(A)  Aggravated Felonies.[219]

 

Misprision of a felony under 18 U.S.C. § 4 (1994) does not fall within the definition of an offense “relating to obstruction of justice,” so a conviction of misprision of a felony does not constitute an aggravated felony[220] even if a one-year sentence has been imposed.[221]  See § 7.11, supra.

 

Board of Immigration Appeals:

 

Matter of Espinoza-Gonzalez, 22 I. & N. Dec. 889 (BIA 1999) (en banc) (misprision of a felony does not constitute an aggravated felony, as obstruction of justice, under INA 101(a)(48)(S), 8 U.S.C. § x1101(a)(48)(S)).

[219] See N. Tooby, Aggravated Felonies § 5.34 (2003).

[220] INA 101(a)(48)(S), 8 U.S.C. § x1101(a)(48)(S).

[221] Matter of Espinoza-Gonzalez, 22 I. & N. Dec. 889 (BIA 1999) (en banc).

BIA

CRIME OF MORAL TURPITUDE - MISPRISION OF FELONY
Matter of Robles, 24 I. & N. Dec. 22 (BIA Sept. 27, 2006) (federal conviction of misprison of a felony, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 4, constitutes crime of moral turpitude, since mere failure to report an offense is insufficient; offense requires affirmative conduct of concealment, contrary to the duties owed to society; "evil intent" is implicit in statutory requirement that offender take affirmative step to conceal a felony from the proper authorities).

This decision is very badly reasoned, for the reasons given in the dissent in Navarro-Lopez v. Gonzales, 455 F.3d 1055 (9th Cir. July 31, 2006) (California conviction for accessory after the fact, in violation of Penal Code 32 ["Every person who, after a felony has been committed, harbors, conceals, or aids a principal in such felony, with the intent that said principal may avoid or escape from arrest, trial, conviction or punishment, having knowledge that said principal has committed such felony or has been charged with such felony or convicted thereof, is an accessory to such felony."], was a conviction involving a crime of moral turpitude, rendering respondent inadmissible and ineligible for cancellation of removal). The BIA mistakenly concluded that mere violation of the duties owed to society - which is present in every single criminal offense - is sufficient to make the offense a CMT. This would mean that all offenses by definition are CMTs, and none are not. It proves too much, and completely abolishes the meaning of the concept of crimes of moral turpitude, and renders the "moral turpitude" language surplusage. This interpretation thus violates the statute. The law is clear that regulatory offenses, that are wrong merely because they are illegal or unauthorized, are not CMTs.

MISPRISION - CRIME OF MORAL TURPITUDE
Matter of Giraldo-Valencia, 10 Immig.Rptr. B1-132 (BIA Index Decision, October 22, 1992) (federal conviction of misprision of felony under 18 U.S.C. 4 constitutes a crime involving moral turpitude for purposes of triggering deportation, because, unlike the common law crime, a federal conviction for misprision of felony requires proof that the defendant took an affirmative step to conceal commission of a felony).

Second Circuit

MORAL TURPITUDE " MISPRISION OF A FELONY
Lugo v. Holder, 783 F.3d 119 (2d Cir. Apr. 9, 2015) (remanding to BIA to determine whether to continue to adhere to Matter of Robles"Urrea, 24 I. & N. Dec. 22 (BIA 2006), holding that conviction of misprision of a felony, under 18 U.S.C. 4, is still a crime of moral turpitude in light of circuit split), citing Itani v. Ashcroft, 298 F.3d 1213, 1216 (11th Cir.2002), and Robles"Urrea v. Holder, 678 F.3d 702, 711 (9th Cir. 2012).