(A)  In General.  The courts initially defined “conviction” for immigration purposes.[19]  In 1996, for the first time, Congress in IIRAIRA defined “conviction” for all immigration purposes by statute.  See § 7.12, infra.  The legislative history indicates congressional intent to bypass certain ameliorative state statutes, so certain criminal dispositions will count as “convictions” for immigration purposes, such as deferred adjudication arrangements, even if they are not considered convictions by the state jurisdiction in which the conviction was rendered.  See § 7.13, infra.  The federal statute defining conviction includes a formal judgment of guilt, see § 7.15, infra, but also certain deferred adjudication arrangements.  See § § 7.16, et seq., infra.  The statute requires certain elements to exist before a disposition is considered a conviction for immigration purposes, see § 7.14, infra, so a disposition lacking one or more of these elements will not be considered a conviction under immigration law.  See § § 7.27, et seq., infra.

[19] See Matter of Ozkok, 19 I. & N. Dec. 546 (BIA 1988).

BIA

CONVICTION " NATURE OF OFFENSE " ELEMENTS OF OFFENSE " SENTENCE ENHANCEMENT " MILITARY CONVICTION
Matter of Chavez-Alvarez, 26 I. & N. Dec. 274 (BIA Mar. 14, 2014) (an sentencing enhancement element listed in a specification in the Manual for Courts-Martial, that must be pled and proved beyond a reasonable doubt, is the functional equivalent of an element of a criminal offense for immigration purposes).

CONVICTION " MUNICIPAL ORDINANCE
Matter of Cuellar-Gomez, 25 I&N Dec. 850, 855 (BIA Jul. 18, 2012) (Kansas conviction of possession of marijuana, in violation of a Wichita municipal ordinance, constituted a conviction for immigration proceedings because the Wichita proceedings required proof beyond a reasonable doubt, even though there was no right to counsel or jury trial), distinguishing Matter of Eslamizar, 23 I. & N. Dec. 684 (BIA Oct. 19, 2004).

CONVICTION - OFFENSE - DEFINITION
Matter of Carachuri-Rosendo, 24 I. & N. Dec. 382, 388 (BIA Dec. 13, 2007) (en banc) ("A criminal "offense" is defined by its "elements," Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 716-17 (1989), with "elements" being understood as facts that must be proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt in order to convict. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).").

Lower Courts of Second Circuit

CONVICTION - SENTENCE - CALIFORNIA LAW PROVIDES THAT WITHOUT A SENTENCE, THERE IS NO CONVICTION
The California courts have plainly held that there is no conviction without a sentence. "There must [. . .] exist both prohibited or commanded acts and punishment for violation thereof; without both, there is no crime." People v. Vasilyan, 174 Cal. App. 4th 443, 450 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 2009) (citing People v. Crutcher (1968) 262 Cal.App.2d 750, 754 [68 Cal. Rptr. 904].) ("That there must be a substantive crime and a punishment for that crime in order to constitute a criminal offense has been long recognized)(citing People v. McNulty (1892) 93 Cal. 427, 437 [29 P. 61].)) (emphasis added).

Third Circuit

CONVICTION " DEFINITION " ESLAMIZAR
Castillo v. Holder, 729 F.3d 296 (3d Cir. 2013) (New Jersey disorderly persons offense is not a conviction, as defined for immigration purposes in INA 101(a)(48), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(48); Matter of Eslamizar, 23 I. & N. Dec. 684 (BIA 2004), requires that a disposition must be considered an adjudication of guilt in a genuine criminal proceeding under the law of the convicting jurisdiction; under New Jersey law, a disorderly persons offense is not a crime).

Ninth Circuit

CONVICTION - PUNISHMENT - CRIMINAL FINE CONSTITUTES SUFFICIENT PUNISHMENT TO CREATE A CONVICTION SO LONG AS IT IS NOT STAYED
Retuta v. Holder, 591 F.3d 1181 (9th Cir. Jan. 7, 2010) (California fine imposed as part of the sentence as a result of a plea in a criminal case constituted sufficient punishment to create a conviction, within the meaning of INA 101(a)(48)(B), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(48)(B): "We need not decide whether we must give deference to BIA's decision in Cabrera that costs or restitution are sufficiently punitive to be a "punishment" or "penalty," as the minute order clearly states the amount involved to be a fine."), citing Matter of Cabrera, 24 I. & N. Dec. 459, 461-462 (BIA 2008) (mandatory costs imposed in a criminal sentence were sufficient to constitute a "punishment" or "penalty," within the meaning of INA 101(a)(48)(B), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(48)(B), creating a conviction for immigration purposes).

