct. 69 (1938).

[83] Cf. Matter of O'Cealleagh, 23 I. & N. Dec. 976 (BIA 2006) (Irish conviction for aiding and abetting murder is a crime of moral turpitude).  The BIA in this case noted, but did not address, issue that Irish aiding and abetting does not necessarily meet US standards of aiding and abetting, since it appears that the parties had not raised that issue on appeal.  The BIA also did not address whether “aiding and abetting” a CMT could ever trigger inadmissibility under INA § 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), since that statute lists “attempt” and “conspiracy,” but not “aiding and abetting.”  See § 9.3, infra.

FOREIGN CONVICTIONS - SPECIFICALLY LISTED IN FEDERAL LEGISLATION
Burgess v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, ___,(Apr. 16, 2008) ("Notably, [21 U.S.C.] 802(44) includes foreign offenses punishable by more than one year, while 802(13) includes only federal and state offenses. Incorporation of 802(13) into 841(b)(1)(A) would exclude enhancement based on a foreign offense, notwithstanding the express inclusion of foreign offenses in 802(44)'s definition of "felony drug offense." Furthermore, some States and many foreign jurisdictions do not label offenses as felonies or misdemeanors.").

FOREIGN CONVICTIONS - SPECIFICALLY LISTED IN FEDERAL LEGISLATION
Burgess v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, ___,(Apr. 16, 2008) ("Notably, [21 U.S.C.] 802(44) includes foreign offenses punishable by more than one year, while 802(13) includes only federal and state offenses. Incorporation of 802(13) into 841(b)(1)(A) would exclude enhancement based on a foreign offense, notwithstanding the express inclusion of foreign offenses in 802(44)'s definition of "felony drug offense." Furthermore, some States and many foreign jurisdictions do not label offenses as felonies or misdemeanors.").

Other

REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS - FOREIGN CONVICTIONS - CHALLENGING FOREIGN CONVICTIONS IN IMMIGRATION COURT
Absent evidence of political motivation for a wrongful prosecution, the adjudicator cannot look behind a conviction to determine whether the applicant was guilty of the offense for purposes of determining inadmissibility under INA 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), although evidence of a wrongful conviction can be relevant to waiver considerations. 9 FAM 40.21(A).

In challenging a foreign conviction counsel can:

A. Argue that the foreign conviction documents were not properly authenticated (8 C.F.R. 1287.6(b)), or were not admissible or reliable evidence of the record of conviction (INA 240(c)(3)(B); 8 C.F.R. 1003.41).

B.Argue that the foreign conviction was fundamentally unfair, i.e., that the applicant was abused by the police and there were not adequate procedural safeguards to ensure a reliable conviction.

C.Argue that the conviction was for a purely political offense. (See, e.g., INA 212(A)(2)(a)(i) (CMT)).

D.Establish that the evidence upon which the conviction was based was improper. Evidence against an alien must, at a minimum, be "probative" and "fundamentally fair." Ezeagwuna v. Ashcroft, 325 F.3d 396, 405 (3d Cir. 2003). As the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has stated, "fairness is closely related to the reliability and trustworthiness of the evidence." Id. at 405. United States courts have always scrutinized whether evidence has been obtained in a manner that satisfies fundamental fairness. See, e.g., Hutto v. Ross, 429 U.S. 28 (1976); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973); United States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210 (4th Cir. 2008); United States v. Karake, 443 F. Supp. 2d 8 (D.C. Dist. Ct. 2006); United States v. Marturo, 982 F. 2d 57 (2d Cir. 1992); United States v. Santos-Garcia, 313 F.3d 1073, 1079 (8th Cir. 2002); United States v. Marzook, 435 F. Supp. 2d 708 (N.D. Ill. 2006). This includes scrutiny of foreign convictions. In a case involving sentence enhancement imposed on account of a prior drug conviction in the Philippines, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals carefully analyzed whether the defendants foreign conviction was "obtained in a manner inconsistent with concepts of fundamental fairness and liberty endemic in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution." United States v. Kole, 164 F.3d 164, 171 (3d Cir. 1998). Similarly, a court ruling on whether a Japanese conviction could be used as a predicate offense held, "Given the uncertainty surrounding foreign convictions, a defendant should have an opportunity to challenge those convictions which were obtained in such a manner as to raise serious doubts about the credibility of the fact-finding process and, thus, to render it fundamentally unfair." U.S. v. Small, 183 F. Supp. 2d 755, 762 (W.D. Penn. 2002).

E. A foreign conviction in absentia cannot be considered in determining whether an alien is inadmissible for a crime involving moral turpitude. 22 C.F.R. 40.21(a)(4). Although the Board has stated that a foreign conviction need not conform exactly to the constitutional guarantees provided by the United States, Matter of M, 9 I. & N. Dec. 132, 138 (BIA 1960), there is no support for the governments suggestion that convictions obtained in foreign military courts through torture or procedures completely lacking in fundamental fairness should be considered reliable evidence of guilt.

The harsh sanction of deportation, or denial of relief from deportation, should not be imposed where there is no reliable proof of moral culpability, notwithstanding the existence of a foreign conviction. See, e.g., Lennon v. INS, 527 F.2d 187, 193 (2d Cir. 1975). Indeed, it is deeply offensive to American notions of justice to suggest that foreign convictions obtained through the use of physical and psychological abuse, or by methods totally lacking in fundamental fairness, should be relied upon as proof of guilt or considered to be valid. See Matter of Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 268-70 (1948) ("The traditional Anglo-American distrust for secret trials has been variously ascribed to the notorious use of this practice by the Spanish Inquisition, to the excesses of the English Court of Star Chamber, and to the French monarchy's abuse of the lettre de cachet"); U.S. v. Karake, 443 F. Supp. 2d 8, 51 (D.C. Dist. Ct. 2006) (holding defendants confessions inadmissible where obtained through psychological and physical abuse). Thanks to Jason Cade.