Post-Conviction Relief for Immigrants

 

The right against conviction except on proof beyond a reasonable doubt is protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution against state interference.[12]  If this principle is weakened, “the presumption of innocence, secured only after centuries of struggle, would lose its meaning.”[13]  As the United States Supreme Court has held:

 

The reasonable doubt standard plays a vital role in the American scheme of criminal procedure.  It is a prime instrument for reducing the risk of convictions resting on factual error.  The standard provides concrete sub­stance for the presumption of innocence — that bedrock ‘axiomatic and elementary’ principle whose ‘enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our cri­minal law.’[14]

 

            This right is protected as well by parallel provisions of the California Constitution.[15]  In People v. Ramos II,[16] the California Supreme Court recognized its “obligation to exercise independent legal judgment in ascertaining the meaning and application of state constitutional provisions.”[17]

 

            This fundamental, constitutionally‑required principle is important since “a society that values the good name and freedom of every individual should not condemn a man [or woman] for commission of a crime when there is reasonable doubt about his [or her] guilt.”[18]

 

            It is a reflection of the fundamental rule[19] that:

 

[t]he defendant is entitled to the benefit of every reasonable doubt, whether it arises out of a question of fact, or as to the true interpretation of words, or the construction of language used in a statute.[20]

 

These principles require that the immigrant receive the benefit of every reasonable doubt concerning facts or law that arises in this critical context.

[12] Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975); Cool v. United States, 409 U.S. 100, 104 (1972) (“The Constitution requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt.”); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).

[13] Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951).

[14] In re Winship, supra, 397 U.S. at 363, quoting Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895).

[15] In Estate of Roulet, 23 Cal.3d 219, 152 Cal.Rptr. 425, 435 (1979), the court held: “The due process clause of the California Constitution requires that proof beyond a reasonable doubt and a unanimous jury verdict be applied to conservatorship proceedings under the LPS act. . . .”  “[T]he choice of standard of proof implicates due process considerations . . . .”  Id. at 428, quoting People v. Thomas, 19 Cal.3d 630, 638, 139 Cal.Rptr. 594, 598, 566 P.2d 228, 232 (1977); see also People v. Burnick, 14 Cal.3d 306, 315‑316, 121 Cal.Rptr. 488, 494, 535 P.2d 352, 358 (1975); In re Gary W., 5 Cal.3d 296, 307, 96 Cal.Rptr. 1, 9, 486 P.2d 1201, 1209 (1971).

[16] People v. Ramos II, 37 Cal.3d 136, 207 Cal.Rptr. 800, 809 (1984).

[17] Id., at 809, quoting People v. Chavez, 26 Cal.3d 334, 352, 161 Cal.Rptr. 762 (1980).  See also Cal. Const., Art. I, sec. 24.

[18] In re Winship, supra, 397 U.S. at 363‑364.

[19] This rule has been applied in many areas as a matter of constitutional law.  E.g., In re Murdock, 68 Cal.2d 313, 317, 66 Cal.Rptr. 380, 383 (1968); People v. Bennett, 60 Cal.App.3d 112, 131 Cal.Rptr. 305, 309 (1976); People v. Lazard, 229 Cal.App.2d 347, 40 Cal.Rptr. 358, 360 (1964).  In considering whether the evidence is sufficient to require jury instructions, the court must resolve all reasonable doubts in favor of appellant.  People v. Wilson, 66 Cal.2d 749, 59 Cal.Rptr. 156, 165 (1967); People v. Carmen, 36 Cal.2d 768, 228 P.2d 281 (1951); accord, People v. Sedeno, 10 Cal.3d 703, 716, 112 Cal.Rptr. 1 (1974); People v. Rodriguez, 274 Cal.App.2d 487, 494, 79 Cal.Rptr. 187 (1969).

[20] People v. Ralph, 24 Cal.2d 575, 581, 150 P.2d 401, 404 (1944), quoting Ex Parte Rosenheim, 83 Cal. 388, 391, 23 P. 372 (1890); In re McVickers, 29 Cal.2d 264, 176 P.2d 40 (1946).