(C)  U.S. Legal Standards Used to Determine Whether Foreign Conviction Falls Within Ground of Deportation.  Whether a foreign conviction constitutes an offense involving moral turpitude will be assessed under United States standards.[328] If a party relies on foreign law, however, it bears the burden of proving what it is.[329] 

            For example, in United States ex rel. McKenzie v Savoretti,[330] the court held that the INS did not have to prove that the British West Indies convictions of crimes of forgery, uttering, and stealing involved moral turpitude in the foreign jurisdiction by investigating the substantive foreign law.  The noncitizen argued that his convictions were actually for juvenile delinquency, and that he was tried and convicted as an adult offender because a juvenile court had not been set up in the British West Indies.  The court rejected this argument, saying that moral turpitude within the scope of the immigration laws is determined without reference to the laws of foreign jurisdictions, and that where the noncitizen had admitted the accuracy of the record showing his conviction of the crimes of forgery, uttering, and stealing, the determination that he had been convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude was correct, since under United States standards these crimes are considered to be crimes of moral turpitude.

 

In rejecting the contention of a noncitizen that the hearing officer erred in referring to Italian law in his decision as to moral turpitude, since no proof of the foreign law was made at the hearing, the court in De Lucia v. Flagg[331] held that it was only necessary for the hearing officer to consider the record of conviction in Italy of voluntary homicide “with grave provocation” and apply the prevalent United States standards of what constitutes moral turpitude to reach his conclusion.

 

In Vidal y Planas v. Landon,[332] the court held that a noncitizen convicted in Spain of homicide with extenuating circumstances, when he had evidently shot a man in self-defense after having been attacked, had not been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.  The record of conviction established that the defendant, at the time of the slaying, was in a blind rage which had been incited by the victim.  The court applied standards supplied by the Solicitor General of the Department of Justice for the information of immigration officers, which excepted from the category of crimes involving moral turpitude those offenses which were “the outcome merely of natural passions, of animal spirits, of infirmity of temper, of weakness of character, or of mistaken principles, unaccompanied by a vicious motive or corrupt mind.”

 

            In Mercer v. Lence,[333] the court rejected the noncitizen’s argument that Canadian statutes must be consulted in order to determine whether the crime of conspiracy to defraud involves moral turpitude, and that without proof as to whether the crime proscribed by the foreign statute involved moral turpitude, the question could not be determined here.  The court held that moral turpitude for immigration purposes must be determined according to United States standards, and concluded that the noncitizen had been convicted of a crime which U.S. courts regard as involving moral turpitude.

[328] Squires v. INS, 689 F.2d 1276, 1278 (6th Cir. 1982) (appraisal of petty offense statute);

United States ex rel. Ventura v. Shaughnessy, 219 F.2d 249 (2d Cir. 1955) (Portuguese crime “very similar to what we call burglary or larceny”); McKenzie v. Savoretti, 200 F.2d 546 (5th Cir. 1952); Mercer v. Lence, 96 F.2d 122 (10th Cir.), cert. den., 305 U.S. 611 (1938); Whitty v. Weedin, 68 F.2d 127 (9th Cir. 1933)(bigamy committed in Canada); Pillisz v. Smith, 46 F.2d 769 (7th Cir. 1931)(manslaughter committed in Hungary); United States ex rel. Ulrich v. Kellogg, 58 App. D.C. 360, 30 F.2d 984, 71 A.L.R. 1210 (D.C. Cir.), cert. den., 279 U.S. 868, 49 S.Ct. 482 (1929)(conviction in foreign country of larceny, irrespective of whether it was petit or grand larceny under American standards); Matter of McNaughton, 16 I. & N. Dec. 569 (BIA 1978) (securities fraud); Matter of M, 9 I. & N. Dec. 132 (BIA 1960); Ex parte Isojoki, 222 Fed. 151 (D. Cal. 1915)(unmarried woman living in Sweden with unmarried man, and having isolated intercourse with other unmarried men, both in Sweden and on a ship en route to Australia); Siniscalchi v. Thomas, 195 F. 701 (6th Cir. 1912)(conviction of rape in Italy); United States ex rel. Huber v. Sibray, 178 F. 144 (C.C.Pa. 1910), rev’d on other grounds, 185 F. 401 (3d Cir. 1910) (adultery committed in Austria); Forbes v. Brownell, 149 F.Supp. 848 (D.D.C. 1957) (bigamy in Canada); United States ex rel. Cumberbatch v. Shaughnessy, 117 F.Supp. 152 (D.N.Y. 1953)(false statement before United States consular officer in Trinidad); United States ex rel. Teper v. Miller, 87 F.Supp. 285 (D.N.Y. 1949) (noncitizen’s conviction in England of “stealing a fur” from his wife); United States ex rel. Ciarello v. Reimer, 32 F.Supp. 797 (D.N.Y. 1940)(assault and battery in Italy); United States ex rel. Chartrand v. Karnuth, 31 F.Supp. 799 (D.N.Y. 1940)(conviction in Canada of theft of shoes valued at $12); United States ex rel. Schreiber v. Reimer, 19 F.Supp. 719 (D.N.Y. 1937) (embezzlement committed in Belgium); Matter of Katsanis, 14 I. & N. Dec. 266 (BIA 1973); Matter of Awaijane, 14 I. & N. Dec. 117 (BIA 1972); Matter of M, 9 I. & N. Dec. 132 (1960) (swindling, forgery, and “violation of domicile” in Italy); Matter of D, 4 I. & N. Dec. 149 (BIA 1950) (attempted suicide); Matter of M, 2 I. & N. Dec. 686 (BIA 1946) (Canadian conviction for “joy riding”).

