United States v. Alvarez-Gutierrez, 394 F.3d 1241 (9th Cir. Jan. 14, 2005) (Nevada conviction for statutory sexual seduction, for having had sexual intercourse with a 14-year-old girl, in violation of Nev.Rev.Stat. 200.364, 368 (2002), punishable as a gross misdemeanor by a sentence of up to one year, Nev.Rev.Stat. 193.140 (2002), constituted sexual abuse of a minor, and was therefore an aggravated felony under INA 101(a)(43)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(A)(2003), for purposes of imposing an eight-level illegal reentry sentence enhancement under U.S.S.G. 2L1.2(b)(1)(C) (2003)).

United States v. Alvarez-Gutierrez, 394 F.3d 1241 (9th Cir. Jan. 14, 2005) (Nevada misdemeanor conviction for statutory sexual seduction, for having had sexual intercourse with a 14-year-old girl, in violation of Nev.Rev.Stat. 200.364, 368 (2002), sentence imposed of one year, might or might not constitute a crime of violence aggravated felony under INA 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F)(2003), for purposes of imposing an eight-level illegal reentry sentence enhancement under U.S.S.G.

United States v. Melendez-Torres, ___ F.3d ___, 2005 WL 2037351 (1st Cir. August 25, 2005) (court of appeal lacked jurisdiction to review claim that district judge erred in failing to depart downward based on cultural assimilation).

United States v. Martinez-Candejas, 347 F.3d 853 (10 Cir. October 21, 2003) (disagreeing with United States v. Krawczak, 331 F.3d 1302, 1307 (11th Cir. 2003), the court held that the underlying facts of a prior conviction may be examined to determine whether the smuggling offense was committed for profit, and the Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 601 (1990), categorical approach is inapplicable).

United States v. Dyck, ___ F.Supp.2d ___ (D.N.D. October 16, 2003) (on dissent upon imposition of sentence, the district court stated its disagreement with the controlling decision of United States v. Dyck, 334 F.3d 736 (8th Cir. 2003) (rejecting district court departure from U.S.S.G. 2L1.2 via U.S.S.G. 5K2.0, based upon the Feeney Amendment). The court cited Supreme Court precedent for the idea that a defendant has a Fifth Amendment Due Process right to be sentenced as an individual, and a mandated, non-discretionary application of the sentencing guidelines violates this right).

Misprision of a felony may constitute a crime of moral turpitude. Itani v. Ashcroft, 298 F.3d 1213 (11th Cir. 2002); see Matter of Sanchez-Marin, 11 I. & N. Dec. 264 (BIA 1965); but see Matter of SC, 3 I. & N. Dec. 350 (BIA 1948); Matter of Sloan, 12 I. & N. Dec. 840 (BIA 1968). It does not constitute an aggravated felony. Matter of Espinoza, 15 I. & N. Dec. 98 (BIA 1962). It does not constitute a crime relating to a controlled substance. Matter of Velasco, 16 I. & N. Dec. 281 (BIA 1977).

United States v. Morgan, 380 F.3d 698 (2d Cir. Aug. 19, 2004) (New York conviction for second degree attempted murder, with sentence to indeterminate term of two-and-a-half to seven-and-a-half years' imprisonment, properly treated as an "aggravated felony" for illegal reentry sentencing purposes, even though it was not an aggravated felony under the relevant immigration statute at the time of the conviction).

Matter of Joseph, 22 I. & N. Dec. 799, 808 (BIA 1999) ("[I]t is substantially unlikely that the offense of simply obstructing or hindering one's own arrest will be viewed as an obstruction of justice aggravated felony under section 101(a)(43)(S) of the Act for removal purposes.").

Alwan v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 507 (5th Cir. Oct. 18, 2004) (conviction of contempt of court, under 18 U.S.C. 401(3), was one "relating to obstruction of justice," and thus an "aggravated felony" for immigration purposes).

A conviction of coercing labor, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1589, does not constitute an aggravated felony under INA 101(a)(43)(K)(iii), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(K)(iii), which lists only neighboring provisions. This offense appears to be divisible with respect to whether it constitutes a crime involving moral turpitude. Subsections (1) and (2) appear would be crimes of moral turpitude if committed by means of threats of serious harm to a person, at least if construed as serious bodily harm.