United States v. Dang, 488 F.3d 1135 (9th Cir. May 24, 2007) (8 C.F.R. 316.10(b)(3)(iii), barring good moral character based on commission of "unlawful acts that adversely reflect upon the applicants moral character, or was convicted or imprisoned for such acts" is not ultra vires to INA 101(f)).

United States v. Dang, 488 F.3d 1135 (9th Cir. May 24, 2007) (8 C.F.R. 316.10(b)(3)(iii), barring good moral character based on commission of "unlawful acts that adversely reflect upon the applicants moral character, or was convicted or imprisoned for such acts" is not ultra vires to INA 101(f); nor is the regulation unconstitutionally vague, as applied to respondent who set fire to own vehicle with intent to defraud insurance company).

Gonzalez-Maldonado v. Gonzales, 487 F.3d 975 (5th Cir. May 25, 2007) ("Gonzalez's misrepresentation [putting attorney's address in a different state as his own on an immigration application] is immaterial because his address had no bearing on his receipt of immigration benefits.").

Gonzalez-Maldonado v. Gonzales, 487 F.3d 975 (5th Cir. May 25, 2007) ("A person does not have good moral character if he "has given false testimony for the purpose of obtaining any benefits under this chapter." 8 U.S.C. 1101(f)(6). "[T]estimony is limited to oral statements made under oath . . . [and] with the subjective intent of obtaining immigration benefits." Kungys v. United
States, 485 U.S. 759, 780, 108 S. Ct. 1537, 1551 (1988); see also
Beltran-Resendez v. INS, 207 F.3d 284, 287 (5th Cir.

Landin-Zavala v. Gonzales, 488 F.3d 1150, 2007 WL 1518854 (9th Cir. May 25, 2007) (order of excludability, acceptance of voluntary departure, and subsequent deportation stop the accrual of physical presence required to become eligible for non-LPR cancellation of removal).

The BIA must remand the case to the IJ for entry of an order of removal where the BIA has reversed the IJs that the respondent is not removable. Noriega-Lopez v. Ashcroft, 335 F.3d 874, 880-81 (9th Cir. 2003); James v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 505 (5th Cir. 2006); Sosa-Valenzuela v. Gonzales, __ F.3d __, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 10052 (10th Cir. May 1, 2007).

United States v. Sandoval-Sandoval, ___ F.3d ___ (9th Cir. May 23, 2007) (per curiam) (district court at sentencing properly relied on California abstract of judgment, for purpose of imposing a 16-level enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. 2L1.2(b)(1)(A) in reliance on a factual finding that Defendant had been convicted earlier of "a drug trafficking offense for which the sentence imposed exceeded 13 months," since the document unequivocally contained the information needed), distinguishing United States v. Navidad-Marcos, 367 F.3d 903 (9th Cir.

United States v. Sandoval-Sandoval, 487 F.3d 1278 (9th Cir. May 23, 2007) (per curiam) (district court at sentencing properly relied on California abstract of judgment, for purpose of imposing a 16-level enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. 2L1.2(b)(1)(A) in reliance on a factual finding that Defendant had been convicted earlier of "a drug trafficking offense for which the sentence imposed exceeded 13 months," since the document unequivocally contained the information needed), distinguishing United States v. Navidad-Marcos, 367 F.3d 903 (9th Cir.

Matter of Valdovinos, 18 I. & N. Dec. 343, 344 (1982) (pre-trial or pre-sentencing detention that was credited toward custodial sentence counted as actual "time served," for purposes of the five-year actual time served bar to INA 212(c) relief); see Saravia-Paguada v. Gonzales, 488 F.3d 1122, ___ n. 2, (9th Cir. May 21, 2007).

Saravia-Paguada v. Gonzales, 488 F.3d 1122, 2007 WL 1462240 (9th Cir. May 21, 2007) (rejecting claim under United States v. Corona-Sanchez, 291 F.3d 1201 (9th Cir. 2002), and Rusz v. Ashcroft, 376 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 2004), that the IJ erroneously included time served pursuant to the three-year sentence enhancement under California Health and Safety Code 11370.2, when concluding that Petitioner had served more than five years for his aggravated felony convictions).