Safe Havens

(B)  Crimes of Moral Turpitude.[35]

Board of Immigration Appeals

Matter of Ghunaim, 15 I. & N. Dec. 269 (BIA 1975) (involuntary manslaughter is not a CMT).

Matter of Gantus-Bobadilla, 13 I. & N. Dec. 777 (BIA 1971) (New York conviction of manslaughter in the second degree under New York Penal Law § 125.15(1), recklessly causing the death of another, held not to be crime involving moral turpitude); modified by Matter of Wojtkow, 18 I. & N. Dec. 111 (BIA 1981).

Matter of Lopez, 13 I. & N. Dec. 725 (BIA 1971) (conviction of manslaughter in violation of Alaska Statutes § 11.15.040 “as charged in the indictment,” which stated that respondent “did unlawfully and feloniously kill” another person “by shooting him with a gun,” is not a conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, since the statute encompassed both voluntary and involuntary manslaughter and the indictment did not distinctly set forth that the offense was voluntary rather than involuntary manslaughter).

Matter of Szegedi, 10 I. & N. Dec. 28 (BIA 1962) (Wisconsin conviction of reckless homicide found not to involve turpitude where the killing occurred during a quarrel in which the deceased tried to hit the noncitizen with a gun, and the gun was not in the noncitizen’s hand at the time it went off during the ensuing scuffle.  The BIA pointed out that the offense of homicide by reckless conduct did not contain the element of “depraved mind” present in the second-degree murder statute, and the noncitizen had been found not to have had a specific intent to kill or to do any act the natural consequences of which could cause death).

Matter of B, 4 I. & N. Dec. 493 (BIA 1951) (conviction of violating New Jersey Criminal Statutes § 2: 138-5, which embraces both voluntary and involuntary manslaughter, could have been based upon either an aggravated assault or a simple assault; since it cannot be determined from the statute or record of conviction that the offense was voluntary manslaughter rather than involuntary manslaughter, it cannot be concluded that the offense of which the noncitizen was charged and convicted involves moral turpitude).

Matter of E, 2 I. & N. Dec. 134 (BIA, AG, 1944) (conviction under predecessor to New York Penal Law § 125.15(1) was in this case not held to be a crime involving moral turpitude).

Matter of N, 1 I. & N. Dec. 181 (BIA 1941) (involuntary manslaughter in violation of § 4586 of the Arizona Code is not a crime involving moral turpitude).

District Courts:

Tutrone v. Shaughnessy, 160 F.Supp. 433 (D.N.Y. 1958) (New York conviction of second-degree manslaughter conceded not to be CMT).

Vidal y Planas v. Landon, 104 F.Supp. 384 (D. Cal. 1952) (Spanish homicide conviction was held not to involve CMT where the judgment established the crime was committed in self-defense, the acts committed by the deceased were sufficient to produce in the accused a “blind rage,” by virtue of which the Spanish law allowed the court to impose the minimum penalty, and the court had held the defendant guilty of “a crime of homicide, with a mitigating circumstance.”  The Solicitor of the United States Department of Justice, in listing crimes involving moral turpitude for the information of immigration officers, had specifically excepted from the list those offenses which were “the outcome merely of natural passion, of animal spirits, of infirmity of temper, of weakness of character, or of mistaken principles, unaccompanied by a vicious motive or corrupt mind.”).

Matter of Schiano Di Cola, 7 F.Supp. 194 (D.R.I. 1934) (involuntary manslaughter through negligent or reckless operation of an automobile did not involve moral turpitude).

United States ex rel. Mongiovi v Karnuth, 30 F.2d 825 (D.N.Y. 1929)  (second-degree manslaughter held not to involve moral turpitude where the noncitizen’s daughter was shot to death by the accidental discharge of a pistol over which he and his wife struggled during a quarrel).

[35] See N. Tooby, J. Rollin & J. Foster, Crimes of Moral Turpitude § § 9.21-9.24 (2005).