(A)  Aggravated Felonies.

 

An offense involving domestic violence may be considered an aggravated felony crime of violence,[234] or an aggravated felony murder, rape, or sexual abuse of a minor conviction,[235] depending upon the elements of the conviction to which the noncitizen pleads.[236]  Recent cases, however, support narrowed interpretations of “crime of violence” and “abuse” that may be used to argue that some “domestic violence” offenses are not aggravated felonies.  See § 7.153-7.155, supra.

 

Ninth Circuit:

 

United States v. Hernandez-Hernandez, 374 F.3d 808 (9th Cir. June 30, 2004) (California misdemeanor conviction of corporal injury on spouse, in violation of Penal Code § 273.5(a), cannot constitute a crime of violence aggravated felony conviction, so as to support a 16-level enhancement of sentence for illegal re-entry under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii), because it was a misdemeanor with a maximum possible sentence of one year in county jail).

[234] INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F); INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).

[235] INA § 101(a)(43)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A); INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).

[236] See N. Tooby, Aggravated Felonies § § 5.13-5.15, Crimes of Violence, § 5.36, Murder, § 5.41, Rape, § § 5.45-5.48, Sexual Abuse of a Minor (2003).

Ninth Circuit

CRIME OF MORAL TURPITUDE - SIMPLE DOMESTIC ASSAULT
Fernandez-Ruiz v. Gonzales, ___ F.3d ___, 2006 WL 3302660 (9th Cir. Nov. 15, 2006) (Arizona conviction in 2003 of class 2 misdemeanor domestic violence/assault, in violation of A.R.S. 13-1203(A), 13-3601, does not constitute a crime of moral turpitude, because the additional element of the domestic relationship is insufficient to convert a non-CMT simple assault conviction into a crime of moral turpitude).

CRIMES OF MORAL TURPITUDE - DOMESTIC BATTERY
Galeana-Mendoza v. Gonzales, 465 F.3d 1054, 2006 WL 2846379 (9th Cir. Oct. 6, 2006) (California convictions of simple battery on the mother of defendant's child, in violation of Penal Code 243(e)(1), were not categorically crimes of moral turpitude since the least touching was sufficient to violate the statute, and the domestic relationship, standing alone, was insufficient to establish moral turpitude).