Oropeza-Wong v. Gonzales, ___ F.3d ___, 2005 WL 1088938 (9th Cir. May 10, 2005) (noncitizen held not entitled to a statutory waiver of the conditional basis of his permanent resident status, based on marriage to a United States citizen, since he did not meet his burden of proving that he entered his marriage in good faith).
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data2/circs/9th/0371446p.pdf

Francis v. Gonzalez, __ F.3d __, 2006 WL 768549 (2d Cir. Mar. 27, 2006) (to determine whether a noncitizen is deportable for being inadmissible at entry or adjustment under INA 237(a)(1)(A), the court must look to the law as it existed at the time of entry or adjustment, not current law).

8 CFR 1246 states that if person has LPR status and it appears they were not eligible "a proceeding shall be commenced by the personal service upon such person of a notice of intent to rescind . . . ."

Kalal v. Gonzales, __ F.3d __ (9th Cir. March 30, 2005) (Conditional permanent resident status cannot be properly granted to a noncitizen who enters with a K-1 visa, granted for the purpose of marrying one person, were the noncitizen marries someone else).
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data2/circs/9th/0371354p.pdf

United States v. Afshari, 426 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. Oct. 20, 2005) (8 U.S.C. 1189, statute prohibiting financial support to organizations designated as "terrorist" is constitutional, despite fact that defendants are precluded from collaterally attacking the designation).

The Real ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231 (May 11, 2005), provides that the terrorism ground of inadmissibility under INA 212(a)(3)(B), now also constitutes a ground of deportation as well, a very significant change in the law. There are very serious constitutional problems with the expanded terrorism ground of inadmissibility, since the law removes any link between what the applicant for admission did and any actual terrorist activity.

The REAL ID Act expands the terrorism ground of inadmissibility. INA 212(a)(3)(B), as amended by the Real ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231 (May 11, 2005). There are very serious constitutional problems with the expanded terrorism ground of inadmissibility, since the law removes any link between what the applicant for admission did and any actual terrorist activity.

Singh v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 533, 540-541 (3d Cir. Jan. 3, 2006) (Pennsylvania misdemeanor conviction of recklessly endangering another person, in violation of 18 Pa. Cons.Stat. Ann. 2705, with a sentence of one year or more, did not constitute a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. 16(a), and was not a felony conviction, and therefore did not constitute a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. 16(a), and therefore was not an aggravated felony aggravated felony, under INA 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F), since it requires a mens rea of no more than recklessness.)

United States v. Hernandez-Hernandez, ___ F.3d ___, ___ n.5, 2005 WL 3440815 (9th Cir. Dec. 16, 2005) (California conviction of felony false imprisonment, in violation of Penal Code 236, constitutes a divisible statute, encompassing some offenses that constitute crimes of violence within the meaning of U.S.S.G.

Martinez-Perez v. Ashcroft, __ F.3d __ (9th Cir. August 3, 2005) (under California law, an aider and abettor can be adequately charged in language accusing him or her of directly committing the offense, therefore a plea to a charge alleging direct commission of a theft does not establish that the offense pled to was not aiding and abetting, and therefore does not establish that the offense is an aggravated felony).  See also Penuliar v Aschroft, 395 F.3d 1037, 1045-46 (9th Cir. 2005).