If an Expungement Will Not Solve the Particular Immigration Problem, It is Still Possible to Pursue Other Post-Conviction Relief After an Expungement Has Been Obtained.

Because expunged convictions continue to exist for some purposes, it is still possible, even after an expungement under Penal Code 1203.4(a) has been obtained, to attack the conviction through other post-conviction vehicles, such as a petition for a writ of coram nobis. (People v. Wiedersperg (1975) 44 Cal.App.3d 550, 118 Cal.Rptr.

Carrillo v. Holder, 781 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir. Mar. 31, 2015) (California conviction of corporal injury of a spouse, in violation of Penal Code 273.5(a), categorically constitutes a crime of domestic violence, under INA 237(a)(2)(E)(i), 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(E)(i), because all of the protected relationships covered by the state offense fall within the definition of the domestic violence ground of deportation).

United States v. Jimenez-Arzate, ___ F.3d ___ (9th Cir. Mar. 30, 2015) (amending and superseding opinion denying rehearing en banc) (California conviction for violation of Penal Code 245(a)(1) is categorically a crime of violence for federal sentencing purposes, since United States v. Grajeda, which held that a conviction under section 245(a)(1) is categorically a crime of violence, is still good law even in light of People v. Aznavoleh, 210 Cal.App.4th 1181 (2012), and People v.

Corpuz v. Holder, 697 F.3d 807 (9th Cir. Aug. 31, 2012) (BIA improperly considered as the term of imprisonment the entire period noncitizen spent in psychiatric pre-trial civil confinement pending a determination of his competence to stand trial, to find noncitizen barred from relief under former INA 212(c)).

United States v. Marcia-Acosta, ___ F.3d ___ (9th Cir. Mar. 24, 2015) (Arizona conviction of aggravated assault, in violation of Arizona Revised Statutes 13-1203 and 13-1204, was not a "crime of violence" for illegal re-entry sentencing purposes; district court erred in relying solely upon a statement by defense counsel during plea colloquy in determining elements to which the defendant entered his plea, since a sentencing court may not rely on an extraneous factual-basis statement details, standing alone, to supply the narrowing for purposes of the modified categorical approach).

Kyzar v. Ryan, ___ F.3d ___, ___, 2015 WL 1061892 (9th Cir. Mar. 12, 2015) (habeas petitioners pro se filings before the Arizona trial court and the Arizona Court of Appeals fairly presented his sufficiency of the evidence claim, which was sufficient to exhaust his state remedies and avoid a procedural default: Although Kyzar did not cite In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct.

United States v. Mendez-Sosa, 778 F.3d 1117 (9th Cir. Mar. 2, 2015) (New Jersey conviction of criminal sexual contact, in violation of NJS 2C:14-3(b), is a crime of violence for illegal reentry sentencing purposes, as a forcible sex offense; district court properly applied divisible statute analysis to determine defendant was convicted of subsection that involved absence of consent).

Marquez Carillo v. Holder, __ F.3d __ (9th Cir. Mar. 31, 2015) (California conviction for violation of Penal Code 273.5(a), corporal injury of a spouse, is a domestic violence offense under INA 237(a)(2)(E)(i), 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) for removal purposes).

People v. Corrales-Castro, ___ P.3d ___, ___ (Mar. 26, 2015) ("[W]e hold that, when, as here, a defendant shows that his or her guilty plea may have serious legal consequences under federal immigration law notwithstanding its withdrawal pursuant to section 18-1.3-102(2), the defendant may challenge the constitutionality of the plea under Crim. P. 32(d).").

Olmos v. Holder, 780 F.3d 1313 (10th Cir. Mar. 24, 2015) (mandatory detention under INA 236(c) may be imposed even if the migrant is taken into ICE custody six days after being released from criminal custody).