Safe Havens

(B)  Immigration Effects of a Pardon.  The deportation statute expressly provides that a pardon protects a noncitizen convicted of one or more crimes of moral turpitude, aggravated felonies, or high speed flight from an immigration checkpoint from deportation on account of those convictions.[147]  This protection has been extended to encompass, in addition, those noncitizens who would have been deportable, on account of having been inadmissible at entry, because of one or more convictions of crimes involving moral turpitude.[148]  (A pardon also eliminates a conviction of a crime of moral turpitude for inadmissibility purposes,[149] and also removes a number of other adverse immigration effects.)[150]

A full and unconditional pardon is completely binding for deportation purposes, and cannot be vitiated or ignored by reason of a claim that it had been fraudulently obtained, in the absence of action by the authorities who granted the pardon to revoke the pardon.[151]

The immigration courts need not grant a stay or continuance of deportation to enable the noncitizen to apply for a pardon.  The decision whether to issue a stay is a discretionary one.[152]  See N. Tooby, Post-Conviction Relief for Immigrants § 8.15 (2004).

[147] INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(v), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(v).

[148] Matter of H, 6 I. & N. Dec. 90 (BIA 1954) (interpreting former statute).

[149] Rasmussen v. Robinson, 163 F.2d 732 (3d Cir. 1947); Matter of H, 6 I. & N. Dec. 90 (BIA 1954); Matter of EV, 5 I. & N. Dec. 194 (BIA 1953).

[150] See N. Tooby, Post-Conviction Relief for Immigrants § 8.41 (2004).

[151] Taran v. United States, 266 F.2d 561 (8th Cir. 1959).

[152] Vermiglio v. Butterfield, 223 F.2d 804 (6th Cir. 1955); Houvardas v. Wixon, 169 F.2d 980 (9th Cir. 1949).