The definition of a “conviction” is governed by federal law, irrespective of the label attached to a disposition under state law.[18]  Therefore, where the requirements of the federal statute have been met, the disposition will be considered a “conviction” for immigration purposes, even if it is not considered to be a conviction under the law of the state or jurisdiction in which the disposition occurred.  See § 7.11(A), infra.

 

[18] INA § 101(a)(48)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(B), as enacted by IIRAIRA § 322(a)(1).  See also United States v. Ayala-Gomez, 255 F.3d 1314 (11th Cir. 2001).

Fifth Circuit

CONVICTION - FINALITY - FULL FAITH AND CREDIT ACT NOT VIOLATED BY SENTENCING COURT'S CONCLUSION STATE DEFERRED ADJUDICATION PROBATION DISPOSITION CONSTITUTES CONVICTION FOR PURPOSES OF ENHANCING FEDERAL SENTENCE UNDER 18
U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A) United States v. Fazande, 487 F.3d 307 (5th Cir. May 18, 2007) (per curiam) (Texas guilty plea resulting in imposition of deferred adjudication probation constituted a "prior conviction" for purposes of sentence enhancement under 18 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A), rejecting claim that it did not constitute a final conviction under Texas law and the Full Faith and Credit Act; 28 U.S.C. 1738, required the federal criminal court to honor that conclusion, since "the principles that underlie the Full Faith and Credit Act are simply not implicated when a federal court endeavors to determine how a particular state criminal proceeding is to be treated, as a matter of federal law, for the purpose of sentencing the defendant for a distinct and unrelated federal crime."), following United States v. Jones, 415 F.3d 256, 265 (2d Cir. 2005) ("[T]he principles of federalism and comity embodied in the full faith and credit statute are not endangered when a sentencing court, not questioning the propriety of the state's determination in any way, interprets how to apply New York's youthful offender adjudications to a Guidelines analysis.") (internal citation and quotation marks omitted); United States v. Guthrie, 931 F.2d 564, 571 (9th Cir.1991) ("[D]octrines such as Full Faith and Credit, ... and related jurisdictional principles, are inapplicable ... where the issue is the role of prior state convictions in a federal sentencing scheme."); United States v. Carter, 186 Fed.Appx. 844, 847 (10th Cir.2006) (unpublished) ("It does not accord a state judgment less than full faith and credit for a federal court to determine its effect on a subsequent federal sentence under federal law."); see also United States v. Cisneros, 112 F.3d 1272, 1281 (5th Cir. 1997) (rejecting defendant's argument that "because he had successfully completed his two-year deferred adjudication probation," that offense "could not be used to enhance his punishment ... under 841(b)(1)(A)"); United States v. Morales, 854 F.2d 65, 68 (5th Cir. 1988) (the meaning of the phrase "have become final" in 18 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(B) is a question of federal law, not state law).

Ninth Circuit

CONVICTION
Nunez-Reyes v. Holder, 646 F.3d 684, 694 (9th Cir. Jul. 14, 2011) (en banc) (But Congress did not intend adverse immigration consequences for those who were merely charged with a crime or suspected of a crime; Congress intended such results only for those who were duly convicted, with all the constitutional protections of our criminal justice system. Relevant here, we think it is a reasonable assumption that Congress intended adverse immigration consequences only for those who were convicted either after the exercise of their constitutional rights, such as the right to trial, or after an informed waiver of those constitutional rights.).

CONVICTION " DEFINITION " FEDERAL " FELON IN POSSESSION OF FIREARM " DEFINITION OF CONVICTION UNDER LAW OF JURISDICTION IN WHICH PRIOR FELONY OCCURRED
United States v. Anderson, 625 F.3d 1219 (9th Cir. Nov. 16, 2010) (federal offense of being a felon in possession of a firearm, under 18 U.S.C. section 922(g)(1), required only that the defendant be "convicted" of a previous felony, as defined by the jurisdiction in which the proceedings were held, and here California law treated a plea of nolo contendere as equivalent to a guilty plea).