United States v. Grajeda-Ramirez,
348 F.3d 1123 (9th Cir. Nov. 12, 2003) (Colorado conviction
of reckless vehicular assault, in violation of Colo.Rev.Stat.
§ 18-3-205(1)(a), is a "crime of violence" for the
purposes of the U.S.S.G.).

Penuliar v. Ashcroft,
395 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. Jan. 12, 2005) (California conviction
of unlawful driving or taking a vehicle, in violation of Vehicle
Code § 10851(a), was not a theft offense, within the meaning
of INA § 101(a)(43)(G), 8 U.S.C.

Nevarez-Martinez
v. INS, 326 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. Apr. 16, 2003) (Arizona conviction
of controlling anothers means of transportation, knowing
or with reason to believe it had been stolen, in violation
of Arizona Revised Statute § 13-1814(A)(5), did not constitute
a theft offense aggravated felony, under INA § 101(a)(43)(G),
8 U.S.C.

Nevarez-Martinez v. INS, 326 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir.
Apr. 16, 2003) (Arizona conviction of failure to return lost
means of transportation, in violation of Arizona Revised Statute
§ 13-1814(A)(4), did not constitute a theft offense aggravated
felony, under INA § 101(a)(43)(G), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(G),
since the statute did not require intent to deprive the owner
of the property) (alternative holding).

Nevarez-Martinez
v. INS, 326 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. Apr. 16, 2003) (Arizona conviction
of unauthorized use of a means of transportation, in violation
of Arizona Revised Statute § 13-1814(A)(2), did not constitute
a theft offense aggravated felony, under INA § 101(a)(43)(G),
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G), since the statute did not require
intent to deprive the owner of the property) (alternative
holding).

Huerta-Guevara
v. Ashcroft, 321 F.3d 883 (9th Cir. Mar. 4, 2003) (Arizona
conviction of possession of a stolen vehicle, in violation
of A.R.S. § 13-1802, did not fall within the generic definition
of "theft offense" necessary to constitute an aggravated
felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(G), 8 U.S.C.

United States v. Perez-Corona,
295 F.3d 996 (9th Cir. July 8, 2002) (Arizona conviction for
unlawful use of a means of transportation, or joyriding, in
violation of A.R.S.

United States v. Vasquez-Flores,
265 F.3d 1122 (10th Cir. Sept. 13, 2001), cert. denied, 122
S.Ct. 1180 (2002) (Utah conviction for knowingly attempting
to receive or transfer a stolen motor vehicle, in violation
of Utah Code § 41-1a-1316 (1953), was an "aggravated
felony" under INA § 101(a)(43)(G), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(G)
for enhancement purposes under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(2) of an
illegal re-entry sentence).

Matter of Bahta, 22 I. &
N. Dec. 1381 (BIA Oct. 4, 2000) (Nevada conviction for attempted
possession of stolen property, in violation of Nevada Revised
Statutes § 193.330 and 205.275, is a conviction for an attempted
"theft offense (including receipt of stolen property),"
and therefore an aggravated felony, within the meaning of
INA § 101(a)(43)(G) and (U), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(G) and
(U)).

Matter of Brieva,
23 I. & N. Dec. 766 (BIA June 7, 2005) (Texas conviction
of unauthorized use of a motor vehicle, in violation of Texas
Penal Code § 31.07(a), is a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C.
§ 16(b), and therefore an aggravated felony under INA 101(a)(43)(F),
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F)).