Matter of Olivares-Martinez,
23 I. & N. Dec. 148 (BIA July 3, 2001) (under United States
v. Chapa-Garza, 243 F.3d 921 (5th Cir. Mar. 1, 2001) and United
States v. Hernandez-Avalos, 251 F.3d 505 (5th Cir. May 11,
2001), a Texas conviction for felony DWI is not a crime of
violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) (1994), and is therefore
not an aggravated felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C.

Matter of Puente-Salazar,
22 I. & N. Dec. 1006 (BIA Sept. 29, 1999) (Texas conviction
of driving while intoxicated under Texas Penal Code § 49.04,
which is a felony as a result of a sentence enhancement statute,
is a conviction for a crime of violence and therefore an aggravated
felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F)),
overruled by Matter of Ramos, 23 I. & N. Dec. 336 (BIA
Apr. 4, 2002).

Matter of Magallanes-Garcia,
22 I. & N. Dec. 1 (BIA Mar. 19, 1998) (conviction of aggravated
driving while under the influence, with a two and a half year
sentence, was a "crime of violence" and therefore
an aggravated felony within the meaning of INA § 101(a)(43)(F),
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F), triggering deportation under 8
U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2)(A)(iii)), overruled by Matter of Ramos,
23 I. & N. Dec.

United States v. Rodriguez-Rodriguez,
388 F.3d 466 (5th Cir. Oct. 15, 2004) (Texas conviction under
Penal Code § 31.07(a), unauthorized use of a motor vehicle,
is not a crime of violence for illegal re-entry sentencing
purposes since the statute does not require the use of force
as an element).

United States v.
Rodriguez-Rodriguez, 323 F.3d 317 (5th Cir. Feb. 27, 2003)
(Texas conviction of unauthorized use of a motor vehicle,
in violation of Texas Penal Code Ann. § 30.02(a), is not a
crime of violence within the meaning of U.S.S.G.

United States v. Charles, 301 F.3d
309 (5th Cir. July 31, 2002) (en banc) (Texas conviction of
simple motor vehicle theft was not a crime of violence under
U.S.S.G.

United States v. Charles, 275 F.3d
468 (5th Cir. Dec. 10, 2001) (conviction of vehicle theft
was "crime of violence" under special guideline
for offense presenting "serious potential risk of injury
to another," different from illegal re-entry Guidelines,
governing enhancement to sentence for ex-felon in possession
of firearm conviction), vacated in part upon en banc rehearing,
301 F.3d 309 (5th Cir. July 31, 2002).

United States v. Jackson,
220 F.3d 635 (5th Cir. July 26, 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S.
988, 121 S.Ct. 1640 (2001) (Texas conviction of unauthorized
use of a vehicle, in violation of Texas Penal Code § 31.07,
was a "crime of violence" as that term is defined
in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2, which is different from the language
of 18 U.S.C. § 16), overruled by United States v. Charles,
301 F.3d 309 (5th Cir.

United States v.
Galvan-Rodriguez, 169 F.3d 217 (5th Cir. Mar. 4, 1999), cert.
denied, 528 U.S. 837 (1999) (conviction of unauthorized use
of motor vehicle is "crime of violence," and therefore
an aggravated felony, under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(43)(F) and 18 U.S.C. 16(b), for purposes sentence
enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(2) for illegal re-entry).

United States v. Martinez-Garcia, 268 F.3d
460 (7th Cir. Sept. 28, 2001), cert. denied, 122 S.Ct. 1111
(2002) (Illinois conviction of burglary of vehicle with intent
to commit theft constituted "attempt," under INA
§ 101(a)(43)(U), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(U), to commit a "theft
offense" under INA § 101(a)(43)(G), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(G)
for purposes of enhancing under U.S.S.G.