Rojas v. Attorney General of U.S., 728 F.3d 203 (3d Cir. Aug. 23, 2013) (en banc) (where DHS bears burden, government must show that the state conviction of possession of drug paraphernalia involved or was related to a federally controlled substance).

Note: This well-reasoned decision provides strong support for asking the Ninth Circuit to reexamine Luu-Le v. INS, 224 F.3d 911 (9th Cir 2000), which held that a conviction of possession of paraphernalia need not involve a federally-listed controlled substance to warrant deportation. As the Third Circuit in Rojas stated:

Thus, the most straightforward reading of 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) is that to establish removability the Department must show that a controlled substance included in the definition of substances in section 802 of Title 21 was involved in the crime of conviction at issue. Parsing the different clauses with the aid of the last antecedent canon reveals that, as a whole, 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) requires the Department to establish that the individual it seeks to remove (1) is an alien (2) who at any time after entering the country violated or attempted to violate a law relating to a controlled substance and (3) that the controlled substance is defined as such by federal law. Points (1) and (2) are not at issue in this case.

A simple example further illustrates why this reading of the statute is correct. Section 802(6) of Title 21 states that [t]he term controlled substance means a drug or other substance, or immediate precursor, included in schedule I, II, III, IV, or V of part B of this subchapter. The term does not include distilled spirits, wine, malt beverages, or tobacco.... Putting the two provisions together, the INA effectively renders removable noncitizens convicted under laws relating to a controlled substance (a drug or other substance ... included in schedule I, II, III, IV, or V ...[,] not includ[ing] spirits, wine, malt beverages, or tobacco). Suppose, then, that Pennsylvania"which has its own controlled-substances schedules to which it is free to add substances not in the federal lists"chose to include tobacco in its schedules, and that Rojas was convicted of possessing tobacco paraphernalia. Given the express exclusion of tobacco from the federal list of controlled substances, it would be a complete anomaly to then place Rojas in removal proceedings for possessing tobacco paraphernalia. Indeed, such a result would violate the cardinal principle that we do not cripple statutes by rendering words therein superfluous, as the Department's reading would have us do to the as defined parenthetical. See, e.g., *210 Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174, 121 S.Ct. 2120, 150 L.Ed.2d 251 (2001) (It is our duty to give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute.) (quoting United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538"39, 75 S.Ct. 513, 99 L.Ed. 615 (1955) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Cushman v. Trans Union Corp., 115 F.3d 220, 225 (3d Cir.1997) (We strive to avoid a result that would render statutory language superfluous, meaningless, or irrelevant.).
Id. at 209-210.