[329] Matter of Soleimani, 20 I. & N. Dec. 99 (BIA 1989); but see Sadeghi v. INS, 40 F.3d 1139, 1143 (10th Cir. 1994).

[330] United States ex rel. McKenzie v. Savoretti, 200 F.2d 546 (5th Cir. 1952).

[331] De Lucia v. Flagg, 297 F.2d 58 (7th Cir. 1961), cert. den., 369 U.S. 837, 82 S.Ct. 867 (1962).

[332] Vidal y Planas v. Landon, 104 F.Supp. 384 (S.D.Cal. 1952).

[333] Mercer v. Lence, 96 F.2d 122 (10th Cir.), cert. den., 305 U.S. 611, 59 S.Ct. 69 (1938).

FOREIGN CONVICTIONS - SPECIFICALLY LISTED IN FEDERAL LEGISLATION
Burgess v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, ___,(Apr. 16, 2008) ("Notably, [21 U.S.C.] 802(44) includes foreign offenses punishable by more than one year, while 802(13) includes only federal and state offenses. Incorporation of 802(13) into 841(b)(1)(A) would exclude enhancement based on a foreign offense, notwithstanding the express inclusion of foreign offenses in 802(44)'s definition of "felony drug offense." Furthermore, some States and many foreign jurisdictions do not label offenses as felonies or misdemeanors.").

FOREIGN CONVICTIONS - SPECIFICALLY LISTED IN FEDERAL LEGISLATION
Burgess v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, ___,(Apr. 16, 2008) ("Notably, [21 U.S.C.] 802(44) includes foreign offenses punishable by more than one year, while 802(13) includes only federal and state offenses. Incorporation of 802(13) into 841(b)(1)(A) would exclude enhancement based on a foreign offense, notwithstanding the express inclusion of foreign offenses in 802(44)'s definition of "felony drug offense." Furthermore, some States and many foreign jurisdictions do not label offenses as felonies or misdemeanors.").

