United States v. Fernandez-Antonia, 278 F.3d 150
(2d Cir. Jan. 29, 2002) (New York conviction for attempted
robbery in the third degree, in violation of N.Y. Penal Law
§ 110.00, met the definition of "aggravated felony"
under INA § 101(a)(43)(U), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(U), for
purposes of illegal re-entry sentence enhancement under U.S.S.G.

Sui v. INS, 250 F.3d
105 (2d Cir. May 11, 2001) (federal conviction of violating
18 U.S.C. § 513(a), possession of counterfeit securities with
intent to deceive, does not necessarily constitute an attempt
to pass counterfeit securities and cause a loss, and is therefore
not an "attempt" to commit an aggravated felony
under INA § 101(a)(43)(U), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(U), for
deportation purposes).

Evangelista v. Ashcroft, 232 F.Supp.2d 30 (E.D.N.Y.
Nov. 22, 2002) (federal conviction of attempt to evade or
defeat tax in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7201, charged as attempting
to avoid an amount of tax liability in excess of $300,000,
constituted an aggravated felony, under INA § 101(a)(43)(M)(ii),
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M)(ii), for deportation purposes).

United States v. Jimenez, 921 F.Supp. 1054
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 1995), affd, 131 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. Dec.
2, 1997) (Table) (New York convictions of attempted criminal
sale of cocaine in the third degree constituted "illicit
trafficking in a controlled substance," and were therefore
aggravated felonies under INA § 101(a)(43)(B), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(B),
disqualifying the noncitizen from receiving voluntary departure).

Leader v. Blackman, 744 F.Supp.
500 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 8, 1990) (New York conviction for attempted
criminal sale of controlled substances in the third degree,
in violation of N.Y. Penal Law § 220.39, constitutes an "aggravated
felony," under INA § 101(a)(43)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B),
to trigger mandatory detention).

United
States v. Meraz-Enriquez, __ F.3d __, 2006 WL 515477 (5th
Cir. Mar. 3, 2006) (Kansas conviction of attempted sexual
battery, in violation of Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21- 3518, which
punishes a sexual touching of a person who is too intoxicated
to be able to give consent to the touching, is not a crime
of violence for illegal re-entry sentencing purposes because
the offense does not require the use of force).

United States v. Martinez-Garcia, 268 F.3d
460 (7th Cir. Sept. 28, 2001), cert. denied, 122 S.Ct. 1111
(2002) (Illinois conviction of burglary of vehicle with intent
to commit theft constituted "attempt", under INA
§ 101(a)(43)(U), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(U), to commit a "theft
offense" under INA § 101(a)(43)(G), 8 U.S.C.

United States v. Hernandez-Valdovinos,
352 F.3d 1243 (9th Cir. Dec. 17, 2003) (Arizona attempted
sale conviction, in violation of A.R.S. § 13-3408, constituted
drug trafficking offense for illegal re-entry sentence enhancement
purposes, under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2).

United States v. Ceron-Sanchez,
222 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. July 26, 2000) (Arizona conviction
for attempted aggravated assault with a deadly weapon or deadly
instrument, in violation of Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 13-1001 and
13-1204(A)(2) and (B), constitutes an aggravated felony under
INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F), for purposes
of illegal re-entry sentence enhancement under U.S.S.G. §
2L1.2(b)(1)(A)).

United States v. Vidal, 426
F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. Oct. 24, 2005) (California conviction
of unlawful taking of a vehicle, in violation of Vehicle Code
§ 10851, constitutes an aggravated felony under the U.S.S.G.,
for purposes of an eight-level increase in the base offense
level for an illegal re-entry sentence).