Nicanor-Romero v. Mukasey, 523 F.3d 992 (9th Cir. Apr.

Martinez v. INS, 523 F.3d 365 (2d Cir. Apr. 23, 2008) (application of the stop-time rule under INA 240A(d)(1)(B), 8 U.S.C. 1229b(d)(1)(B), as applied to a conviction occurring before IIRAIRA effective date was not impermissibly retroactive).

Arguelles-Olivares v. Mukasey, 526 F.3d 171 (5th Cir. Apr. 22, 2008) ("[A] conviction under 26 U.S.C. 7206(1) for filing a false tax return constitutes an aggravated felony for purposes of 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(M) if that offense involved a loss of $10,000 or more. ... The PSR could be considered under the circumstances presented here, particularly given that Arguelles-Olivares admitted in the underlying criminal proceedings that the amounts of loss reflected in the PSR were correct.").

Arguelles-Olivares v. Mukasey, 526 F.3d 171 (5th Cir. Apr. 22, 2008) (BIA did not abuse its discretion to consider facts in presentence report to establish loss to the victim exceeded $10,000, since reason for employing "modified categorical approach" did not fully obtain when tribunal subsequently examined, for collateral purposes, the amount of loss resulting from offense; and consideration of presentence report (PSR) in determining amount of loss was not abuse of discretion where the district court accepted the PSR into the record and the defendant did not object).

Arguelles-Olivares v. Mukasey, 526 F.3d 171 (5th Cir. Apr. 22, 2008) (BIA did not abuse its discretion to consider facts in presentence report to establish loss to the victim exceeded $10,000, since reason for employing "modified categorical approach" did not fully obtain when tribunal subsequently examined, for collateral purposes, the amount of loss resulting from offense; and consideration of presentence report (PSR) in determining amount of loss was not abuse of discretion where the district court accepted the PSR into the record and the defendant did not object).

Villarreal-Rodriguez v. Mukasey, ___ F.3d ___, 2008 WL 1776994 (9th Cir. Apr. 17, 2008) ("[T]he record of conviction and Villarreal's admissions before the IJ do not support use of the convictions as bases for removal.").

Penuliar v. Mukasey, 523 F.3d 963 (9th Cir. Apr. 22, 2008) ("Similarly, the abstracts of judgment for both convictions, which simply recite that Penuliar pled guilty to 10851(a), cannot establish what facts Penuliar admitted in his guilty plea. See Vidal, 504 F.3d at 1087 ("In order to identify a [ 10851] conviction as the generic offense through the modified categorical approach, when the record of conviction comprises only the indictment and the judgment, the judgment must contain the critical phrase "as charged in the Information." ").

Penuliar v. Mukasey, 523 F.3d 963 (9th Cir. Apr. 22, 2008) ("The panel in Penuliar therefore stated: "Arteaga is therefore not precedent with regard to application of the Taylor modified categorical approach to any particular kind of documents or any specific language appearing in those documents. Legal rulings in a prior opinion are applicable to future cases only to the degree one can ascertain from the opinion itself the reach of the ruling.

Penuliar v. Mukasey, 523 F.3d 963 (9th Cir. Apr. 22, 2008) ("Finally, insofar as the IJ relied on the probation report to establish that Penuliar pled guilty to a "crime of violence," he was in error. See, e.g., United States v. Vidal, 504 F.3d 1072, 1087 n.25 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (citing United States v. Franklin, 235 F.3d 1165, 1171 (9th Cir. 2000)) (explaining that a presentence report, even when considered in conjunction with charging papers, is insufficient to establish what facts a defendant admitted in his plea).").

Acosta v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 524 F.3d 1191 (11th Cir. Apr. 16, 2008) (court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear petition for review of order denying continuance of removal proceedings, which presented only a "garden variety" abuse of discretion claim, rather than a constitutional claim or question of law sufficient to confer jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. 1252(a)(2)(C) and (D)).