CONVICTION - PUNISHMENT - CRIMINAL FINE THAT HAS BEEN STAYED DOES NOT CONSTITUTE SUFFICIENT PUNISHMENT TO CREATE A CONVICTION FOR IMMIGRATION PURPOSES
Retuta v. Holder, 591 F.3d 1181 (9th Cir. Jan. 7, 2010) (the statutory definition of "conviction," INA 101(a)(48), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(48), does not include criminal judgments whose only consequence is a suspended non-incarceratory sanction because in the first part of its statutory definition of conviction, INA 101(a)(48)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(48)(A), "Congress intentionally omitted the exemplars [listed in Matter of Ozkok], which included several minor sanctions such as "revocation or suspension of a driver's license, deprivation of nonessential activities or privileges, or community service." [Footnote omitted.] The minute order here required less from petitioner Retuta than any of the exemplars in the Ozkok opinion that Congress chose not to adopt. In fact, the minute order requires nothing of Retuta. He suffered no loss of wealth, nor loss of liberty." In addition, in INA 101(a)(43)(B), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(48)(B) Congress specifically allowed suspended incarceration to qualify as sufficient punishment to create a conviction, but did not do so for a suspended fine.).

CONVICTION - PUNISHMENT - CRIMINAL FINE CONSTITUTES SUFFICIENT PUNISHMENT TO CREATE A CONVICTION SO LONG AS IT IS NOT STAYED
Retuta v. Holder, 591 F.3d 1181 (9th Cir. Jan. 7, 2010) (California fine imposed as part of the sentence as a result of a plea in a criminal case constituted sufficient punishment to create a conviction, within the meaning of INA 101(a)(48)(B), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(48)(B): "We need not decide whether we must give deference to BIA's decision in Cabrera that costs or restitution are sufficiently punitive to be a "punishment" or "penalty," as the minute order clearly states the amount involved to be a fine."), citing Matter of Cabrera, 24 I. & N. Dec. 459, 461-462 (BIA 2008) (mandatory costs imposed in a criminal sentence were sufficient to constitute a "punishment" or "penalty," within the meaning of INA 101(a)(48)(B), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(48)(B), creating a conviction for immigration purposes).

Tenth Circuit

CONVICTION " EXISTENCE OF CONVICTION " GOVERNMENT NEED NOT PROVE CONVICTION WAS CONSTITUTIONAL IN ORDER TO DEPORT
Waugh v. Holder, 642 F.3d 1279, 1283 (10th Cir. Jun. 22, 2011) (DHS does not need to establish that criminal counsel gave proper immigration advice under Padilla v. Kentucky in order to establish deportability), citing United States v. Adame-Orozco, 607 F.3d 647, 653 (10th Cir. 2010) (that while an alien may have the right to pursue appellate or collateral relief for an aggravated felony conviction under various provisions of state and federal law, the government need not wait until all these avenues are exhausted before deporting him.).

Eleventh Circuit

JUVENILES - ADULT CONVICTIONS
Singh v. US Attorney Gen., __ F.3d __ (11th Cir. Dec. 31, 2008) (Florida conviction, in adult court, of defendant who was a juvenile at the time the offense was committed is still a "conviction" for immigration purposes, even though the defendant could not have been tried as an adult under the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act), following Vieira Garcia v. I.N.S., 239 F.3d 409 (1st Cir.2001); Vargas-Hernandez v. Gonzales, 497 F.3d 919, 922-23 (9th Cir.2007); Savchuck v. Mukasey, 518 F.3d 119, 122 (2nd Cir. 2008).

Other

CONVICTION " SENTENCE " NO CONVICTION EXISTS UNLESS A SENTENCE HAS BEEN IMPOSED " ARGUMENT
The statutory definition of conviction, for immigration purposes, requires that the court must have ordered some form of punishment, penalty, or restraint on the alien's liberty to be imposed. INA 101(a)(48)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(48)(A)(2010). As the Second, Third and Fifth Circuits have held, a formal judgment of guilt requires that the court must set forth the plea, the jury verdict or the court's findings, the adjudication, and the sentence. Singh v. Holder, 568 F.3d 525, 530 (5th Cir. 2009) (emphasis added), citing Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(k)(1); Puello v. Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Servs., 511 F.3d 324, 329 (2d Cir. 2007); Perez v. Elwood, 294 F.3d 552, 562 (3d Cir. 2002)). The United States Supreme Court also holds that [f]inal judgment in a criminal case ... means sentence. The sentence is the judgment. Singh, 568 F.3d at 530, citing Corey v. United States, 375 U.S. 169, 174, 84 S.Ct. 298, 11 L.Ed.2d 229 (1963), quoting Berman v. United States, 302 U.S. 211, 212, 58 S.Ct. 164, 82 L.Ed. 204 (1937). This is also the law in California. Judgment in California is synonymous with the pronouncement of a sentence. See People v. Perez 23 Cal.3d 545, 549 n.2 (1979); People v. Flores, 12 Cal.3d 85, 93 n.6 (1974). Because no new sentence has been imposed on these convictions, the respondent does not have a final conviction for immigration purposes. See Pino v. Landon, 349 U.S. 901 (1955) (stating that a criminal conviction may not be considered by the immigration authorities until it is final). Thanks to Michael Mehr and Rachael Keast.