People v. Gari, 199 Cal.App.4th 510 (4th Dist. Sept. 12, 2011) (Penal Code 1018, which authorized the trial court to allow a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea before judgment was entered, did not provide authority for trial court's order granting defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty pleas where defendant claimed he had no knowledge that entry of plea would be inconsistent with representations he made on citizenship application, and thus jeopardize his naturalized United States citizenship).

People v. Gari, 199 Cal.App.4th 510 (4th Dist. Sept. 12, 2011) (defendants claim when he entered guilty plea he was not warned, and it was not otherwise foreseeable, that his naturalized United States citizenship might be revoked as a consequence of pleas to offenses committed prior to his stating to immigration authorities he had not committed any offenses for which he had not been arrested, did not justify equitable relief from the convictions based on the argument the court had inherent power to provide relief).

On Sept. 14, 2011, Santa Clara District Attorney Jeff Rosen issued a Memorandum to his office allowing for the consideration of collateral consequences of criminal convictions in plea bargaining in appropriate cases. The new policy states: It is not generally the duty of a prosecutor to mitigate the collateral consequences to a defendant of his or her crime.

ICE has revised immigration detainer Form I-274 to include an instruction to local and state authorities that they are not to detain a noncitizen for more than 48 hours, excluding weekends and holidays, and that they must provide the noncitizen with a copy of the detainer form.

Lopez-Penaloza v. State, 804 N.W.2d 537 (Iowa Ct. App. Sept. 8, 2011) (Padilla requires only general advice that adverse immigration consequences may result if the issue is whether the conviction constitutes a crime of moral turpitude); interpreting Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1483 (2010).
NOTE: This decision (incorrectly) creates a bright-line rule that only general advice is required when the issue is whether an offense is a crime of moral turpitude.

The federal controlled substances list mistakenly failed to renew the listing of two drugs. Benzylfentanyl and Thenylfentanyl continued to be listed on the federal controlled substances schedules from 1986 to 2010 even though their designation had expired. (See 75 Fed. Reg. 37300-301 (June 29, 2010).) These substances, however, continued to be listed on the Connecticut controlled substances schedules for this entire period, and the same is likely true for other states as well, based on the federal error.

Cavazos v. Smith, ___ U.S. ___ , 132 S.Ct. 2 (Oct. 31, 2011) (No. 10-1115) (per curiam) (The opinion of the Court in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (1979), makes clear that it is the responsibility of the jury--not the court--to decide what conclusions should be drawn from evidence admitted at trial. A reviewing court may set aside the jury's verdict on the ground of insufficient evidence only if no rational trier of fact could have agreed with the jury.

United States v. Segundo, __ F.Supp.3d __ (S.D. Tex. Nov. 16, 2010) ("Mr. Gonzalez Segundo's May 13, 2003 reinstatement order was based upon his April 1, 2002 removal order. He has successfully shown that the April 1, 2002 removal
order was the result of a proceeding that violated his rights to procedural due process and eliminated his rights to judicial review. The reinstatement proceeding in May 2003 did not permit Mr. Gonzalez Segundo the opportunity to obtain any review, administrative or judicial, of the underlying deportation order. 8 U.S.C.

Matter of Cruz de Ortiz, 25 I&N Dec. 601 (BIA Sept. 20, 2011) (the 5-year statute of limitations to rescission of LPR status, in INA 246(a), 8 U.S.C. 1256(a), relates only to proceedings to rescind lawful permanent resident status acquired through adjustment of status, and is therefore inapplicable to bar the removal of an alien who was admitted to the United States with an immigrant visa), distinguishing Garcia v. Attorney General of the United States, 553 F.3d 724 (3d Cir. 2009).

Prus v. Holder, 660 F.3d 144 (2d Cir. Sept. 28, 2011) (New York conviction for promoting prostitution in the third degree, under New York Penal Law 20.00 and 230.25, does not constitute an aggravated felony within the meaning of INA 101(a)(43)(K)(i), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(K)(i), because New York law defines prostitution more broadly than the generic federal definition of this aggravated felony offense).