Rojas v. Attorney General of U.S., 728 F.3d 203 (3d Cir. Aug. 23, 2013) (en banc) (where DHS bears burden, government must show that the state conviction of possession of drug paraphernalia involved or was related to a federally controlled substance).

Note: This well-reasoned decision provides strong support for asking the Ninth Circuit to reexamine Luu-Le v. INS, 224 F.3d 911 (9th Cir 2000), which held that a conviction of possession of paraphernalia need not involve a federally-listed controlled substance to warrant deportation.

United States v. Royal, 731 F.3d 333 (4th Cir. Oct. 1, 2013) (in federal conviction for possession of ammunition by an ex-felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), defendant has burden of establishing as affirmative defense that bullets in question were designed exclusively for use in antique firearms).

United States v. Royal, 731 F.3d 333 (4th Cir. Oct. 1, 2013) (in federal conviction for possession of ammunition by an ex-felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), defendant has burden of establishing as affirmative defense that bullets in question were designed exclusively for use in antique firearms).

United States v. Royal, 731 F.3d 333 (4th Cir. Oct. 1, 2013) (Maryland conviction for second-degree assault, in violation of Md. Code, Crim.

United States v. Cabrera-Umanzor, 728 F.3d 347, 352 (4th Cir. Aug. 26, 2013) (the inclusion in Maryland offense of causing abuse to a child, under Md. Code, art. 27, 35C, of a nonexclusive list of possible ways of satisfying the elements of the offense does not thereby become a divisible statute, where the list is not composed of elements of the offense).

The court reasoned:

The government insists, however, that 35C is divisible. As the government notes, 35C defines sexual abuse to include sexual offense in any degree. See Md.Code, art.

Yeremin v. Holder, 738 F.3d 708 (6th Cir. Apr. 16, 2013) (federal conviction of one count of violating 18 U.S.C. 1028(f), for conspiracy to traffic in identification documents in violation of 18 U.S.C.

Cordova-Soto v. Holder, 732 F.3d 789 (7th Cir. Oct. 15, 2013) (illegal reentry after 2005 removal, despite several procedural errors, permanently bars reopening that earlier removal order); citing 8 U.S.C. 1231(a)(5).

The Supreme Court held that to constitute a fraud aggravated felony, the loss to the victim resulting from the conviction must be tied or tethered to the specific count of conviction, rather than other offenses or dismissed counts. Nijhawan v. Holder, supra, 557 U.S. at 42 (the loss must be tied to the specific counts covered by the conviction. Brief for Respondent 44; see, e.g., Alaka v.

People v. Wahidi, 222 Cal.App.4th 802, 807, 166 Cal.Rptr.3d 416 (2d Dist. Dec. 30, 2013) (defendants request that victim and defendant settle their dispute by Islamic mediation, rather than a criminal case, was held to be both knowing and malicious, within the meaning of the malicious witness dissuasion statute, Penal Code 136.1(a)(2), even though the defendant did not demand the victim drop the charges or threaten any violence: There is no substantial evidence that Wahidi intended to vex, annoy, harm, or injure Khan when Wahidi approached Khan in the mosque.

Orabi v. Attorney General of the U.S., 738 F.3d 535, 540-541 (3d Cir. Jan. 2, 2014) (New York convictions were pending on direct appeal before the Second Circuit, and were therefore not sufficiently final to form a basis for removal: We do not agree that the IIRIRA eliminated a direct appeal from the finality rule in its definition of conviction. Hence, we do not agree with those Courts that have adopted this interpretation. See, e.g., id. (collecting cases). By doing so, they have vitiated, without reason, the BIA's rule formulated and established in In re Ozkok, 19 I. & N. Dec. 546, 552 n.