AGGRAVATED FELONY " SENTENCE IMPOSED " ONE YEAR IS DEFINED AS 365 DAYS, REGARDLESS OF LEAP YEARS
Habibi v. Holder, 658 F.3d 977 (9th Cir. Sept. 14, 2011) (the phrase "one year" is defined as 365 days, regardless of leap years; noncitizen was deportable for aggravated felony, under INA 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F), even though his sentence was served during a leap year).
CRIMES OF MORAL TURPITUDE " MODIFIED CATEGORICAL ANALYSIS
Saavedra-Figueroa v. Holder, 625 F.3d 621, 627-28 (9th Cir. Nov. 5, 2010) (Regardless of whether we may apply this approach in this case in light of our holding that misdemeanor false imprisonment lacks an element of the generic crime-see Navarro-Lopez v. Gonzales, 503 F.3d 1063, 1073 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc)-the application of the modified categorical approach would make no difference. Although Saavedra-Figueroa admitted both section 236 misdemeanor convictions, there is no record evidence of the factual allegations underlying his second conviction.
CRIMES OF MORAL TURPITUDE " DEFINITION OF MORAL TURPITUDE
Saavedra-Figueroa v. Holder, 625 F.3d 621, 626 & n.4 (9th Cir. Nov. 5, 2010) (We have held that the federal generic definition of a CIMT is a crime involving fraud or conduct that (1) is vile, base, or depraved and (2) violates accepted moral standards. Morales-Garcia v. Holder, 567 F.3d 1058, 1062 & n. 2 (9th Cir.2009). Non-fraudulent CIMTs almost always involve an intent to harm someone. Nunez v. Holder, 594 F.3d 1124, 1131 & n. 4 (9th Cir.2010). FN4. An intent to harm is not always necessary. Nunez, 594 F.3d at 1131 n. 4; see also Matter of Franklin, 20 I. & N. Dec.
CRIMES OF MORAL TURPITUDE " DEFINITION " SILVA-TREVINO
Saavedra-Figueroa v. Holder, 625 F.3d 621, 626 & n.4 (9th Cir. Nov. 5, 2010) (Ninth Circuit left open the question whether Matter of Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. 687 (AG 2008), applied retroactively to convictions occurring before it was decided).
JUDICIAL REVIEW " PETITION FOR REVIEW " MOTION TO REOPEN
Saavedra-Figueroa v. Holder, 625 F.3d 621 (9th Cir. Nov. 5, 2010) (We lack jurisdiction over a petition for review when the BIA reopens an alien's removal proceedings. See Lopez-Ruiz v. Ashcroft, 298 F.3d 886, 887 (9th Cir.2002) (the BIA's reopening of the case divested us of jurisdiction); Timbreza v. Gonzales, 410 F.3d 1082, 1083 (9th Cir.2005) (same); accord Yuan Gao v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 728, 730 (7th Cir.2006) (where the BIA reconsiders a final order of removal, there is nothing [for the appellate court] to retain jurisdiction of). As we explained in Cordes v.
AGGRAVATED FELONIES " CHILD PORNOGRAPHY " NO FEDERAL JURISDICTION OVER IMAGES THAT DID NOT CROSS STATE LINES
United States v. Wright, 625 F.3d 583 (9th Cir. Nov. 4, 2010) (no federal jurisdiction over an offense involving transmitted images that did not cross state lines).
JUDICIAL REVIEW " PETITION FOR REVIEW " CIRCUIT COURT CANNOT AFFIRM BIA ON GROUND UPON WHICH IT DID NOT RELY
Arredondo v. Holder, 623 F.3d 1317 (9th Cir. Nov. 2, 2010) (remanding case to the BIA where: (1) the BIAs own decision did not provide legal basis sufficient for review; and (2) the BIAs decision failed to address the reasoning of the immigration judge, and thus the Circuit court also cannot address the reasoning of the immigration judge, and the Circuit court cannot affirm the BIA on a ground upon which the BIA did not rely).
JUDICIAL REVIEW " PETITION FOR REVIEW " COURT CANNOT AFFIRM BIA ON A GROUND ON WHICH IT DID NOT RELY
Arredondo v. Holder, 623 F.3d 1317 (9th Cir. Nov. 2, 2010) (the court of appeals cannot affirm the BIA on a ground on which it did not rely); following Naas v. INS, 217 F.3d 646, 658 n. 16 (9th Cir. 2000).
DETENTION " EXCESSIVE FORCE BY OFFICER
Porro v. Barnes, 624 F.3d 1322 (10th Cir. Nov. 9, 2010) (claims by detainees that the Government officials have applied excessive force should be brought as a due process claim under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution).
JUDICIAL REVIEW " PETITION FOR REVIEW " EXHAUSTION
Garcia-Carbajal v. Holder, 625 F.3d 1233, 1237 (10th Cir. Nov. 5, 2010) (petitioner did not exhaust his administrative remedies before the BIA by presenting his arguments there: But presenting a conclusion or request for relief to the BIA isn't enough to exhaust every potential argument for reaching that conclusion or winning that relief.).