Ruiz-Morales v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 1219, 1222 (9th Cir.2004) ("If the state statute is over-inclusive, meaning that conduct that does and does not qualify as an aggravated felony is criminalized, we analyze the statute under a modified categorical approach.") (quotation and citation omitted).

United States v. Baron-Medina, 187 F.3d 1144, 1146 (9th Cir. 1999) (Under the "categorical approach" laid out in Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990), "[t]he crime defined by [ 261.5(c) ] qualifies as 'sexual abuse of a minor' and hence an aggravated felony if and only if the full range of conduct covered by it falls within the meaning of that term.") (internal quotations and citation omitted).

United States v. Orellana, ___ F.3d ___ , 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 5436 (5th Cir. April 5, 2005) ("Because we conclude that it is uncertain whether Congress intended to criminalize the possession of firearms by aliens in receipt of lawful temporary protected status, we apply the rule of lenity and reverse.").

Leocal v. Ashcroft, ___ U.S. ___, 125 S.Ct. 377 (Nov. 9, 2004) (Florida conviction of driving under the influence and accidentally causing serious bodily injury, in violation of Florida Stats. Ann. 316.193(3)(c), did not constitute an aggravated felony as a crime of violence, under INA 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F), for purposes of triggering deportation, since the offense did not have a mens rea requirement in excess of strict liability or negligence, sufficient to meet the statutory requirement of use of force in the commission of the offense).

An Immigration Judge must require a noncitizen in removal hearing to state explicitly whether s/he desires representation by counsel. 8 C.F.R. 1240.10(a)(1). Prejudice may consist in the possibility that the noncitizen, with the assistance of counsel, may be able to demonstrate eligibility for relief such as cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b)(1). See Baltazar-Alcazar v. INS, 386 F.3d 940, 947-48 (9th Cir. 2004). Failure to do so may invalidate the resulting removal order so as to constitute a defense to illegal reentry after deportation.

Slocum, Brian G. The immigration rule of lenity and Chevron deference. 17 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 515-582 (2003).

John F. Decker, Addressing Vagueness: Ambiguity, and Other Uncertainty in American Criminal Laws, 80 Denver U. L. Rev. 241 (2002).  

United States v. Torres-Diaz, ___ F.3d ___, 2006 WL 225615 (5th Cir. Jan. 30, 2006) (different subsections of a criminal statute constitute different offenses for purposes of determining the nature of the conviction to see whether a sentence enhancement should be imposed under USSG 2L1.2 for illegal reentry), accord, United States v. Landeros-Gonzales, 262 F.3d 424, 426 ("For the purpose of defining a 'crime of violence,' the different subsections of ... [the underlying statute of conviction] should be treated as separate offenses"); United States v. Calderon-Pena, 383 F.3d 254, 258.

United States v. Karaouni, 379 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir. Aug. 24, 2004) ("Karaouni contends that no rational trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt that his verification of the printed statement on the I-9 Form constituted a violation of 911 because the printed statement was phrased in the disjunctive. See Prince v. Jacoby, 303 F.3d 1074, 1080-81 (9th Cir.2002) (explaining that the use of the disjunctive "or" suggests that terms in a sequence should not be interpreted as synonyms).

Matter of Brown, 18 I. & N. Dec. 324 (BIA 1988) (LPR respondent was convicted of poss.