Rodriguez v. Holder, 705 F.3d 207, (5th Cir. Jan. 16, 2013) (Section 16 has both criminal and noncriminal applications, and thus, the rule of lenity applies. We therefore are constrained to interpret any ambiguity in the statute in [Rodriguez's] favor.) (footnotes omitted); quoting Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 11 n. 8, 125 S.Ct. 377, 160 L.Ed.2d 271 (2004).

United States v. Vidal-Mendoza, 705 F.3d 1012 (9th Cir. Jan. 15, 2013) (reversing dismissal of illegal reentry indictment, because defendants underlying removal proceeding was consistent with due process because he was correctly informed that he was ineligible for discretionary relief from removal under the law applicable at the time of his removal hearing).

Practice Advisory, National Immigration Project, Matter of Davey and the Categorical Approach, takes a close look at the Boards reasoning in Matter of Davey and suggests strategies to challenge the decision or limit its impact. It also contains an appendix surveying state marijuana laws and their weight requirements.
http://www.nationalimmigrationproject.org/legalresources/practice_adviso...

Christopher N. Lasch, How the Courts Upholding of Federal Immigration Enforcement Authority in Arizona v. United States Casts Doubt on the Validity of Federal Immigration Detainers, 46 Loyola Los Angeles L. Rev. --- (forthcoming 2013) (federal government lacks the authority to issue immigration detainers as it has being doing with great frequency in recent years).
First, Lasch argues, the regulation DHS relies on gives its agents more power to arrest than Congress authorized.

Penal Code 1016.5 requires a statement the plea may trigger adverse immigration consequences. Judges commit judicial misconduct when they violate this statute when they erroneously misinform the defendant that it will do so. They are ignorant of the specific defendants immigration status or immigration consequences of a particular plea, and therefore have no idea whether the plea will or will not result in deportation or other consequences.

18 U.S.C. 547. Depositing goods in buildings on boundaries, punishes [w]hoever receives or deposits any merchandise in any building upon the boundary line between the United States and any foreign country, or carries any merchandise through the same, in violation of law This offense constitutes a regulatory offense, that is not a crime of moral turpitude. See N. TOOBY, ET AL., TOOBYS CRIMES OF MORAL TURPITUDE 8.22 (2008). There is nothing inherently evil about taking goods across a border in violation of an unspecified law.

Mondragon v. Holder, 706 F.3d 535 (4th Cir. Jan. 31, 2013) (respondents sworn evidence concerning the offense conduct did not constitute part of the record of conviction on the basis of which the immigration authorities determine whether his Virginia conviction for assault and battery, in violation of Virginia Code 18.2"57, constituted an aggravated felony crime of violence for immigration purposes).

NOTE: This case demonstrates the problems with placing the burden on a respondent in removal proceedings seeking relief where the record of conviction is inconclusive.

Mondragon v. Holder, 706 F.3d 535 (4th Cir. Jan. 31, 2013) (respondents sworn evidence concerning the offense conduct did not constitute part of the record of conviction on the basis of which the immigration authorities determine whether his Virginia conviction for assault and battery, in violation of Virginia Code 18.2"57, constituted an aggravated felony crime of violence for immigration purposes).

NOTE: This case demonstrates the problems with placing the burden on a respondent in removal proceedings seeking relief where the record of conviction is inconclusive.

Mondragon v. Holder, 706 F.3d 535, (4th Cir. Jan. 31, 2013) (retroactive application of 1996 expansion of aggravated felony definition to convictions predating its effective date did not violate the Constitution).

Mondragon v. Holder, 706 F.3d 535, (4th Cir. Jan. 31, 2013) (respondent cannot challenge in removal proceedings the constitutional validity of a conviction on which those proceedings are based: Indeed, the same reasoning has also led courts to apply Custis to the immigration context. See, e.g., Drakes v. INS, 330 F.3d 600, 604 (3d Cir. 2003) (There is no meaningful difference between a collateral attack on an expired state conviction underlying removal proceedings and a collateral attack on an expired state criminal conviction underlying an enhanced sentence); Taylor v.