United States v. Lence, ___ F.3d ___ (9th Cir. Jul. 27, 2006) (criminal defendant has right to be resentenced by original sentencing judge on remand following Booker error).
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data2/circs/9th/0530236p.pdf

Under the C.F.R., the Attorney General may release a noncitizen on a bond of at least $1500, or on conditional parole. 8 USC 1226(a)(2). The Immigration Judge has jurisdiction to review these decisions. 8 CFR 1003.19 (2006) ["(a) Custody and bond determinations made by the service pursuant to 8 CFR part 1236 may be reviewed by an Immigration Judge pursuant to 8 CFR part 1236."]. No C.F.R. provisions give the IJ authority to release someone on bond of a minimum of $1500, but fail to include authority to release a person on conditional parole.

King v. Lamarque, ___ F.3d ___ (9th Cir. Jul. 26, 2006) (simply contesting the adequacy of a state rule is sufficient to meet the petitioner's burden, under Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573 (9th Cir. 2003), if the court has previously found the rule to be too ambiguous to bar federal review during the applicable time period).
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data2/circs/9th/0515757p.pdf

Garcia v. Gonzales, ___ F.3d ___, 2006 WL 2061819 (4th Cir. Jul. 26, 2006) (New York conviction of second-degree assault, in violation of N.Y. Penal Law 120.05 ["recklessly causes serious physical injury to another person by means of a deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument"], does not constitute an aggravated felony "crime of violence" under 18 U.S.C. 16(a), since its definition does not contain an element that there be the intentional employment of physical force against a person or thing).

Garcia v. Gonzales, ___ F.3d ___, 2006 WL 2061819 (4th Cir. Jul. 26, 2006) (BIA interpretation of the "substantial risk" requirement in 18 U.S.C. 16(b), looking to whether "by its nature, the offense involves that in the course of committing it the offender will intrinsically employ power, violence, or pressure against a person or thing" is foreclosed by Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S.

Garcia v. Gonzales, ___ F.3d ___, 2006 WL 2061819 (4th Cir. Jul. 26, 2006) (New York conviction of second-degree assault, in violation of N.Y. Penal Law 120.05 ["recklessly causes serious physical injury to another person by means of a deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument"], does not constitute a "crime of violence" under 18 U.S.C. 16(b), and thus is not an aggravated felony under INA 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F), since recklessness, like negligence, is not enough to support a determination that a crime is a "crime of violence"), following Bejarano-Urrutia v.

A Massachusetts "continued without a finding" disposition, where there is no admission to sufficient facts, is not a conviction because the disposition does not satisfy the first prong of the conviction definition under INA 101(a)(48), which requires a plea of guilty, nolo or an admission to sufficient facts. In Matter of Grullon, 20 I. & N. Dec. 12 (BIA 1989), the Board held that a noncitizen placed in Florida's pre-trial intervention program did not have a conviction because there was no plea of any kind.

"That is, immigration enforcement obligations do not consist only of initiating and conducting prompt proceedings that lead to removals at any cost. Rather, as has been said, the government wins when justice is done. In that regard, the handbook for trial attorneys states that '[t]he respondent should be aided in obtaining any procedural rights or benefits required by the statute, regulation and controlling
court decision, of the requirements of fairness.'" Handbook for Trial Attorneys 1.3 (1964). See generally Freeport-McMoRan Oil & Gas Co. v. FERC, 962 F.2d 45, 48 (D.C. Cir.

Almaghzar v. Gonzales, 450 F.3d 415 (9th Cir. Jun. 8, 2006) (court lacks jurisdiction to review claim that IJ erred in concluding that alien's felony convictions constituted particularly serious crimes).

Rodriguez v. Gonzales, ___ F.3d ___, 2006 WL 1545452 (2d Cir. Jun. 7, 2006) (per curiam) (federal conviction under 18 U.S.C. 1542 for submitting false information in a passport application categorically qualifies as a crime involving moral turpitude), following Matter of B-, 7 I. & N. Dec. 342 (BIA 1956).