Ali v. U.S. Attorney General, ___ F.3d ___, 2006 WL 709870 (7th Cir. Mar. 22, 2006) (per curiam) (Georgia conviction of two counts of child molestation under Georgia First Offender Act, O.C.G.A. 42-8- 60, et seq., which allows a first-time felony offender to be placed on probation (or be sentenced to confinement) and serve out that probation or confinement without receiving an adjudication of guilt, constituted a conviction under INA 101(a)(48)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(48)(A), for removal purposes).

United States v. Aguilar-Ortiz, __ F.3d __ (11th Cir. May 31, 2006) (Florida conviction for solicitation of delivery of drugs, in violation of Fla. Stat. 777.04(2) is not a "drug trafficking offense" for illegal re-entry sentencing purposes because the guidelines include aiding and abetting attempt, and conspiracy, but not solicitation offenses).

Mutascu v. Gonzales, __ F.3d __ (5th Cir. Apr. 3, 2006) (California conviction of petty theft with a prior, in violation of Penal Code 666, with one-year sentence imposed is an aggravated felony theft offense), rejecting United States v. Corona-Sanchez, 291 F.3d 1201 (9th Cir. 2002).
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data2/circs/5th/0460708cv0p.pdf

United States v. Bridgeforth, ___ F.3d ___, 2006 WL 786474 (9th Cir. Mar. 29, 2006) (California conviction of assault with a deadly weapon, in violation of Penal Code 245(a)(1) or (2), in which probation was terminated and the court imposed a sentence of 365 days in county jail, was a wobbler which then became a misdemeanor "for all purposes" under Penal Code 17(b)(1), and therefore did not subject the defendant to the federal career offender enhancement of U.S.S.G. 4B1.1-4B1.2, because it was a misdemeanor under California law), following United States v.

United States v. Pintado-Isiordia, ___ F.3d ___ (9th Cir. May 26, 2006) (per curiam) (because record unclear whether district court relied on categorical approach, or modified categorical approach, defendants sentence for illegal reentry was vacated and remanded for district court determination as to whether prior conviction for assault with a firearm qualifies as a "crime of violence" under either approach).
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data2/circs/9th/0550489p.pdf

United States v. Meza-Corrales, ___ F. Supp. 2d ___, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11199 (E.D. Wash. Mar. 1, 2006) (motion to dismiss illegal reentry charge granted on ground immigration judge violated due process by bypassing categorical analysis of Oregon conviction of attempted sexual abuse in the first degree, in violation of O.R.S.

Canada v. Gonzales, ___ F.3d ___, 2006 WL 1367367 (2d Cir. May 18, 2006) (Connecticut conviction for assault on a public safety officer, in violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. 53a-167c(a)(1) is a divisible statute, since assault of a police officer is a categorical crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. 16(b), but assault of another peace office may not categorically qualify as a crime of violence; where plea transcript shows victim was, in fact, a police officer, the Government has met its burden of showing removability as an aggravated felon).

United States v. Fernandez-Cusco, __ F.3d __ (5th Cir. Apr. 20, 2006) (examining for plain error, the court found that where the complaint charges defendant under a subsection of a divisible statute that is a categorical crime of violence, but the plea colloquy does not indicate any specific subsection, it is not plain error for the illegal re-entry sentencing court to find that the defendant had pleaded guilty to the subsection charged in the complaint).
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data2/circs/5th/0540289cr0p.pdf

Canada v. Gonzales, ___ F.3d ___, 2006 WL 1367367 (2d Cir. May 18, 2006) (rejecting petitioners claim that only statutes divisible into discreet subjection may be found divisible; divisible statutes include statutes applying the disjunctive or to identify separate sets of elements punished under the same statute), citing Singh v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 144, 163 (3d Cir.

Doe v. ICE, __ F.Supp.2d __, 2006 WL 1294440 (S.D.N.Y. May 10, 2006) ("Information relating to persons subject to a civil order of deportation does not automatically qualify as a crime record. The Government must show that the person "willfully" violated the statute to warrant entry as part of a criminal record. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. 1253(a)(1) (criminal penalties for "willful" failure to depart after entry of a removal order); 8 U.S.C. 1306 (criminal penalties for "willful" failure to comply with registration requirements). . . .