SENTENCE " CREDIT FOR TIME SERVED " TIME SPENT IN IMMIGRATION DETENTION PENDING CRIMINAL TRIAL
Zavala v. Ives, ___ F.3d ___, 2015 WL 2343637 (9th Cir. May 18, 2015) (defendants are entitled to sentencing credit for time in ICE detention pending criminal prosecution).
REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS " TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION " MARIANA ISLANDS
Mtoched v. Lynch, ___ F.3d ___, 2015 WL 2445063 (9th Cir. May 22, 2015) (United States immigration laws may be applied and enforced within CNMI to noncitizens who entered that territory, committed the crime, and suffered the conviction upon which the removal order is based prior to the extension of United States immigration laws to the Commonwealth).
RELIEF " WAIVERS " INA 212(h) WAIVER " VIOLENT OR DANGEROUS CRIME " CATEGORICAL ANALYSIS INAPPLICABLE
Torres-Valdivias v. Lynch, ___ F.3d ___, 2015 WL 2146726 (9th Cir. May 8, 2015) (BIA was not required to apply categorical analysis to determine whether a conviction was for a violent or dangerous crime, for purposes of application of the enhanced hardship standard under Matter of Jean, 23 I. & N. Dec. 373 (Att'y Gen. 2002); immigration judge was allowed to examine documents outside the record of conviction in making the determination whether a conviction was for a violent or dangerous crime).
RELIEF " WAIVERS " INA 212(h) WAIVER " VIOLENT OR DANGEROUS CRIME " DISCRETIONARY DECISION
Torres-Valdivias v. Lynch, ___ F.3d ___, 2015 WL 2146726 (9th Cir. May 8, 2015) (determination whether conviction was for a violent or dangerous crime, for purposes of considering an application for a waiver of inadmissibility under INA 212(h), is a discretionary decision not subject to review).
RELIEF " WAIVERS " INA 212(h) WAIVER "VIOLENT OR DANGEROUS CRIME " SEXUAL BATTERY
Torres-Valdivias v. Lynch, ___ F.3d ___, 2015 WL 2146726 (9th Cir. May 8, 2015)
(California conviction of sexual battery, in violation of Penal Code 243.4(a), constituted a violent or dangerous crime, for purposes of triggering application of the Matter or Jean enhanced hardship standard to an application for a waiver of moral turpitude inadmissibility under INA 212(h)).
POST CON RELIEF " WASHINGTON " SUPREME COURT FINDS PADILLA RETROACTIVE
In re Yung Ching Tsai, ___ Wash. ___, __ P.3d __, 2015 WL 2164187 (May 7, 2015) (Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010), applies no matter when the conviction was entered; since Padilla was not a new rule of constitutional law it applies retroactively).
http://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/887705.pdf
CONVICTION " NATURE OF CONVICTION " CATEGORICAL ANALYSIS " ALMANZA ARENAS VACATED
Almaza Arenas (overruling Young v. Holder) was vacated. It's going en banc. Many of you may be aware of this already, but if not--here it is. Now arguably, Moncrieffe still trumps Young v. Holder on the burden issue (for affirmative applications for relief), but this makes our advisory world much more challenging when advising undocumented clients.
AGGRAVATED FELONY " FRAUD " UTTERING FORGED INSTRUMENT
Walker v. U.S. Atty. Gen., ___ F.3d ___, 2015 WL 1782677 (11th Cir. Apr. 21, 2015) (Florida conviction of uttering a forged instrument, under Fla. Stat. 831.02, is categorically an aggravated felony fraud or deceit offense, under INA 101(a)(43)(M)(i), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(M)(i), because the violator utters and publishes as true something that the violator know[s] to be false, whether this is done with intent to injure or intent to defraud).
CRIMES OF MORAL TURPITUDE " UTTERING A FORGED INSTRUMENT
Walker v. U.S. Atty. Gen., ___ F.3d ___, ___, 2015 WL 1782677 (11th Cir. Apr. 21, 2015) (Florida conviction of uttering a forged instrument, under Fla. Stat. 831.02, is categorically a crime involving moral turpitude, under INA 237(a)(2)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(i): Because uttering a forged instrument involves deceit, we hold that it is a crime of moral turpitude. Uttering a forged instrument is behavior that runs contrary to accepted societal duties and involves dishonest or fraudulent activity.); quoting and following Itani v. Ashcroft, 298 F.3d 1213, 1215 (11th Cir. 2002).
AGGRAVATED FELONY " CHILD PORNOGRAPHY
Section 101(a)(43)(I) of the Act defines as an aggravated felony an offense described in section 2251, 2251A, or 2252 of title 18, United States Code (relating to child pornography). However, the statute does not expressly list 18 USC 2252A " knowingly possess child pornography.
In their current forms, the possession provisions of 2252 and 2252A are almost identical, but 2252A applies to a greater amount of material because the term "child pornography" therein applies to both actual and virtual child pornography.
Additionally, section 2252A prohibits "knowingly possess[ing] . . .
