People v. Lloyd, 236 Cal.App.4th 49, 186 Cal.Rptr.3d 245 (4th Dist. Apr. 21, 2015) (reversing admission of prior conviction for Yurko error, where defendant was not expressly advised of his or her trial rights " the rights to trial, to confrontation, and to remain silent; the record does not show defendant was aware of or intended to waive these rights and does not permit the inference that defendant was sufficiently aware of the trial procedures to show that his current waiver was knowing and intelligent).

People v. Lloyd, ___ Cal.App.4th ___, ___ Cal.Rptr.3d ___, 2015 WL 1804472 (4th Dist. Apr. 21, 2015) (trial court failed to obtain knowing and intelligent waiver of rights of confrontation and silence prior to defendant's admission of prior convictions, where the last time the defendant had been advised trial rights was at arraignment almost 15 months earlier).

People v. Keith, 235 Cal.App.4th 983, ___, ___, 185 Cal.Rptr.3d 768 (2d Dist. Apr. 6, 2015) (statutory amendment which reduced punishment for possession of cocaine base for sale from maximum five years to maximum four years applied to defendant: We asked the parties to brief the question whether, under In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 745, 48 Cal.Rptr. 172, 408 P.2d 948, the reduced punishment for cocaine base possession for sale applies to Mr. Keith. The parties agree that it does.

United States v. Sahagun-Gallegos, ___ F.3d ___, 2015 WL 1591446 (9th Cir. Apr. 10, 2015) (Arizona conviction of assault, under A.R.S. 13"1204(A), is overbroad with respect to 18 U.S.C. 16, because the definition of assault in subsection (1) of the Arizona statute includes simple recklessness, whereas a crime of violence requires a mens rea of at least heightened recklessness, see United States v. Gomez"Hernandez, 680 F.3d 1171, 1175 (9th Cir. 2012), and is divisible); see United States v. Cabrera"Perez, 751 F.3d 1000, 1004"05 (9th Cir. 2014).

United States v. Sahagun-Gallegos, ___ F.3d ___, 2015 WL 1591446 (9th Cir. Apr. 10, 2015) (Arizona conviction of assault, under A.R.S. 13"1203(A)(2) is categorically a crime of violence, under 18 U.S.C. 16, and INA 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F), because it is an offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another.); following United States v. Cabrera"Perez, 751 F.3d 1000, 1004"05 (9th Cir.2014).

United States v. Sahagun-Gallegos, ___ F.3d ___, ___, 2015 WL 1591446 (9th Cir. Apr. 10, 2015) (grand jury transcript and defense counsels statement of factual basis for the plea could not be considered to establish that plea was to aggravated felony portion of a divisible statute, since both this court and the Supreme Court have held that the factual basis for a plea must be assented to by the defendant for a sentencing court to rely on it when conducting the modified categorical approach, see Shepard, 544 U.S. at 26, 125 S.Ct.

United States v. Sahagun-Gallegos, ___ F.3d ___, ___, 2015 WL 1591446 (9th Cir. Apr. 10, 2015) (When conducting the modified categorical approach, we may not examine a transcript to try to discern what ... a plea proceeding revealed[ ] about the defendant's underlying conduct. Descamps, 133 S.Ct. at 2288. Rather, we are limited to assessing whether the defendant necessarily admitted the elements of the particular statutory alternative that is a categorical match to the generic federal offense. See id. at 2284 (quoting Shepard, 544 U.S. at 26, 125 S.Ct. 1254).).

United States v. Simmons, 782 F.3d 510 (9th Cir. Apr. 3, 2015) (Hawaii conviction of second-degree escape from custody, in violation of Hawaii Revised Statutes 710"1021, did not categorically constitute a crime of violence, under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines (Sentencing Guidelines or U.S.S.G.) 4B1.1(a), because it includes both active and passive forms of escape); see Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122, 126"27, 129 S.Ct. 687, 172 L.Ed.2d 484 (2009).

http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-brown-pardons-20150405-story...

There is a new article, "Race, immigration, & imprisonment in the United States," at http://crimmigration.com. Here is an excerpt: The United States sordid history with race-based policing is too well known to need recounting. Often forgotten, though, is that race-based policing continues to receive the Supreme Courts blessing when it comes to immigration law. In a pair of decisions from the mid-1970s, the Court allowed immigration officials to explicitly consider whether someone looks Mexican [...].
Thanks to Csar Cuauhtmoc Garca Hernndez at crimmigration.com