Crimes of Moral Turpitude

This deportation ground requires the following five elements: 

(a)     a conviction of

(b)    a criminal offense,

(c)     involving moral turpitude,

(d)    committed within five years of the noncitizen’s last admission[7] into the United States, or 10 years if the noncitizen was admitted with an “S” visa,[8]

(e)     for which the maximum possible sentence was one year or more in custody.[9] 

This final requirement applies in all removal proceedings initiated on or after April 24, 1996.  Different forms of this sentence requirement apply to proceedings begun before that date.  See § 5.10, infra.

            Unlike the CMT ground of inadmissibility,[10] this ground does not include a political offense exception[11] or list any inchoate offenses (i.e., “attempt or conspiracy”).  One court has found that because this ground lacks the “attempt or conspiracy” language, all inchoate CMT convictions, including solicitation, are potentially included within this ground.[12]

[7] See § § 5.3-5.7, infra.

[8] If the noncitizen was admitted into the United States by virtue of an “S” visa, granted for cooperation with law enforcement or prosecuting authorities in the investigation or prosecution of crime, under INA § 245(j), 8 U.S.C. § 1255(j), then the person is deportable if the offense was committed within 10 years of admission, instead of within five years.  INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)(I).  See § § 5.9(B), 5.11(C), infra.

[9] This is the current definition of this ground.  For deportation proceedings initiated prior to April 1, 1997, the person is not deportable unless s/he was actually sentenced to serve one year or more in custody as a result of the conviction.  See § 5.10, infra.

[10] INA § 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I).

[11] See § 4.7, supra.

[12] Barragan-Lopez v. Mukasey, 508 F.3d 899 (9th Cir. Nov. 21, 2007) (Arizona conviction for solicitation to possess at least four pounds of marijuana for sale, in violation of Ariz. Rev. Stat. § § 13-1002(A) and (B)(2), 13-3405(A)(2) and (B)(6), constitutes a crime involving moral turpitude for purposes of INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i), since this ground does not specifically list "attempt" and "conspiracy," and thus does not impliedly exclude "solicitation").  Cf. Longview Fibre Co. v. Rasmussen, 980 F.2d 1307, 1312-13 (9th Cir. 1992) (statutory construction maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius means when some statutory provisions expressly mention a requirement, the omission of that requirement from other statutory provisions implies that the drafter intended the inclusion of the requirement in the instances in which it was listed but not in others).