CONVICTION - DEPORTATION - FOREIGN CONVICTIONS - CONGRESS EXCLUDED FOREIGN CONVICTIONS FROM CONVICTIONS TRIGGERING DEPORTATION, EXCEPT WHERE IT EXPRESSLY PROVIDED OTHERWISE
Small v. United States, ___ U.S. ___ (April 26, 2005) (18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), which prohibits a person who has been "convicted in any court" from possessing a firearm, encompasses only domestic, not foreign, convictions), abrogating United States v. Atkins, 872 F.2d 94, 96 (4th Cir. 1989), and United States v. Winson, 793 F.2d 754, 757-759 (6th Cir. 1986).
http://laws.findlaw.com/us/000/03-750.html       In Small v. United States, ___ U.S. ___ (April 26, 2005), the United States Supreme Court held that 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), which prohibits a person who has been "convicted in any court" from possessing a firearm, encompasses only domestic, not foreign, convictions. This suggests an argument that Congress excluded foreign convictions from those convictions which trigger deportation, except where it expressly provided otherwise.      For aggravated felonies, for example, foreign convictions falling within the aggravated felony definition were expressly listed by Congress as constituting aggravated felonies, but only if the term of imprisonment was completed within the previous 15 years. INA 101(a)(43), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43). Foreign convictions not meeting this test do not fall within the definition.      There is an argument that no foreign conviction can trigger deportability. Congress certainly knew how to provide for the effects of foreign convictions if it wished to do so. Safe Havens 4.35(A). For example, immigration law expressly provides that a noncitizen convicted of or who admits committing a violation of state law, federal law, or any law or regulation of "a foreign country relating to a controlled substance . . . is inadmissible." INA 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(II), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) ("[A]ny alien convicted of, or who admits having committed, or who admits committing acts which constitute the essential elements of -- (II) a violation of (or a conspiracy or attempt to violate) any law or regulation of a State, the United States, or a foreign country relating to a controlled substance (as defined in section 802 of Title 21), . . . is inadmissible.").      Moreover, the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines define "felony" to include "any federal, state or local offense punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year." U.S.S.G. 2L1.2, Application Note 1. As the Supreme Court pointed out, this does not include foreign convictions.      Additionally, the Controlled Substances Act defines a "felony drug offense" as "an offense that is punishable by imprisonment for more than one year under any law of the United States or of a State or foreign country." 21 U.S.C. 802(44). See Safe Havens 7.22(E).      The domestic violence conviction ground of deportation covers a victim who "is protected from that individuals acts under the domestic or family violence laws of the United States or any State, Indian tribal government, or unit of local government." INA 237(a)(2)(E)(i), 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) (emphasis supplied). A conviction under foreign law is not listed here, and is therefore not included as a ground of deportation. Congress certainly knew how to include foreign convictions when it wished to do so. E.g., INA 101(a)(43)(U), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(U) (sentence following subparagraph U) ("The term [aggravated felony] applies to an offense described in this paragraph whether in violation of Federal or State law and applies to such an offense in violation of the law of a foreign country for which the term of imprisonment was completed within the previous 15 years.") (emphasis supplied).      The unlawful voting deportation ground lists only voting in violation of federal, state, or local law, so Congress in effect excluded voting in violation of foreign law from this ground of deportation. See Safe Havens 7.16, 7.192.      Noncitizens are deportable who have, outside the United States, committed, ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the commission of, under color of law of any foreign nation, any extrajudicial killing, as defined in Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, 3(a), 28 U.S.C. 1350 note. INA 237(a)(4)(D), 8 U.S.C. 1237(a)(4)(D), referencing INA 212(a)(3)(E)(iii)(II).      With respect to any conviction-based ground of deportation that does not expressly include foreign convictions, there is an excellent argument that Congress did not include them within the ground of deportation. All grounds of deportation, that are based on convictions, provide that only convictions received "after admission" trigger deportation. See Safe Havens 4.34.      There is no express language including foreign convictions within those convictions that trigger deportation. This gives rise to an argument that foreign convictions cannot trigger deportation. This makes sense because when someone is seeking admission to the United States, any convictions are likely to have been suffered in foreign lands. Similarly, it would be unfair to allow any such convictions that did not trigger inadmissibility when the noncitizen was admitted to the United States to trigger deportation later. Therefore, it makes sense for Congress to have omitted a provision that foreign convictions trigger deportation.      In addition, in general, a conviction must have occurred "after the date of admission" in order to trigger deportation. The statute defining grounds of deportation, INA 237(a), provides that noncitizens "admitted to the United States" shall be deportable if they fall within one or more specified classes of deportable noncitizens. INA 237(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) (conviction of crime of moral turpitude); INA 237(a)(2)(A)(ii), 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) (multiple convictions of crimes of moral turpitude "at any time after admission"); INA 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (aggravated felony "at any time after admission"); INA 237(a)(2)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (controlled substances conviction "at any time after admission"); INA 237(a)(2)(B)(ii), 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(B)(ii) (drug abuser or addict who is or "at any time after admission has been" convicted); INA 237(a)(2)(C), 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(C) (firearms conviction). Many specific statutory grounds of deportation also expressly require a conviction after admission to the United States. E.g., INA 237(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) (conviction of crime of moral turpitude); INA 237(a)(2)(A)(ii), 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) (multiple convictions of crimes of moral turpitude "at any time after admission"); INA 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii)(aggravated felony "at any time after admission"); INA 237(a)(2)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(B)(i)(controlled substances conviction "at any time after admission"); INA 237(a)(2)(B)(ii), 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(B)(ii) (drug abuser or addict who is or "at any time after admission has been" convicted); INA 237(a)(2)(C), 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(C)(firearms conviction "at any time after admission"); INA 237(a)(2)(E)(i), 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(E)(i)(domestic violence conviction "at any time after admission"). Because a deportable conviction must occur after admission to the United States, there is every reason to believe that Congress was considering convictions suffered within the United States when it defined the conviction-based grounds of deportation.      Because of the serious consequences of deportation, this ambiguous legislation must be construed in favor of the noncitizen. See Safe Havens 5.25.

Other

CONVICTION - FOREIGN CONVICTIONS
Congress recently provided, with respect to a specified new statute, that "A foreign conviction is not a sex offense for the purposes of this title if it was not obtained with sufficient safeguards for fundamental fairness and due process for the accused under guidelines or regulations established under section 112." The Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, H.R. 4472, Pub. L. 109-248, 111(5)(B) (July 27, 2006).

CONVICTION - CRIMINAL OFFENSE -- FOREIGN OFFENSE
Congress knows how to refer to foreign criminal offenses if it wishes to do so. For example, Congress recently provided, with respect to a specific new statute, that "The term `criminal offense' means a State, local, tribal, foreign, or military offense (to the extent specified by the Secretary of Defense under section 115(a)(8)(C)(i) of Public Law 105-119 (10 U.S.C. 951 note)) or other criminal offense." The Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, H.R. 4472, Pub. L. 109-248, 111(6) (July 27, 2006).

