RECORD OF CONVICTION - ABSTRACT OF JUDGMENT - DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY RELIED ON CALIFORNIA ABSTRACT OF JUDGMENT IN DETERMINING SENTENCE IMPOSED SINCE DOCUMENT UNEQUVOCALLY CONTAINED THE NECESSARY INFORMATION
United States v. Sandoval-Sandoval, 487 F.3d 1278 (9th Cir. May 23, 2007) (per curiam) (district court at sentencing properly relied on California abstract of judgment, for purpose of imposing a 16-level enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. 2L1.2(b)(1)(A) in reliance on a factual finding that Defendant had been convicted earlier of "a drug trafficking offense for which the sentence imposed exceeded 13 months," since the document unequivocally contained the information needed), distinguishing United States v. Navidad-Marcos, 367 F.3d 903 (9th Cir.
RELIEF - 212(C) RELIEF - FIVE-YEAR BAR - PRESENTENCE CUSTODY CREDITED AGAINST PRISON SENTENCE COUNTS TOWARD ACTUAL TIME SERVED FOR PURPOSES OF FIVE-YEAR BAR
Matter of Valdovinos, 18 I. & N. Dec. 343, 344 (1982) (pre-trial or pre-sentencing detention that was credited toward custodial sentence counted as actual "time served," for purposes of the five-year actual time served bar to INA 212(c) relief); see Saravia-Paguada v. Gonzales, 488 F.3d 1122, ___ n. 2, (9th Cir. May 21, 2007).
RELIEF - 212(C) RELIEF - FIVE-YEAR BAR - IMPRISONMENT SERVED AS A RESULT OF A RECIDIVIST SENTENCE ENHANCEMENT COUNTS TOWARD ACTUAL TIME SERVED FOR PURPOSES OF FIVE-YEAR BAR
Saravia-Paguada v. Gonzales, 488 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir. May 21, 2007) (rejecting claim under United States v. Corona-Sanchez, 291 F.3d 1201 (9th Cir. 2002), and Rusz v. Ashcroft, 376 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 2004), that the IJ erroneously included time served pursuant to the three-year sentence enhancement under California Health and Safety Code 11370.2, when concluding that Petitioner had served more than five years for his aggravated felony convictions).
RELIEF - 212(C) RELIEF - FIVE-YEAR BAR APPLIES TO CONVICTIONS THAT OCCURRED BEFORE IMMACT 90 AS LONG AS THE CONVICTION AROSE FROM A JURY TRIAL
Saravia-Paguada v. Gonzales, 488 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir. May 21, 2007) (Toia v. Fasano, 334 F.3d 917 (9th Cir. 2003), which held that the five-year bar did not apply for convictions occurring prior to the effective date of IMMACT 90, only applies where the conviction arose out of a guilty plea; the five-year bar applies to a noncitizen convicted before IMMACT 90 by jury trial).
SENTENCE - MAXIMUM POSSIBLE TERM - MAXIMUM TERM ENHANCED BY RECIDIVIST SENTENCE ENHANCEMENT DOES NOT COUNT FOR PURPOSES OF ACCA BECAUSE RECIDIVISM DOES NOT RELATE TO THE COMMISSION OF THE OFFENSE
United States v. Rodriquez, 464 F.3d 1072, 1079, 1082 (9th Cir. 2006) (Washington conviction for delivery of a controlled substance, in violation of Washington Revised Code 9A.20.021(1)(c), which carried a maximum term of five years for the substantive crime, but was enhanced to ten years as a "second or subsequent offense[ ]" under a recidivism provision, did not qualify as a "serious drug offense" under the pertinent definition in the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924, et seq.
CONVICTION - EFFECT OF STATE LAW ON FEDERAL IMMIGRATION DECISION - IMMIGRATION CONSEQUENCES OF CONVICTIONS ARE QUESTIONS OF FEDERAL, NOT STATE, LAW
United States v. Fazande, 487 F.3d 307 (5th Cir. May 18, 2007) (per curiam) (federal sentence effect of state conviction is a question of federal, not state law, holding Full Faith and Credit Act, 28 U.S.C. 1738, did not require federal sentencing court to follow state law on whether it constituted a conviction to enhance a federal sentence); see United States v. Morales, 854 F.2d 65, 68 (5th Cir. 1988) (the meaning of the phrase "have become final" in 18 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(B) is a question of federal law, not state law).
CONVICTION - FINALITY - FULL FAITH AND CREDIT ACT NOT VIOLATED BY SENTENCING COURT'S CONCLUSION STATE DEFERRED ADJUDICATION PROBATION DISPOSITION CONSTITUTES CONVICTION FOR PURPOSES OF ENHANCING FEDERAL SENTENCE UNDER 18
U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A)
United States v. Fazande, 487 F.3d 307 (5th Cir. May 18, 2007) (per curiam) (Texas guilty plea resulting in imposition of deferred adjudication probation constituted a "prior conviction" for purposes of sentence enhancement under 18 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A), rejecting claim that it did not constitute a final conviction under Texas law and the Full Faith and Credit Act; 28 U.S.C.
RELIEF - 212(C) RELIEF - CANCELLATION OF REMOVAL
Peralta-Taveras v. Gonzales, 488 F.3d 580 (2d Cir. May 22, 2007) (affirming denial of 212(c) and cancellation, since (1) his 1996 aggravated felony convictions rendered him ineligible for cancellation of removal for his 1997 drug conviction under 240A(a); and (2) the plain language of 240A barred simultaneous relief under both 240A(a) and 212(c))
RELIEF - 212(C) RELIEF - CANCELLATION OF REMOVAL - GRANT OF 212(C) RELIEF FOR AN AGGRAVATED FELONY CONVICTION DOES NOT ELIMINATE ITS EXISTENCE FOR PURPOSES OF BARRING CANCELLATION
Peralta-Taveras v. Gonzales, 488 F.3d 580, ___ (2d Cir. May 22, 2007) (order granting INA 212(c) relief does not eliminate a conviction for purposes of barring cancellation of removal as an aggravated felony conviction: "The granting of a 212(c) waiver does not expunge the underlying offense or its categorization as an aggravated felony. See, e.g., Chan v. Ganter, 464 F.3d 289, 295 (2d Cir.
DENATURALIZATION - UNLAWFUL ACTS COMMITTED DURING GMC PERIOD
United States v. Dang, 488 F.3d 1135 (9th Cir. May 24, 2007) (8 C.F.R. 316.10(b)(3)(iii), barring good moral character based on commission of "unlawful acts that adversely reflect upon the applicants moral character, or was convicted or imprisoned for such acts" is not ultra vires to INA 101(f)).
