Matter of M-H-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 46 (BIA Nov. 13, 2012) (applying Brand-X to hold that the term particularly serious crime includes non-aggravated felony convictions for purposes of barring asylum or withholding of removal even within the Third Circuit, despite a prior decision to the contrary, Alaka v. Attorney General of U.S., 456 F.3d 88 (3d Cir. 2006)), applying Matter of N-A-M-, 24 I&N Dec. 336 (BIA 2007), affd, 587 F.3d 1052 (10th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 898 (2011).

Mendoza Leiba v. Holder, 699 F.3d 346 (4th Cir. Nov. 9, 2012) (the LPR aggravated felony bar to relief under INA 212(h) does not apply to a noncitizen who adjusted status to that of a lawful permanent resident status while remaining within the United States); see Bracamontes v. Holder, 675 F.3d 380 (4th Cir. 2012).

Carranza-De Salinas v. Holder, 700 F.3d 768, *772 (5th Cir. Nov. 6, 2012) (noncitizen convicted by jury trial of an aggravated felony prior to the repeal of former INA 212(c) is eligible to apply for the relief under St. Cyr., even though she was found guilty by a jury; [I]n light of Vartelas, Carranza may invoke the presumption against the retroactive application of statutes. Because she has demonstrated the kind of reliance described by the Court in Vartelas, namely a likelihood of reliance on prior law, see 132 S.Ct.

Carranza-De Salinas v. Holder, 700 F.3d 768, *772 (5th Cir. Nov. 6, 2012) ([I]n light of Vartelas, Carranza may invoke the presumption against the retroactive application of statutes. Because she has demonstrated the kind of reliance described by the Court in Vartelas, namely a likelihood of reliance on prior law, see 132 S.Ct. at 1491, she is entitled to argue that IIRIRA's repeal of 212(c) relief may not be retroactively applied to her.).

United States v. Rodriguez-Escareno, 700 F.3d 751 (5th Cir. Nov. 1, 2012) (conspiracy for purposes of U.S.S.G. 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(i), does not require an overt act, where the conviction falls within 21 U.S.C. 846 (attempt and conspiracy)).

Brikova v. Holder, 699 F.3d 1005 (8th Cir. Nov. 7, 2012) (Minnesota conviction of possession of cocaine, for which defendant would have been eligible for Federal First Offender Act treatment, under 18 U.S.C. 3607(a), was not eliminated for immigration purposes by state rehabilitative relief, since equal protection challenge fails because there are multiple potential rational bases for distinguishing between federal and state defendants).

United States v. Catalan, 701 F.3d 331 (9th Cir. Nov. 19, 2012) (per curiam) (sentence imposed, pursuant to USSG 2L1.2(b)(1), does not include a probation revocation sentence served after the defendant was deported, for purposes of imposing a 16"level illegal reentry sentence enhancement, because the Sentencing Commission recently clarified that a probation revocation sentence served after deportation should not be used to calculate the sentence imposed and the court determined to apply this amendment retroactively).

United States v. Oseguera-Madrigal, 700 F.3d 1196 (9th Cir. Nov. 19, 2012) (IJ did not violate due process by failing to inform the defendant of the possibility of relief through a waiver of inadmissibility under INA 212(h), 8 U.S.C. 1182(h), where the defendant was plainly ineligible for the waiver because the paraphernalia he was convicted of using was related to cocaine, not marijuana).

United States v. Oseguera-Madrigal, 700 F.3d 1196 (9th Cir. Nov. 19, 2012) (Washington conviction for use of drug paraphernalia, in violation of Wash. Rev.Code 69.50.412, constituted a conviction relating to a controlled substance, under INA 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(II), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II), for inadmissibility purposes); following Luu"Le v. INS, 224 F.3d 911, 914-16 (9th Cir. 2000) (Arizona's statute criminalizing the possession of drug paraphernalia, Ariz.Rev.Stat. 13"3415(A) is, by its plain language, an offense relating to a controlled substance for removal purposes); Bermudez v.

United States v. Zamorano-Ponce, 699 F.3d 1117 (9th Cir. Nov. 6, 2012) (Washington conviction of "rape of a child in the third degree," in violation of the Revised Code of Washington 9A.44.079, categorically qualifies as "statutory rape," which is enumerated as a crime of violence for the purposes of a 16-level sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G. 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) for the crime of illegal reentry after deportation; statutory rape for this purpose includes, at least, unlawful sexual intercourse with a person under the age of 16 where the actor is four years older than the victim).