SAFE HAVEN - STATE REHABILITATIVE RELIEF - PRIOR FOREIGN CONVICTION DOES NOT DISQUALIFY DEFENDANT FROM FFOA TREATMENT
The Federal First Offender Act, 18 U.S.C. 3607(a)(1), does not permit an expungement if the defendant has prior to the commission of the current offense suffered a conviction under "Federal or State" law. This provision does not include foreign convictions as a disqualification for this relief.

REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS - FOREIGN CONVICTIONS - CHALLENGING FOREIGN CONVICTIONS IN IMMIGRATION COURT
Absent evidence of political motivation for a wrongful prosecution, the adjudicator cannot look behind a conviction to determine whether the applicant was guilty of the offense for purposes of determining inadmissibility under INA 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), although evidence of a wrongful conviction can be relevant to waiver considerations. 9 FAM 40.21(A).

In challenging a foreign conviction counsel can:

A. Argue that the foreign conviction documents were not properly authenticated (8 C.F.R. 1287.6(b)), or were not admissible or reliable evidence of the record of conviction (INA 240(c)(3)(B); 8 C.F.R. 1003.41).

B.Argue that the foreign conviction was fundamentally unfair, i.e., that the applicant was abused by the police and there were not adequate procedural safeguards to ensure a reliable conviction.

C.Argue that the conviction was for a purely political offense. (See, e.g., INA 212(A)(2)(a)(i) (CMT)).

D.Establish that the evidence upon which the conviction was based was improper. Evidence against an alien must, at a minimum, be "probative" and "fundamentally fair." Ezeagwuna v. Ashcroft, 325 F.3d 396, 405 (3d Cir. 2003). As the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has stated, "fairness is closely related to the reliability and trustworthiness of the evidence." Id. at 405. United States courts have always scrutinized whether evidence has been obtained in a manner that satisfies fundamental fairness. See, e.g., Hutto v. Ross, 429 U.S. 28 (1976); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973); United States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210 (4th Cir. 2008); United States v. Karake, 443 F. Supp. 2d 8 (D.C. Dist. Ct. 2006); United States v. Marturo, 982 F. 2d 57 (2d Cir. 1992); United States v. Santos-Garcia, 313 F.3d 1073, 1079 (8th Cir. 2002); United States v. Marzook, 435 F. Supp. 2d 708 (N.D. Ill. 2006). This includes scrutiny of foreign convictions. In a case involving sentence enhancement imposed on account of a prior drug conviction in the Philippines, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals carefully analyzed whether the defendants foreign conviction was "obtained in a manner inconsistent with concepts of fundamental fairness and liberty endemic in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution." United States v. Kole, 164 F.3d 164, 171 (3d Cir. 1998). Similarly, a court ruling on whether a Japanese conviction could be used as a predicate offense held, "Given the uncertainty surrounding foreign convictions, a defendant should have an opportunity to challenge those convictions which were obtained in such a manner as to raise serious doubts about the credibility of the fact-finding process and, thus, to render it fundamentally unfair." U.S. v. Small, 183 F. Supp. 2d 755, 762 (W.D. Penn. 2002).

E. A foreign conviction in absentia cannot be considered in determining whether an alien is inadmissible for a crime involving moral turpitude. 22 C.F.R. 40.21(a)(4). Although the Board has stated that a foreign conviction need not conform exactly to the constitutional guarantees provided by the United States, Matter of M, 9 I. & N. Dec. 132, 138 (BIA 1960), there is no support for the governments suggestion that convictions obtained in foreign military courts through torture or procedures completely lacking in fundamental fairness should be considered reliable evidence of guilt.

The harsh sanction of deportation, or denial of relief from deportation, should not be imposed where there is no reliable proof of moral culpability, notwithstanding the existence of a foreign conviction. See, e.g., Lennon v. INS, 527 F.2d 187, 193 (2d Cir. 1975). Indeed, it is deeply offensive to American notions of justice to suggest that foreign convictions obtained through the use of physical and psychological abuse, or by methods totally lacking in fundamental fairness, should be relied upon as proof of guilt or considered to be valid. See Matter of Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 268-70 (1948) ("The traditional Anglo-American distrust for secret trials has been variously ascribed to the notorious use of this practice by the Spanish Inquisition, to the excesses of the English Court of Star Chamber, and to the French monarchy's abuse of the lettre de cachet"); U.S. v. Karake, 443 F. Supp. 2d 8, 51 (D.C. Dist. Ct. 2006) (holding defendants confessions inadmissible where obtained through psychological and physical abuse). Thanks to Jason Cade.